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Foreword 
The European Union is currently engaged in one of its biggest political 
projects ever: Another round of enlargement to include twelve more mem-
ber countries, ten of which will be from Central and Eastern Europe. Ne-
gotiations on the conditions for accession of future new member countries 
have always been complex and difficult, but the complexity of the current 
accession negotiations exceeds any past experience. Since the first round 
of enlargement in the 1970s, agriculture has been one of the most difficult 
items on the agenda for accession talks, and the ongoing negotiations with 
accession candidates from Central and Eastern Europe are no exception to 
this rule. The agricultural chapter of the negotiations has been taken up as 
one of the last items on the agenda, and at the time of writing it is obvious 
that negotiators are facing serious difficulties with this chapter. 
The fundamental reason behind these difficulties is the fact that in agricul-
ture there is a particularly pronounced intensity of policy intervention, in 
both the European Union and the accession countries. As a result, inte-
gration of new member countries does not simply imply the opening up of 
markets in agriculture and food, but the alignment of policies in the new-
comer countries with those of the European Union. This requires technical 
adjustments of an often intricate nature, but, more importantly, also has 
significant economic implications for both the existing Union and the ac-
cession countries. After all, agricultural policies represent the largest single 
bloc in EU budget expenditure, and result in significant transfers among 
member countries. 
Against this background, the study done by Wolfgang Munch assesses the 
major economic implications of integrating the accession countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe into the framework of the European Union's 
Common Agricultural Policy, under alternative policy scenarios. It there-
fore throws a highly welcome light on this most controversial component of 
the accession negotiations. Among other issues, the study also addresses the 
political mega-issue in the agricultural chapter, i.e. the extension of direct 
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payments under the Common Agricultural Policy to the future new member 
countries. Based on a well-designed analytical tool, Wolfgang Miinch pro-
vides quantitative information on what alternative future policies may do to 
agricultural markets and economic welfare in an enlarged Union. His study 
is therefore another good example of the useful contributions agricultural 
economists can make to creating a solid base for decisive political decisions. 
6 
Stefan Tangermann 
Paris, June 2002 
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Introduction 
The simulations in this study were defined and carried out during the sum-
mer of 1999, before the Candidate Countries and the EU-15 defined their 
initial positions on the agricultural chapter. The policy assumptions on di-
rect payments, cattle premiums, and quota quantities are broadly defined as 
in the Common Positions of the EU-15. Certainly, the position of the EU-
15 would yield lower budgetary costs than those estimated in the present 
work. However, despite all the recent developments in negotiations, the 
identified general trends on agricultural markets and budget expenditure 
have remained valid. 
Politically, the most sensitive outcome of the study is the estimate of bud-
getary expenditure. The reader should note that the largest part of the 
budgetary expenditure will be determined by the political agreements on 
direct payments and quotas, which surely will not be settled until the final 
hour of accession negotiations. Therefore, the study also reviews the sensi-
tivity of budgetary expenditure concerning these important parameters. 
In the early 1990s, membership in the European Union (EU) became a def-
inite prospect for Central and Eastern European countries (CECs). Since 
then, the issues of EU membership and transition of the CECs to Western 
market economies have been a focal point for the creativity and imagina-
tion of the agricultural economic profession. This has led not only to a 
better understanding of the underlying economics, but also to development 
of powerful tools to assess the effects of CEC-EU accession on agriculture 
in general and agricultural markets in particular. 
One of the major empirical and methodological questions of CEC-EU acces-
sion is the assessment of effects on agricultural markets. In methodological 
terms, such an analysis should take into account the characteristics of transi-
tion economies as well as the relative complexity of EU agricultural policies. 
In empirical terms, a number of markets, which are most affected by the 
CAP, should be included in such an analysis. Thus, this very relevant topic 
could be examined in detail. 
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A large number of analyses have already been undertaken, which are referred 
to in detail in Chapter 1. For the present study, Tangermann and Josling 
(1994) laid the foundation in numerous respects. Their study marked a 
turning point in thinking; it demonstrated that the integration of the CECs 
into the EU is not similar to any previous EU enlargements thus far. They 
clearly demonstrated the complexity and enormity of the task and drew 
conclusions that are still valid. They also presented for the first time the 
application of a new modeling tool, which resulted from a cooperation with 
the USDA/ERS. This tool, the European Simulation Model (ESIM) was 
further developed for use in this analysis. Without those initial research 
projects this study would not have been possible. My special thanks, there-
fore, go to Stefan Tangermann for his continuous support and critical survey 
of the results. 
The Joint Research Project Agricultural Implications of CEEC Accession 
to the EU, financed by the European Commission from 1996 to 1999, in 
which researchers from Bonn University, Wye College, Catholic University 
of Leuven, and University of Gottingen collaborated, provided significant 
resources for the present research. The financial contributions from the 
European Commission and the Polish, German, British, and Hungarian 
Ministries of Agriculture were highly appreciated. 
A network of ESIM users came together to contribute to the modeling work 
by supplying data, giving critical comments, and other highly useful contri-
butions to the present work. This network of researchers and civil servants 
contributed to developing and, finally, delivering ESIM to ten CECs and 
the EU-15. Contributors were Wladislaw Piskorz, Jerzy Plewa, Andrezij 
Kwiesinki, Waldemar Guba, Jorge Nunez-Ferrer, Alan Buckwell, Dirk Ah-
ner, Jens Schaps, Sandor Meszaros, Gyula Varga, Marian Boszik, Geeza 
Blaas, Maya Andreeva, Tomas Doucha, Tomas Ratinger, Susan Leetma, 
David Kelch, and Pete Liapis. Thanks to the USDA/ERS for making pos-
sible the first and only meeting of the network in Jablonna/Poland in 1998. 
The cooperation and help received through this network are much appreci-
ated. 
I must also thank the staff of the Institute of Agricultural Economics/ 
University of Gottingen for the unique environment, which helped accom-
plish the research. Here my thanks go to Martin Banse, Henning Twesten, 
Ferdinand Nolle, Andrea Walzholz, and Petra Geile. Not least I have to 
thank Ann and Jason Hartell for their highly competent work on editing 
the present study. However, all remaining errors are my responsibility. 
18 
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A number of publications resulted from this research project in the form 
of working papers, articles, chapters in books, and contributions to confer-
ences. The publications dealt not only with the modeling work, but also 
aspects of measuring competitiveness. The present study combines the var-
ious strands of my research work. 
The work is organized as follows. A chapter describing the developments of 
agricultural policies and agricultural prices in the CECs and the EU serves 
as an extended introduction as well as an explanation of the developments 
and characteristics in the CECs. It includes a review of literature. The next 
chapter describes the ESIM and reviews the literature on modeling. The 
assessment of CEC-EU integration effects for agricultural markets follows 
in three chapters. Chapter 3 assesses results from accession simulation for 
ten CECs in a conventional partial equilibrium analysis, addressing mar-
ket, budget, and welfare effects. The next chapter addresses the specifics 
of transition economies in macroeconomic developments by linking the par-
tial equilibrium model to four Computable General Equilibrium Models for 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Chapter 5 deals with 
two case studies and sheds some light on the effects of downstream sector 
adjustment on agricultural production for Slovenia and on increased tech-
nical progress of Hungary's crop production. The study concludes with a 
summary and some interpretations. 
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1 Economic Aspects of CEC-EU Integration 
The collapse of communist rule has triggered an intense process of economic 
restructuring in the CECs. The transition process in Central Europe can be 
separated into two phases: (i) economic liberalization and (ii) stabilization 
and institutional reform. The first phase was generally complete by 1993 
when the CECs returned to a period of strong economic growth after an 
initial phase of contraction. The second phase of transition policies, though, 
is an ongoing process. 
During the early phase of transition from central-planned to market econ-
omies, the Europe Agreements began the gradual process of EU integration. 
The preamble of the so-called Association Agreements between the EU and 
ten CECs stated the commitment of the EU to help the associated countries 
eventually gain EU membership. The second legal milestone in the process 
of preparing for EU membership was the start of accession negotiations in 
1998 with Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. The 
Helsinki summit opened the door for negotiations with Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, and Slovak Republic, the second wave, or Helsinki 
Group countries, as they are sometimes called. A fast track procedure has 
been implemented for the second wave countries, which will allow individual 
countries to catch up to the first wave countries if the negotiation of the 31 
chapters proceed quickly. 
The EU itself has followed the path of internal integration since the late 
1950s. The economic cornerstone of the EU is the customs union, which 
was established in 1968 and included agricultural products. A customs 
union allows for free movement of goods between member countries and ap-
plies common external border measures for trade with third countries. The 
next step of internal integration was the establishment of the Single Market 
in 1993. The properties of the Single Market were previously outlined in 
Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome: 
The elimination, as between member states, of customs duties 
and quantitative restrictions on import and export of goods, 
21 
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and all other measures having equivalent effects; the abolition, 
as between member states, of obstacles to freedom of movements 
for persons, services and capital. 
The Single Market inherits the freedom to move goods from the customs 
union and adds the freedom of workers to move between countries, the free-
dom to exercise a trade or profession, and the freedom to move payments 
and capital. Therefore, the Single Market is a customs union plus free 
movement of production factors. Moreover, mutually recognized national 
production standards and established common production standards have 
increased transparency and removed barriers to trade. The dynamic effects 
of the Single Market are summarized in the literature as having three major 
effects: reducing monopoly power, reducing levels of x-inefficiency (over-
staffing, excessive inventories, and other slack management practices), and 
finally, reaping economies of scale and learning effects (McDonald, 1999). 
Thus far the final step of internal integration is the European Monetary 
Union (EMU), which led to the introduction of a common currency in 1999. 
The EU is a highly integrated political and economic framework in which 
the CECs have sought to be included. One of the preconditions of EU mem-
bership is the complete implementation of the Acquis Communautaire, the 
Common Legislation, into national law. While this process assures insti-
tutional compatibility of new member countries with the EU, the lengthy 
process of accession negotiations determine the political terms of integra-
tion. In particular, the negotiations determine specific and temporary ex-
emptions from the Acquis Communautaire. The agricultural chapter is one 
of the most sensitive subjects of the negotiations. 
Agricultural policies are a traditional focal point for the EU both in re-
spect to integration as well as of budgetary costs. The CAP is a highly so-
phisticated set of policies that delivers considerable protection for domestic 
producers with the aim of raising agricultural income via high agricultural 
prices and, since 1992, by direct payments. The EU is one of the largest 
agricultural trading nations in the world and the CAP has been a con-
tinuous subject of international concern especially among other important 
agricultural exporting nations. This, coupled with tighter budgets, has led 
to several reforms, the latest in 1999 which is to define the CAP until 2006. 
Agriculture has always been a sensitive sector when countries have sought 
integration with the EU. This is also the case in CEC-EU integration. 
In the Europe Agreements, which aim at a free trade zone between the 
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EU and CECs, agriculture and food products are mostly excluded from 
bilateral trade liberalization. The concessions granted for market access are 
tightly constrained by preferential quotas (see Overberg, 1996; Buckwell 
and Tangermann, 1997). The special importance of agriculture in CEC 
economies, the need for CECs to pursue economic reforms, the extraordinary 
complexity of the CAP, and the production potential of CEC agriculture 
add up to an enormous entanglement, which the accession negotiations on 
agriculture must resolve for the EU as well as for the CECs. 
The following sections describe some of the characteristics of CEC agricul-
ture, the development of agricultural policies in the CECs, their characteris-
tics vis-a-vis the CAP, and some key developments on agricultural markets 
relevant for the later analysis. 
1.1 Agriculture in the CECs and the EU-15 
A simple comparison of basic data for the CECs and the EU-15 shows the 
scope of the enlargement process. Based on current data (mostly 1999), the 
EU-25 (EU-15 plus first and second wave countries) would have 28 percent 
more population, 32 percent more agricultural area, and GDP in Purchasing 
Power Standards would be 10.7 percent higher than the current EU-15 (see 
Table 1.1). The income levels in the CECs measured as GDP in purchasing 
power standards per capita are roughly 40 percent of the average level in the 
EU-15. The highest income levels in the CECs were observed in Slovenia, 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, and Estonia ranging 
from 70 to 39 percent of the average EU level. Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, 
and Lithuania have the lowest income levels, between 24 and 30 percent of 
the EU-15 income level. 
Reflecting this low income level, CEC households devote a higher share of 
income to food purchases than those in the EU-15. The food expenditure 
share in the CECs is consistently above 20 percent. Bulgarians and Roma-
nians pay the highest share of their income for food at 49 and 55 percent. 
Compared to this, Czech citizens use only 23 percent of their income for 
food, the closest to the EU level. 
Currently, agriculture represents 1.6 percent of GDP in the EU-15. Food 
industries contribute an additional 1.8 percent. In the CECs, agriculture 
plays a far more significant role. On average, agriculture contributes 7 
percent and the food industries 3.1 percent to the GDP. Again however, 
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Table 1.1: Importance of the Agri-Food Sector in the CECs. 
Population GDP in Purchasing Food 
Power Standards Expenditure 
Mill. Bill. PPS PPS/Capita % of Total 
Bulgaria 8.2 39.0 4749 49.6 
Czech Rep. 10.3 128.5 12498 23.3 
Estonia 1.4 11.1 7676 34.2 
Hungary 10.1 107.8 10705 38.0 
Latvia 2.4 14.1 5786 42.1 
Lithuania 3.7 22.8 6169 41.4 
Poland 38.7 299.1 7737 33.7 
Romania 22.5 127.6 5682 55.3 
Slovak Rep. 5.4 53.0 9825 28.4 
Slovenia 2.0 29.7 14964 22.0 
CEC-10 104.7 832.7 7951 36.3 
EU-15 369.7 7770.2 20097 17.4 
Ratio of CEC-10 28.3 10.7 39.5 
to EU-15 
Agricultural GDP Share 
Area {1999) 
{'000 ha) Agriculture Food Industries 
5696 21.1 
4285 3.7 2.6 
1043 5.7 4.7 
6186 5.5 3.5 
2488 4.0 3.0 
3496 8.8 5.8 
18222 3.9 3.5 
14784 15.5 2.3 
2444 4.5 2.6 
491 3.6 3.0 
43308 7.0 3.1* 












Table 1.1: Continued. 
Employment Share 
{1999) 
Agriculture Food Industries 
Bulgaria 26.2 6.0 
Czech Rep. 5.5 1.8 
Estonia 9.5 4.0 
Hungary 7.5 4.0 
Latvia 18.8 7.4 
Lithuania 21.0 8.9 
Poland 19.1 6.0 
Romania 40.0 5.8 
Slovak Rep. 8.2 4.2 
Slovenia 11.4 4.6 
CEC-10 21.3 5.3 
EU-15 5.0 1.6 
* Without Bulgaria. 
tEU-15: only extra trade. 
Source: Eurostat {2000a); National Statistics. 
Agricultural Trade in Total Trade Agri-Food Trade Balance 
{1997)t {Mill. EUR){1997)t 
% of Exports % of Imports 1989 1993 1997 
15 10 1242.6 267.8 187.9 
6 8 -561.9 -503.4 -568.9 
17 18 43.6 -217.0 
15 6 1329.7 906.5 1560.3 
15 15 77.3 -119.1 
17 12 193.5 -6.2 
13 10 382.6 -465.9 -414.5 
7 7 -964.2 -488.1 -88.2 
5 8 -99.9 -183.6 -346.6 
4 9 -72.6 -233.3 -398.7 
1256.2 -385.6 -411.0 
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significant country differences can be observed. Bulgaria and Romania have 
the highest portions of GDP from agriculture and the agri-food industries 
with 26.8 and 21.3 percent, followed by Lithuania with 14.6 percent. At the 
lower end of this scale are the Czech and Slovak Republics, Slovenia, and 
Latvia with contributions between 6.3 and 7.1 percent. 
In terms of employment in agriculture and the agri-food industries, the 
picture is similar. According to labor force survey data, agriculture in the 
EU employs 5 percent of the work force plus 1.6 percent working in the food 
industries. Compared to this, the CECs employ 21.3 percent in agriculture 
and 5.3 percent in food industries. Romania with a 40 percent share of 
agriculture in employment, Bulgaria with 26.6 percent, and Poland with 
19.1 percent dominate this average number. Lithuania and Latvia also 
add to this picture with employment in agriculture at 21 and 18.8 percent. 
Again at the lower end of the scale are the Czech and Slovak Republics, and 
Estonia. 
In the CECs, agriculture also contributes more than in the EU-15 to ex-
ports and imports, except for Slovenia, the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
and, surprisingly, Romania. The latter, however, only recently introduced 
a policy of less restrictive import and export licensing (see OECD, 2000c). 
In 1989 the CEC-10 were net exporters of agri-food products. The net ex-
porting nations were Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland. Beginning in the early 
1990s, transition reforms changed the trade surplus in agriculture to an in-
creasing deficit. Poland became a net importer and Bulgaria had its trade 
surplus reduced to 267 Mill. EUR from 1.2 Bill. EUR in 1989. The down-
turn of agriculture led to a general increase of imports in the CECs. This 
downturn is illustrated in Figure 1. 1. Agricultural output decreased until 
around 1994, slightly stabilizing since, except in the Czech Republic and 
Estonia. On the other hand, Slovenia follows a different pattern reflecting 
consistently high protection throughout the period (see Section 5.1.1). 
In 1997 the trade deficit of the CEC-10 slightly increased from 385 Mill. 
EUR to 411 Mill. EUR. However, net imports where reduced; in Hungary 
by increasing net exports and in Romania by agricultural policies. The only 
continuously net exporting countries over the last decade were Hungary and 
Bulgaria. 
Agriculture and the food industry in the CECs are an important part of 
the economy in terms of contribution to GDP, employment, and foreign 
trade. In these respects agriculture plays a more important role than in 
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Figure 1.1: Development of Agricultural Output in CECs. 
Source: OECD (2000b). 
the EU-15. Especially the level of employment in agriculture is remarkable, 
which might serve as a social buffer in countries where small-scale oper-
ations prevail in the agricultural sector, e.g. Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, 
and Lithuania. However, this role of agriculture has increasingly dimin-
ished, especially in countries with sufficient economic growth. In Poland, 
for example, agricultural employment declined from 24.5 percent of overall 
employment in 1995 to 19.1 percent in 1999 (see Eurostat, 2000b). 
1.2 Development of Agricultural Policies in the 
CECs and the EU-15 
After the initial liberalization of price and trade policies in the early 1990s, 
government interventions in agricultural and food markets have gradually 
been re-introduced in CECs. Initially, policy interventions were rather ad 
hoc, trying to address the urgent demands of both consumers and pro-
ducers for protection against short-term negative impacts of liberalization. 
While these first policies were meant to curtail market failures, since 1992 
governments have begun to introduce more consistent and more protective 
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agricultural policies. Since then the CAP has been the model for policy 
instrumentation. A main feature of agricultural legislation is how it explic-
itly includes a commitment to provide continuing long-term support to and 
intervention in the agricultural sector. The initial market intervention in-
struments, such as guaranteed minimum prices and intervention purchases, 
changed from providing a safety net to increasing agricultural prices (Bartell 
and Swinnen, 1997). However, budget constraints have prevented export-
and intervention-related policies of becoming the dominant instruments of 
transfer to agri-food producers and most CECs have become substantial net 
importers of agricultural products (see Table 1.1). Unlike the pre-1992 CAP, 
under which the majority of transfers to producers related to expensive ex-
port and intervention policies, the majority of CECs increased support by 
gradually increasing import measures. In this way non-tariff barriers were 
reintroduced including restrictive import licensing (see Table 1.2). 
Hungary, the only consistent net exporter, stepped up export support. How-
ever, budget and WTO restrictions prevented the extensive use of these 
measures (OECD, 1994a). Therefore, Hungarian agricultural protection re-
mains low, while protection in the other countries increased (see Figure 
1.2). 
w 
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Figure 1.2: Development of Producer Subsidy Estimate in the CECs and the 
EU. Source: OECD (2000a); OECD (2000b). 
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Table 1.2: Patterns of Trade and Price Policy Among CECs, 1989-96. 
Instrument Country Commodity Date 
Import Tariffs All All 1990 
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) 
Removal or substantial Poland Most 1990 
reduction of import and Hungary Most 1991 
export NTBs Bulgaria Most 1991 
Romania Most 1991 
Czech Rep. Most 1991 
Slovak Rep. Most 1991 
Reintroduction of Hungary Grains and sugar 1992 
import NTBs Poland Most including processed food, fruit juice, 1992 
dairy products 
Bulgaria Most agri-food products and some inputs 1992 
Czech Rep. Temperate zone agricultural products 1992 
Slovak Rep. 1992 
Reintroduction of Hungary Milling wheat, meat, sugar 1992 
export NTBs Poland Grains, oilseeds, poultry, bovine animals 1992 
Bulgaria Grains, flour, seeds, livestock, sunflower 1992 
oil 
Romania Grains, flour, sugar, milk, animals 1992 
Czech Rep. Important food commodities 1993 
Appeara nee of Poland Meat, dairy, cereals, eggs, etc. 1994 
variable import levies Czech Rep. Oilseeds, sugar, wine, live animals, beef, 1992 
poultry, butter, starch 
Slovak Rep. 1992 
Credit Subsidies All Current inputs, capital investment, pro- 1989 
cessing, and storage 
Minimum and guaranteed Various commodities often on an 1990-
prices via purchases ad-hoc basis 1996 
market price support Bulgaria Wheat, tobacco 
Czech Rep. Wheat 
Hungary Milk, wheat, beef, pork 
Poland Wheat, rye, milk and dairy products, pork, 
sugar 
Romania Wheat, milk 
Slovak Rep. Cereals, milk, beef 
Export Subsidies All Various commodities often on an ad-hoc 1989-
basis 1996 
Production Quota Poland Sugar 1994• 
Slovak Rep. Milk 1994 
Hungary Milk 1996 
Source: Hartell and Swinnen (1997), pp. 20-21. 
• Regulation announced; put into effect 1997. 
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Figure 1.2 summarizes the development of agricultural policies in the CECs. 
With liberalization, protection as measured by the Producer Subsidy Esti-
mate (PSE) dropped from levels at or close to those of the EU. Protection 
became negative in Poland and the Baltics, while in the other countries 
surveyed by the OECD it significantly declined but remained positive. The 
turning point of this development is between 1992 and 1995. High world 
market prices in 1996 and 1997 led to a decline of protection which increased 
again as world market prices declined. In 1998 and 1999, PSEs in the CECs 
remained 25 to 30 percentage points below those in the EU. 
The PSE comprises all kinds of measurements of support policies, among 
them market price support (MPS), direct payments, input subsidies, and 
general services. MPS is comprised of all measures related to agricultural 
price and trade policies. In the EU the importance of MPS has declined 
with the introduction of direct payments in 1992; the share of MPS in total 
support decreases from 80 percent of total support in 1992 to 66 percent in 
1999 (OECD, 2000b). In the CECs the share of MPS varies considerably 
from country to country. 
Market and trade policies are especially important measures in the net im-
porting countries. For example, in 1998 and 1999, 86 percent of Poland's 
transfers to agriculture were market price supports, in Romania this figure 
is even higher at 88 percent. For net exporter Hungary, the share of MPS 
in total support is considerably lower: 35 percent in 1998 and 51 percent 
in 1999. The year 1999 marked a sharp increase of support for Hungar-
ian agriculture, mainly due to the increase of market prices support (see 
Figure 1.3). 
Most of the increases in PSE levels starting in 1996 have in fact been com-
prised of market price supports, as direct payments, the other important 
CAP instrument for transfers to producers, have been only reluctantly in-
troduced in the CECs (e.g. the Czech and Slovak Republics, Slovenia). In 
terms of government budgets, market price support through import mea-
sures is the preferable choice as the costs of these policies are invisible in 
annual government budgets. Net importing countries, therefore, were able 
to increase support in their pre-accession policies more easily than net ex-
porting ones. 
When comparing the CEC policies with the CAP, many instruments are 
similar but have a different level of intensity. Most countries had already 
introduced market intervention mechanisms like purchases, storage, and in-
tervention prices, though usually not at the intensity and not on all markets 
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Figure 1.3: Share of Market Price Support in Total PSE in the CECs and the 
EU. Source: OECD (2000a); OECD {2000b). 
as in the CAP. That some governments even introduced some kinds of sup-
ply quotas schemes demonstrates the far-reaching influence of the CAP on 
policy design in the CECs. In technical terms, the most successful examples 
are the sugar quota in Poland and the milk quota in the Slovak Republic, 
although their strictness in restricting actual supply is far lower than similar 
quotas in the CAP and production frequently exceeds the predefined lev-
els. Recently some CECs also began to introduce direct payments, though 
mostly in the form of payments for disadvantaged regions ( e.g. Czech and 
Slovak Republics and Slovenia). 
1.3 Development of Agricultural Prices in the CECs 
and the EU-15 
One of the questions determining the impact of CEC-EU accession effects on 
agricultural markets are the gaps between EU-15 and CEC producer prices. 
The size of the gap gives some idea about movements of CEC producer 
prices when CECs become EU members. The following section discusses 
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the development of price gaps between EU and CEC producer prices and 
world reference prices in the last decade for key markets. The graphs include 
selected countries and commodities; more complete data is presented in 
Appendix A (see Table A.l). 
For common wheat the price gap between the EU and the CECs narrowed 
considerably in the observed period. Starting from producer prices, which 
were about 60 percent lower in 1990, CEC prices considerably narrowed the 
gap and moved with increasing world market prices up to levels close to or 
higher than those in the EU in 1995. Decreasing world market prices in 
the following years widened the gap again. In Slovenia, however, producer 
prices were higher than those of the EU between 1993 and 1998 and dropped 
to EU levels in 1999. Slovenia then introduced direct payments for wheat. 
In recent years, Polish prices were closest to those of the EU. Hungary and 
the Slovak Republic had the lowest producer prices compared to the EU, 
usually below EU world market reference prices. 
A second interesting development took place at the beginning of 2000, when 
the devaluation of the EUR against CEC currencies narrowed the gap con-
siderably. In that period, Polish producer prices became roughly 20 percent 
higher than those of the EU. 
Roughly the same patterns of development can be observed for other com-
modities. Especially where EU prices are less affected by world market 
prices, rye, sugar, and milk for example, a large gap can be observed. For 
sugar the price gap was between 30 percent (Poland) and 80 percent (Slo-
vak Republic). Slovene sugar prices dropped from levels slightly above EU 
prices in 1991 to roughly 28 percent below in 1993 and then returned to old 
levels. 
For milk a slightly different pattern can be observed. The gap between EU 
and world reference prices, though still at 60 percent, slightly decreased over 
the period. Following these developments, CEC prices caught up such that 
the CEC-EU price gap diminished. 
Generally the price gaps between EU and CEC producer prices decrease 
even for commodities highly protected under the CAP like sugar and milk. 
A second general pattern shows that the more advanced CECs already nar-
rowed the gap considerably more than the others (see Table A.l). 
Despite the difference in level, however, a common pattern of price devel-
opments can be derived for wheat from Figure 1.4, but in a similar way 
also for other products. The development of producer prices followed that 
32 
Wolfgang Münch - 978-3-631-75691-1




20 -+--czech Rep. 
---Estonia 
? o +------'-------l---=-=..,_.;;a_...,.i+-_-l --Hungaiy 
--Poland 
I -~~ 
;,e -20 --Slovenia 
--Eu 
-40 • • Wo~d 
-60 
~o.._ _____________________ ___, 
Figure 1.4: Common Wheat: Price Gap between EU and CEC Producer 
Prices and World Reference Prices (EU = 0). Source: National 
Statistics; OECD (2000a); Eurostat (2000a); ZMP. 
of the world markets, while the EU producer price is relatively less affected 
by world market price developments. 
With the implementation of CAP instruments, the pattern of producer price 
developments might considerably change when referring to past trends in 
the EU_ Particularly CAP intervention price systems would be expected to 
diminish the importance of world market price developments for domestic 
producer prices in the CECs, especially for the highly protected commodities 
like coarse grains, sugar, and milk. 
A comparison of Figures 1.4-1.6 reveals that on accession, relative prices for 
agricultural commodities will change. For example, wheat prices in Poland 
might fall while sugar and milk prices increase. This will affect production 
as well as consumption. 
When comparing producer prices, an important part of the agricultural 
markets is left out of consideration. Before agricultural commodities be-
come tradable, wholesalers or first stage processors have to handle them. 
According to 1997 data, the wholesale and processing margins in the EU-15 
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Figure 1.5: Sugar: Price Gap between EU and CEC Producer Prices and 
World Reference Prices (EU = 0). Source: National Statistics; 
OECD {2000a); Eurostat {2000a); ZMP. 
and the CECs differ widely. 1 For cereals, the margin ranges from 20 per-
cent in Slovenia to 9.5 percent in Poland. Comparing wholesale and first 
stage processing prices in the CECs and the EU for 1999, prices alter the 
pattern of price gaps for wheat. The price gap between wholesale prices is 
lower than that of producer prices in the majority of countries; in the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia wholesale prices for wheat are higher than those in 
the EU (see Figure 1.7). 
The CAP price and trade policy instruments aim at the wholesale and first 
stage processing level ( e.g. intervention is connected to carcasses not cattle). 
The efficiency of this sector determines how much of the protection actually 
is transmitted to agriculture. The theory of the Single Market suggests that 
a long term effect of integration would be the disappearance of some of the 
inefficiencies in the downstream sector in the CECs, basically as a result of 
increased competition. However, that process may take considerable time 
to materialize. 
1The wholesale and processing margins describe the difference between farm-
gate and wholesale/factory price as a percentage of the farmgate price. 
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Figure 1.6: Milk: Price Gap between EU and CEC Producer Prices and 
World Reference Prices (EU = 0). Source: National Statistics; 
OECD (2000b); Eurostat (2000a}; ZMP. Note: The world market 
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Figure 1.7: The CEC-EU Price Gap for Producer and Wholesale Prices for 
Common Wheat, 1999 (EU-15 = 0). Source: National Statistics; 
OECD (2000b}; Eurostat (2000a}; ZMP. 
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Along with lagging adjustment of the downstream sector, upon accession 
CEC producer prices may develop differently than a pure comparison of 
EU and CEC producer prices would suggest. Only with total adjustment of 
downstream sector efficiency, would producer prices in the CECs come close 
to those in EU-15. If greater differences in efficiency continue to prevail, 
producer prices in the enlarged EU would not converge. This has implica-
tions for agricultural production, as supply incentives of the CAP would be 
different among countries. 
1.4 Exchange Rates and Protection 
For cross-country economic analyses, the choice of the appropriate exchange 
rate is crucial for calculating economic effects. In theory one should always 
use the equilibrium exchange rate (EER). The EER, in very general terms, 
is what ensures the simultaneous attainment of internal and external (gen-
eral) equilibrium. Internal equilibrium means that markets for non-tradable 
goods clear in the current period and are expected to do so in the future. 
External equilibrium is attained when current account balances are compat-
ible with sustainable capital flows (Williamson, 1994). Generally, changes of 
the EER affect relative prices of tradable versus non-tradable commodities 
and inputs in a country. 
Under central planning, exchange rates in CECs were tightly controlled and 
usually maintained at highly overvalued rates. Upon achieving ( often re-
stricted) internal convertibility, nearly all currencies underwent a massive 
real devaluation. Afterwards, CEC currencies embarked on a path of real ap-
preciation, sometimes by impressive amounts. This pattern of real exchange 
rates in CECs is persistent regardless of the measure for real exchange rates 
(see Halpern and Wyplosz, 1996; Bojnec, Munch, and Swinnen, 1998). 
The choice of exchange rate used for economic analyses is especially impor-
tant for CECs as real exchange rates are much more volatile than in stabi-
lized market economies such as the EU (see Bojnec, Munch, and Swinnen, 
1998). Tangermann (1994) shows that the assumption on exchange rates 
is the most important factor determining the results of pre-1993 OECD 
and USDA analyses of CEC agricultural protection rates. Bojnec, Munch, 
and Swinnen (1998) showed the potentially large effects of exchange rate 
assumptions on projected CEC-EU accession effects as well as on estimated 
protection levels. 
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Table 1.3: Development of Real Exchange Rates in the CEC-10 Relative to 
the EU (NC/EUR), 1995=100. 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000* 
Bulgaria 110 115 100 119 89 80 78 
Czech Rep. 111 104 100 94 92 85 86 76 
Estonia 185 129 100 85 80 74 72 71 
Hungary 94 95 100 98 92 93 90 83 
Latvia 184 116 100 88 78 76 72 65 
Lithuania 219 122 100 80 67 64 61 57 
Poland 114 103 100 92 89 85 87 72 
Romania 99 95 100 109 88 69 81 71 
Slovak Rep. 109 104 100 97 92 90 95 81 
Slovenia 111 109 100 103 103 99 99 98 
EU 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Eurostat (2000a). 
* May 2000. 
Table 1.3 summarizes the developments of real exchange rates in the CECs 
between 1993 and 2000. The nominal exchange rates have been deflated 
by the respective GDP price index. A common pattern is the strong real 
appreciation of the CEC currencies against the EUR. Since 1995, most 
CEC currencies appreciated 39 percent (Lithuania) to 5 percent (Slovak 
Republic); the real value of Slovenia's currency closely followed the EUR. 
Notably, in the year 2000 the EUR strongly depreciated followed (by 23 per-
cent) against the USD. This depreciation also affected the CEC currencies, 
increasing their real value against the EUR from 14 percent in the Slovak 
Republic to 1 percent in Estonia. 
The development of exchange rates affects protection in several ways. World 
market prices transmit to domestic prices constrained by price and trade 
policies. The applied instruments that determine how much the markets are 
sheltered from world markets depend on the applied instruments in a market 
regime. Exchange rates directly enter the price transmission mechanisms 
when world market prices are converted into national currencies. Indirectly 
they come into effect through policy measures defined in national currencies 
( administrative prices and specific tariffs). 
In a tariff-based system, domestic prices move with world market prices, 
with the ad valorem tariff maintaining the difference. Under these instru-
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ments exchange rate movements directly shift domestic prices without af-
fecting the relative difference to world market prices. Therefore, exchange 
rates do not influence the degree of protection in a tariff-based system. 
In intervention systems, the converted world market price also enters into 
the equation. This directly affects the price gap between administrative 
and world market prices, as well as the level of import protection. Thus, 
appreciating currencies widen the price gap and increase import protection, 
while a depreciating currency lowers protection levels. 
In the CAP administrative price, specific tariffs and direct payments are 
defined in EUR. These instruments have an important role in agricultural 
policies. CEC agricultural policies are increasingly modeled after the CAP. 
With the appearance of more administrative prices and other measures de-
fined in domestic monetary terms, the resulting level of agricultural protec-
tion is more affected by exchange rate developments than in the early phase 
of transition. With real appreciating currencies, agricultural policies in the 
CECs tend to become more protective. 
Changing real values of the CEC currencies against the EUR also have con-
sequences for the expected effects of CEC-EU accession. A real appreciation 
of CEC currencies against the EUR decreases the level of protection that 
CAP instruments will generate after accession, while depreciation increases 
it. Real exchange rate movements have simultaneous consequences for the 
internal and external competitiveness of agriculture. However, capital and 
labor costs as well as prices for inputs also influence competitiveness of 
agriculture. Decreasing capital costs and input prices could offset some 
exchange rate effects. For example, with real appreciation, the value of 
CAP measures declines in national currency. At the same time, however, 
imported inputs become cheaper. Depending on the cost shares of produc-
tion, lower input prices partly offset the exchange rate effect. 2 
2If CECs become members of the EMU, the initial value of the CECs' cur-
rencies in EUR determines the degree of initial protection of CAP instruments. 
Then other macroeconomic variables like capital and labor costs would influence 
competitiveness on the Single Market. 
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1.5 Conclusions for the Study 
The analysis of CEC-EU accession effects is an important question in re-
spect to methodological requirements because economic patterns in transi-
tion economies differ from those in settled market economies and because 
CEC markets become subject to the complex CAP once the countries be-
come members of the EU. The political relevance of such an analysis re-
quires a comprehensive scope in terms of empirical results. 
The developments of policies in the CECs suggest that more and more CAP 
instruments like intervention mechanisms and policies have been introduced. 
Protection for agriculture increased considerably often starting from nega-
tive protection at the beginning of transition, though it has generally stayed 
below that of the EU. The development of agricultural prices suggests that 
CEC prices are much more affected by world market price movements than 
those in the EU. 
For the investigation of CEC-EU accession effects on agricultural markets, 
the specific patterns of CAP instruments for price formation have to be con-
sidered. Moreover, other CAP instruments like quotas, and set-asides have 
to be integrated into a quantitative assessment tool. Assessing quantitative 
effects, therefore, requires a tool, one which is able to model the CAP in 
detail and is also able to capture future changes in the CAP. 
The likely price developments, as suggested by the price gaps of recent years, 
show that relative agricultural prices in the new member countries might 
change considerably between close substitutes in production, e.g. between 
cereals or between livestock. To handle this, a commodity model has to 
consider rich cross-commodity relationships. Another important feature for 
transition economies is the development of macroeconomic variables such 
as costs and exchange rates. That is, unlike agriculture in settled market 
economies, the CEC sector must rapidly adjust to changing equilibria. Ac-
cession would bring such changes. With integration into the Single Market, 
effects on downstream efficiency can be expected. 
A quantitative analysis of CEC-EU accession effects on agricultural markets 
must consider these main effects, and requires a tool of considerable scope 
and complexity in terms of commodities, countries, and policies. For this 
purpose the ESIM was chosen and further developed to serve as a partial 
equilibrium model. The partial equilibrium analysis has been accomplished 
by simultaneous analyses with Computable General Equilibrium Models 
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(CGEs) developed by Banse (1997b; 2000). Numerous simulations are de-
signed to show the scope of some of the effects previously discussed. 
1.6 Analysis of CEC-EU Accession Effects on 
Agricultural Markets in the Literature 
A body of literature is developing which deals with quantitative analyses of 
impacts of CEC-EU accession on agricultural markets, government budgets, 
and welfare effects. Of the numerous studies, a few have been selected and 
presented in Table 1.4. The earliest studies using a partial equilibrium 
model were Anderson and Tyers (1993; 1995) and Tangermann and Josling 
(1994). 
Anderson and Tyers used their World Food Model calibrated on 1990 data 
for seven commodities and groups of commodities, assuming accession in 
2000. In the scenarios, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Re-
publics adopt the CAP of 1992. They projected a moderate increase in 
cereal production and a huge increase in dairy production, as no quotas 
constrain the supply of milk. As a result of corresponding increases of net 
exports, government expenditure for agriculture reaches 37.6 bill. ECU or 
47.4 Bill. USD. 
Tangermann and Josling used ESIM for the first time in a three-country 
version based on data from 1989 to 1991. In these scenarios the CECs 
gradually adopt the CAP in a harmonization period up to 2000, modeled 
on the example of Spain and Portugal's accession. The results yield more 
details on commodities compared to Anderson and Tyers. Additionally, 
they simulated a quick return of the CECs to their pre-transition potentials. 
They project a strong increase of coarse grain production, along with milk, 
beef, and pork. As a result, the CECs would become net exporters of all 
major agricultural commodities. Their budget projection of 19.3 Bill. ECU 
includes Bulgaria and Romania and commodity regimes not represented 
in the model. Another important result of the study shows that the CECs 
would not be able to meet their Uruguay Round commitments if they pursue 
a path of aligning their policies with the EU as a pre-accession agricultural 
policy. 
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The work of Tangermann and Josling formed a starting point for numerous 
analyses pursued with ESIM. Among them, the EU-Commission (1995) 
which used a further developed ESIM version as the basis for their strategy 
paper on EU enlargement. The strategy paper marked a turning point in the 
thinking of the European Commission. For the first time it was officially rec-
ognized that the 1992 CAP might produce problems for enlargement. The 
model calculations for four countries, including the first separate modules 
for the Czech and Slovak Republics, are based on 1991-93 data. The sup-
ply response is lower than in Tangermann and Josling, which corresponds 
to lower estimates of budgetary outlays of 12 Bill. ECU. 
Bojnec, Miinch, and Swinnen (1998) applied ESIM in showing the sensitivity 
of accession simulations under different real equilibrium exchange rate as-
sumptions. Their application of ESIM considered seven CECs, which adopt 
Agenda 2000 and the 1992 CAP, and used 1994-96 averaged data. The 
analysis shows the sensitivity of market reactions and corresponding bud-
getary spending towards appreciating real exchange rates. Market reactions 
were considerably lower, since appreciating real exchange rates diminish the 
price gap between the EU and the CECs. As a result, budgetary expendi-
ture decreases from 15 Bill. ECU to 9 Bill. ECU under real appreciating 
exchange rates. This study was the first to explicitly address the impor-
tance of macroeconomic indicators for assessing the effects of agricultural 
accession for the CECs, though it lacked other variables to include other 
macroeconomic forces, which may offset some of the exchange rate effects. 
Frohberg et al. (1998), using the Central European Agricultural Simulations 
Model ( CEASIM), simulated accession effects for seven CECs under two 
different policy scenarios, i.e. Agenda 2000 and the 1992 CAP. The model, 
which is more theoretically advanced and less policy-detailed than ESIM, 
simulates little production change and, therefore, only limited spending for 
market guarantee of 2.4 Bill. ECU and 0.6 Bill. ECU under the unreformed 
and the reformed CAP, respectively. The simulations were based on data 
from 1995. 
A comparison of all these results shows that despite different methodologies, 
the newer the study, the less visible the effects on markets and the amount 
of government expenditure. At the beginning of the 1990s, many researchers 
assumed a quick recovery for CECs. This view was supported by the recog-
nition of the vast production potential of the CECs before the transition and 
the rapid decline of agricultural production under early transition reforms. 
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Table 1.4: Comparison of CEC-EU Accession Studies. 
Author Base Data Commodity Scenarios Main Market and Budgetary 
CECs Included Aggregation Budget Results Results 
Simulation 
Horizon 
Anderson 1990 7 commodities of CECs gradually adopt Production increases 47.7 Bill. USO 
and Tyers POL, HUN, which 4 are the 1992 CAP. No between 12 percent 
(1993;1995) CZR, SLR aggregates URA constraints (cereals) to 69 
2000 included. percent (dairy). 
Corresponding 
expansion of net 
exports. 
Tangerman 1989-91 27 commodities of CECs gradually adopt Strong increase in 19.3 Bill. ECU 
and Josling POL, HUN, which 9 are the 1992 CAP. Return production of coarse (including 
(1994) Czechoslovakia processed to pre-transition grains, milk, beef, estimates for 
1993--04 commodities production potentials. pork. CECs become Romania and 
No URA constraints net exporters of all Bulgaria as 
included. major commodities. well as 
URA implications non-model 
addressed . commodities) 
European 1989-91 27 commodities of CEC gradually adopt Cereal net exports 12 Bill . ECU 
Commission POL, HUN, which 9 are the 1992 CAP. No double, beef exports 
(1995) CZR,SLR processed URA constraints increase, milk surplus 
1995--07 commodities taken into account. increases. Results 


















199H6 27 commodities of 
POL, HUN, which 9 are 
CZR, SLR, EST, processed 
BUL,SLO commodities 
2000-12 
1995 17 commodities 
BUL, CZR, EST, 
HUN, LAT, LIT, 
POL, SLR 
2005 
Source: Adapted from Pohl-Nielson (1999). 







CECs adopt CAP 
market price support 
of 1995/96 and 
assume Agenda 2000 
market price support; 
no direct payments. 
No URA constraints 
taken into account. 
Real exchange rate 
appreciation dampens 





little change in 




15 Bill. ECU. 
Appreciation to 
PPP levels: 9 
Bill. ECU. 
CAP 1995/96: 
2.4 Bill. ECU. 
Agenda 2000: 
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Without necessary institutions and market transparency, CEC domestic 
prices often remained below world market prices despite liberalization of 
policies. Thus, there was a large gap between EU and CEC prices for most 
products. Earlier research made overly optimistic projections for the po-
tential to recover and of the supply reaction. The latter overestimation was 
related to the data used to calibrate the models causing supply reactions to 
be overestimated in the simulations compared to actual agricultural prices, 
which have approached EU levels. 
This reveals one of the weaknesses of all the quantitative analyses of 
CEC-EU accession: None of the models estimate the elasticities of sup-
ply. This stems from estimations developed for other countries, which are 
then adapted for use in the CEC simulations. A sufficiently long time series 
without structural breaks is still not available for carrying out meaningful 
estimates for the CECs. 
In conclusion, the literature displays a changing perception of developments 
on markets in the CECs. Having in mind the large agricultural potential, 
the early analyses assumed that freeing agriculture from the restrictions of 
central planning would soon lead to a recovery and expansion of agriculture 
in the CECs. At that time CEC prices were significantly lower than in 
the EU, often below comparable world market prices such that agriculture 
was expected to react to the foreseen price increases. Examples of these 
optimistic views on agriculture in the CECs are Anderson and Tyers (1993; 
1995) and Tangermann and J osling ( 1994). 
Despite a gradual alignment of important agricultural prices between CECs 
and the EU, the stagnation of agricultural production observed in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s has continued. The analyses became less optimistic 
and the lack of functioning institutions were emphasized. With the gradual 
implementation of the Acquis Communautaire in preparation of accession, 
CEC and EU institutions have increasingly aligned and integration of CEC 
agriculture and food industries with European markets has continued. How-
ever, despite increasing market integration and institutional development, 
agricultural production is not foreseen to expand significantly. 
A newer strain of literature examines the causes of the slow pace of restruc-
turing, especially the structure of production technologies and costs, and 
macroeconomic developments, which affect internal and external compet-
itiveness. Bojnec and Swinnen (1997) and Bojnec, Miinch, and Swinnen 
(1999) show that macroeconomic developments (exchange rates) largely off-
set the increasing protection of agricultural policies in the CECs. Usually 
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such competitive pressures are offset by structural change (in the long run) 
and changes in production technologies (in the short run). However, the 
development of agriculture in the CECs is characterized by slow structural 
change and low investments. 
Despite some differences between the studies, some common conclusions 
can be drawn. The increase of prices induces a faster growing supply and 
a stagnating or slightly declining domestic use. Inevitably the result is 
higher market surpluses than currently observed, most of which have to be 
disposed of by government intervention or prevented in advance by tight 
supply control measures. All studies clearly identify the sensitive products 
under accession: coarse grains, dairy, sugar, and beef. All studies show that 
the potential burden of extending the CAP to new EU members is significant 
and thus call the design of such agricultural policies into question. 
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2 Structure of the European Simulation Model 
Accession of CECs to the EU fundamentally affects the economics of CEC 
agricultural markets. The CAP introduces new instruments to the joining 
members, which change the level of protection as well as the price transmis-
sion from world to domestic markets. Under the European Single Market, 
agricultural markets are more shielded from influences of world markets, 
although indirectly exposed to competition on the Single Market once ap-
plicants are fully integrated into the customs union. All these effects alter 
levels as well as the relationships of agricultural prices. A partial equilibrium 
model has been used to assess the effects of agricultural accession. 
The European Simulation Model (ESIM) was developed by the USDA/ERS 
in cooperation with Josling and Tangermann and first used in Tangermann 
and Josling (1994). Thereafter, the development of ESIM has taken sep-
arate paths. The USDA/ERS developed ESIM to further their pursuit of 
forecasts and policy analyses for numerous countries covered in their Pro-
duction, Supply, and Demand Database. For Europe, ESIM was further 
developed in Tangermann and Munch (1995), Munch (1995) and expanded 
country coverage by Munch (1997). The model is expanded in several ar-
eas, such as the inclusion of production costs and linkages to Computable 
General Equilibrium Models (CGEs). However, despite modifications and 
new developments, the current model is strongly indebted to the original 
cooperation by Josling, Tangermann, and the USDA/ERS. 
This chapter describes the structure of the model and summarizes recent 
development of the ESIM model for the purpose of quantifying EU accession 
effects. 1 The first part describes the structure of the model. The other 
sections refer to the economic mechanisms as well as welfare and budgetary 
calculations in detail. The chapter concludes with a comparison with other 
partial equilibrium models. 
1 A version of ESIM is used in the USDA/ERS for their baseline projections 
which differs from this version in structure and functional form as well as scope 
of products, countries, and technical realization. 
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2.1 An Overview of the Model Structure 
The analysis of CEC accession to the EU focuses on the introduction of 
the CAP in the CECs and the resulting implications for agricultural mar-
kets and government expenditure. The CAP market regimes consist of 
sophisticated sets of instruments designed to elevate domestic prices above 
world market levels and simultaneously contain production by supply con-
trol. Moreover, as the market price support declines, direct payments for 
area and cattle gain emphasis. Regarding the importance of the expected 
effects on CEC markets during accession (see Section 1.2), the modeling 
effort concentrates on the representation of CAP policies in a model with 
sufficient commodity and country detail. The modeling of behavior is prag-
matic and relies on proven concepts. 
ESIM is a price- and policy-driven comparative static agricultural world 
model with rich cross-commodity relations and the potential to model price 
and trade policy instruments in great detail. It is a partial equilibrium 
model, i.e. macroeconomic variables (income, exchange rates) are exoge-
nous. As a world model it includes all countries, though in greatly varying 
degrees of disaggregation. Typically one chooses between countries that are 
explicitly modeled and others that are combined in an aggregate, or the 
rest of the world (ROW). The model used for the analyses presented in 
this study includes ten CECs (Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia) and the 
EU-15. All other countries are aggregated to the ROW. The agricultural 
sector is modeled by sixteen agricultural commodities, nine processed goods, 
and six other commodities and production factors (see Table 2.1). 
2.1.1 The Structure of the Model 
Table 2.2 summarizes the general forms of major equations for supply, de-
mand, and processing as well as price transmission. In this table the vari-
ables are in capital, exogenous variables in small letters. 
Supply activities in ESIM are modeled for agricultural commodities as well 
as for selected processed goods. Crop and livestock supply functions are 
separated into two parts: capacity (area, herd) and yield. This basically 
assumes separable supply activities. Equations 2.1 to 2.3 describe crop 
supply, which depends on prices, costs, policies, and technical progress. A 
similar system exists for livestock supply in Equations 2.4 to 2.6. 
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Oils and cakes 
Dairy 
Others 
Factors and inputs 
Residual tradable feeds 
Residual consumer goods 
Wheat, barely, corn, other grains, rapeseed, 
sunflower seed, soybeans, sugar. 
Milk, beef and veal, pork, poultry, eggs. 
Rapeseed oil and cake, 
sunflower seed oil and cake, 
soybean oil and cake. 
Butter, skimmed milk powder, cheese. 
Labor, capital, non-agricultural intermediates, 
feeds. 
Other energy rich feeds, other protein rich feeds. 
Other commodities. 
Apart from effective producer prices or shadow prices (PPE), costs are a 
major determinant for supply. Costs are separated into components related 
to the factors capital (cape) and labor (wage) as well as non-agricultural 
intermediates (intc). Feed costs (CF) are the only endogenous cost com-
ponent. These factors and inputs represent tradable (CF, cape) and non-
tradable (wage) components. The effects of changes of relative prices be-
tween tradable and non-tradable factors and inputs on agricultural supply 
can be analyzed, as they occur with shifts of the real exchange rate. This 
is an especially important issue in transition economies (see Macours and 
Swinnen, 1997). 
In economies in transition, macroeconomic equilibrium conditions are sub-
ject to rapid change, the more so with integration into the EU. Therefore, 
key macroeconomic indicators are affected, i.e. exchange rates, costs, and 
incomes. Two versions of the model exist which take a different approach 
in treating the macroeconomic linkages. The stand-alone version represents 
the classic partial equilibrium approach by basing the exogenously assumed 
development of these key economic indicators on literature. In the recur-
sive version, these variables become indirectly endogenous by linking ESIM 
to single country CGEs developed by Banse (1997a, 2000). There are no 
structural differences between these two versions; only the treatment of 
macroeconomic indicators differs. 
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Table 2.2: Modeled Activities. 







Rest of the world 





Total domestic use 




V. Domestic price transmission 
Wholesale prices 
Producer prices 
Effective producer price 
VI. Closure rules 
World markets (tradables) 
Domestic market (non-tradables) 
EAcr.c = f(P Pcr,c, EDPcr,c, capcc, wagcc, sac, tac) 
Y cr,c = f (P Pcr,c, intcc, sac, tPcr,c) 
Bcr,c = EAcr,c · Ycr,c 
H1vst,c = f(P P1vst,c, EDPivst,c, capcc, wagcc) 
Y!vst,c = f (P Pivst,c, C F1vst,c, tp1vst,c) 
S1vst,c = H1vst,c · Y!vst,c 
Si,ROW = f (PWi,ROW, tpi,ROW) 
DHi,c = f(PDi,c,9incc,9Papc) 
DFi,c = f(PDi,c, S1vst,c, tp/J,lvst,c) 
DScr,c = f (EAcr,c) 
DCproc,c = f(PDi,c, PDproc,c, CSi,c) 
DTi,c = DHi,c + DFi,c + DSi,c + DCi,c 
Bproc,c = f(DCproc,c) 
N Xi,c = Si,c - DTi,c 
PDi,c = f(PWi,poli,c,maxexi,c,erc,NXi,c) 
PPi,c = f(PDi,c,mmi ,c) 
PPEq,c = f(PPi,c,QUi,c) 
L-c N Xit,c ~ 0 
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Crops: er E i 
Feed: / E i 
Livestock: lvst E i 
Processed goods: proc E i 
Tradables: it E i 
Non-tradables: nt E i 
Quota products: q E i 
List of Variables 
CF Index feed costs 
DF Total demand for feed 
DH Human demand 
DC Processing demand 
DS Seed demand 
DT Total domestic use 
EA Effective area 
EDP Effective direct payments 
H Herd 
NX Net exports 
PD Domestic price 
pp Producer price 
PPE Effective producer price 
PW World market price 
s Supply 
y Yield 
List of Parameters 
en.pc Capital cost index 
cs Capacity shifter for processing 
er Real exchange rate domestic/USD 
inc Income (index) 
pop Population (index) 
intc Cost index non-ag. intermediates 
mm Marketing and processing margin 
maxex Maximum net exports 
pol Trade and price policies 
qu Supply quota 
sa Effective set-aside 
ta Total area 
tp Supply shifter 
tpf Shifter feeding efficiency 
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Total domestic use (DT) consists of human demand (2.8), feed demand 
(2.9), processing demand (2.11), and seed demand (2.10). While the lat-
ter is a transformation of the effective area (EA), the other domestic use 
components are directly modeled. 
Processing involves oilseeds and milk as raw materials. Purchase and dis-
tribution of raw material among the processing activities, which depends 
on prices of raw materials and processed commodities, are described in 
2.11. The actual processing activity in 2.12 is a transformation relying on 
technical coefficients, which defines the yield of processed goods out of raw 
materials. 
Price and trade policies influence the price transmission from world to do-
mestic markets in Equation 2.15. Direct payments and supply quotas di-
rectly affect supply. These instruments are closely modeled on actual EU 
regulations as well as those proposed for the Agenda 2000. Table 2.3 sum-
marizes the different policy instruments modeled for the commodities. 
To better incorporate price and trade policies, four different prices are de-
fined for two price levels: World market (PW) and domestic market prices 
(PD) are wholesale prices. This price level is relevant for domestic use and 
processing. Moreover, the CAP trade and price policy instruments actually 
apply at this level. The producer or farmgate price (PP) is derived in Equa-
tion 2.16 from PD by deducting the marketing and processing margin. The 
farmgate price, therefore, depends on the transaction costs of the down-
stream sector. The fourth price in Equation 2.17, the effective producer 
price (PP E) or shadow price, incorporates the effects of quota regimes for 
sugar and milk. 
The activities in the fully modeled countries are formulated in detail es-
pecially for agricultural products. For the ROW, however, activities are 
simplified. While this part is also price driven, supply is modeled through 
direct functions, consequently neglecting area, herds, and yields. Moreover, 
policies are of limited specificity. Therefore, the ability of the model to 
project agricultural activities on a global scale is restricted, although it is 
capable of identifying the effects of European agricultural policies on world 
markets. 
Foreign trade is the residual of domestic supply and total domestic use, i.e. 
trade flows are net figures. 2 Following a common approach well established 
2 Gross trade models (most CGEs) relax this assumption by distinguishing be-
tween domestic and exportable goods via the Armington approach (Banse, 1997a). 
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Table 2.3: CAP Policy Instruments in ESIM . 
Price Policies 
Cereals Minimum price 
Oilseeds 
Sugar Minimum price 
Milk 
Dairy Products Minimum price 




Variable export subsidies, 
variable export tax, 
variable import tariffs 
Variable import tariffs 
Variable export subsidies, 
import tariffs 
Variable export subsidies, 
import tariffs 
Maximum export 
quantities, import tariffs 










coupled to area 
Direct payments 
coupled to area 
Direct payment 
coupled to dairy 
cattle 
Direct payments 
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in literature, the model is numerically solved for the equilibrium prices on 
world markets (e.g. Roningen and Dixit, 1989; Anderson and Tyers, 1993). 
The equilibrium condition for tradables is world market clearing, i.e. the sum 
of all net exports of the ith commodity over the countries has to be very 
close to zero. For non-tradables, domestic markets are required to clear (see 
Equations 2.16 and 2.17). The vector of equilibrium world market prices, 
therefore, simultaneously clears aggregated supply and demand. The solv-
ing algorithm calculates world market prices in response to the changes of 
aggregated net exports for the ith product. In order to distinguish between 
small and large agricultural world markets, i.e. determining the size of the 
necessary price change, net exports are set in relation to world production 
in the base. 
Changes in domestic policies alter world market prices to varying degree, 
depending on the share of a particular country in world net exports. There-
fore, a policy change in a small country in agricultural terms, e.g., Slovenia, 
alters world market prices less than a new policy in a large country, e.g. the 
EU-15. Nevertheless, even policies in small Slovenia affect world market 
prices. 
In the absence of policies and market distortions, domestic prices equal 
world market prices. Price and trade policies, however, drive wedges be-
tween world market and domestic prices. Additionally, they decouple do-
mestic prices from world market prices to differing degrees (see Section 1.2). 
Therefore, domestic price levels as well as development of price ratios differ 
from those on world markets. This, in turn, also affects world market prices. 
Another important aspect is the development of real exchange rates. These 
affect relative prices in two main ways. First, if price and trade policy 
instruments are defined in monetary terms ( e.g. intervention prices, specific 
tariffs), the gap between domestic and world market prices alters. Second, 
fluctuations in exchange rates change relative prices of tradable and non-
tradable commodities and factors. 
2.1.2 Functional Forms 
The assumption of perfect markets, on which the model is based, implies 
price-taking behavior of economic agents. Since no price expectation and 
time lags of production are included, supply and demand adjust immediately 
to the respective market prices in this deterministic model. The behavioral 
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DH- = dhint· . IT p DE,.j.c . inc'li,c . prm i,c i,c 3 ,c c ..,re 
j 
is human demand, 
is the human demand intercept, 
is domestic prices, 
is elasticities of demand with respect to prices, 
is income growth per capita, 
is elasticities of demand with respect to income, 
represents population growth. 
(2.20) 
For reasons of calculation efficiency the implemented functions are log linear: 
DHi,c = exp(lndhinti,c+ Le'i,j,c•lnPDj,c+rti,c•lnincc+lnpapc) (2.21) 
j 
The human demand equation includes three types of parameters: elastici-
ties, intercepts, and shifters, i.e. income and population growth. All of these 
are determined outside the model. The intercepts are calculated by calibrat-
ing the model on the base data, i.e. assigning base values to all variables 
( e.g. prices, quantities). 
This functional form imposes the following properties for demand:3 
1. Homogenous of degree I:j C:i,j,c + T/i,c in prices and income. 
2. Continuously differentiable and quasi-convex for any non-negative 
price and income. This property is independent of the degree of ho-
mogeneity and the level of aggregation. 
3. The shifters, which are positive multipliers, introduce time-related 
change to the functions. These represent population and income 
growth in the demand functions. A one percent change of popula-
tion shifters leads to a one percent change in the functional value 
without changing any of the properties of (1) and (2). 
3For the mathematical properties of isoelastic functions, see Chiang (1984, p. 
387 and p. 410). 
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The structures of the supply functions are similar in functional form, only 
supply splits into capacity (herd, area) and yield, and of course the shifters 
are of a different nature. Since the response of supply and demand to price 
changes is the same, the comparative static nature of the model becomes 
clear, i.e. each year of a projected period is a single comparative static 
equilibrium, totally independent of solutions for other years except the base 
period. Supply functions of that type are homogeneous of the degree given 
as the sum of supply elasticities in respect to own and cross-prices and to 
input and factor prices. They are also quasi-concave for positive prices and 
costs, and similar to (3) in that neutral technical progress shifts supply. 
From (2) and (3) follow important implications for the equilibrium of the 
model. The sets of country and world supply and demand satisfy the condi-
tions of strict quasi-convexity and strict quasi-concavity respectively on the 
positive orthant. These properties prevail for expansions of values through 
time. In the presence of convex constraints, the model is solved for a unique 
equilibrium for any positive prices and costs. 4 
Supply and demand functions are required to fulfill the basic laws of sup-
ply and demand. These are imposed on the functions by the matrices of 
elasticities, i.e. by parameter restrictions. 
As consumers are expected to act rationally, three conditions restrict the 
demand system: the symmetry of cross-substitution effects ( 8f /;i) ii = 
( 8f/f/) ii, the non-positive compensated own price effect ( 8fJ:i) ii ~ 0 and, 
finally, homogeneity of degree zero in price and incomes Lj eij + 'f/i,m = 1. 
From the budget constraint follows the adding up property Li 1/i'f/i,m = l. 
As food is only a part of human consumption, the calculation of elasticities 
also takes the aggregate "other products" and their share of expenditure 
(vi) into account. 
The system of supply elasticities requires the fulfillment of similar neces-
sary conditions. These are the symmetry of cross-price effects and the 
non-negative own price effect for output prices. The latter implies that 
the supply curve is positively sloped in P Pi. The homogeneity condition 
4Samuelson (1952) shows that market equilibrium can be achieved by maxi-
mizing the net social payoff (NSP) function, given by the adjusted sum of producer 
and consumer surplus. In a world model, an aggregate NSP function is obtained 
by summing the NSP function across commodities and countries. For a recent 
application and theoretical implications of this alternative way of optimization, 
see Waquil and Cox (1995) and Chavas and Cox (1996). 
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requires the sum of elasticities of output prices and costs to be zero, which 
satisfies the non-profit condition of competitive firms in perfect markets and 
the condition of constant returns to scale in production. 
lsoelastic functions are one type of functional forms ubiquitous in large-
scale agricultural trade models. Other common functions are standard lin-
ear functions and, increasingly, supply and demand systems derived from 
flexible profit and expenditure functions. 
Compared to linear and standard Cobb-Douglas functional forms, the isoe-
lastic type has the ability to include a wider scale of behavioral parameters, 
e.g. cross-price elasticities. The condition of homogeneity as well as negativ-
ity of the own substitution effect in demand are globally satisfied, because 
elasticities are kept constant. The conditions of symmetry and adding up 
are fulfilled locally, at the point of base data. 
An alternative approach to modeling would have been to use a model based 
on completely consistent systems of supply and demand, using for example, 
profit and expenditure functions. Globally flexible functional forms, such 
as the Generalized Symmetric McFadden for profit and related expenditure 
functions (Brosig, 1999; Frohberg et al. 1998; Feger and Muller, 1999), as-
sure global fulfillment of all neoclassical assumptions for any price vector 
and give modeling a theoretically and empirically strong base. The general 
restriction of models based strictly on flexible functional forms is the inflexi-
bility in representing separable activities (see Chambers, 1988, p. 178). This 
imposes constraints on modeling policies, such as the CAP, which work at 
different levels of agricultural supply activities ( e.g. area restrictions, direct 
payments per head of cattle or per unit of area). Moreover, these models 
are highly demanding in terms of quality and scope of the data, which is 
especially relevant in the CEC context (see Jackson and Swinnen, 1994; 
Brosig, 1999). 
2.2 The Modeling of Supply and Domestic Use 
Following the broad overview of properties and structure, the functional 
details of supply and domestic use are further illuminated. This section, 
hence, broadens the description in the previous pages and adds some dis-
cussion on benefits and drawbacks of the implementation of the economic 
relationships into the model. 
57 
Wolfgang Münch - 978-3-631-75691-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 02:55:04AM
via free access
2.2.1 Supply of Grandes Cultures 
The supply of cereals and oilseeds consists of two separable activities, i.e. 
the allocation of area and the determination of yields. Both components 
are price-, cost-, and policy-driven. 
Area allocation depends on effective producer prices, set-aside, direct pay-
ments, costs, and total area (see Equation 2.1). The latter constrains the 
allocation mechanism to the given amount of total area for the selected 
crops. The allocation of area takes place in two steps. First, the uncon-
strained area for each individual crop is determined by: 
UAcr,c = exp(lncintcr,c = L(ecr,j,c - ln(PPj,c + EDPj,c)) 
j 










is area unconstrained, 
is the area intercept, 
is the elasticity of area allocation with respect to prices, 
is the producer price or shadow price for quota products, 
is the effective direct payment per ton of produce, 
is the elasticity of area allocation with respect to costs 
capital, 
is capital costs, 
is the elasticity of area allocation with respect to wages, 
is wages. 
As stated above, for these equations the elasticities are set such that this 
function is homogenous of degree zero in prices and costs and is, as a part 
of the supply activity, positively sloped in P Pi. Hence, only relative prices, 
including direct payments related to area and costs, matter for the allocation 
of areas to crops. 5 
In a second step the area allocation is constrained by the effective total area 
available (eta) to the selected crops: 
UAcrc 
EAcr,c = E U A · etac 
er cr,c 
(2.23) 
5For quota products, shadow price of the activity is calculated and used. 
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is effective area, 
is unconstrained area, 
is total effective area. 
The function determines effective area out of the relative distribution of 
unconstrained area in 2.23 and total effective area. The parameter eta is 
total area available minus the set-aside obligation. The determination of the 
magnitude of set-aside includes the politically defined set-aside obligation, 
the amount of area harvested by small producers, and area slippage. 6 While 
the first and second parameters are defined by policy, the last one is obtained 
from EU data of the base period. 
Besides restrictions in area use, the second important aspect of CAP regu-
lations for crops are direct payments, which is an instrument of increasing 
importance in the future CAP (see EU-Commission, 1997a; 1998; 1999). 
According to 1992 and 1999 regulations the grandes cultures, i.e. cereals, 
oilseeds, and protein crops, are eligible. Farmers qualify for direct payments 
only if they actually grow these crops on their registered area. The pay-
ments are, therefore, coupled to area allocation, i.e. partially coupled to 
production (see CAP Monitor). As farmers directly receive them, direct 
payments are not visible in market prices. 
The direct payments ( dpc) are defined as an amount of ECU per ton of base 
yield for cereals (bye), which is the average weighted cereal yield of 1989-91 
of the EU-15. 7 For the CECs, the base yield is obtained by averaging the 
yields of three years prior to accession. The payment per hectare is the 
simple product out of these two factors. For modeling purposes the original 
formula as applied in the CAP is adjusted for the actual yield, i.e. actual 
payments per ton of produce are applied: 
er Eu bycc 
EDPcereals,c = dpcEu-- · y; 
ere cereals,c 
(2.24) 
6This political or administrative slippage captures the difference of the sup-
posed area and the actual area under set-aside in the EU-15 for the base period. 
7The EU-15 is modeled as one country. The model abstracts for national or 
regional base yields which are currently used to determine the payments in the 
EU. 
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is direct payment per ton of actual produce per 
hectare, 
is direct payment for cereals per ton of base yield, 
is the ~~~ exchange rate, 
is the exchange rate of country c, 
is the base yield, 
is the actual yield. 
The calculation of direct payments for oilseeds differs in the 1992 CAP 
regulations. Moreover, the Blair House Agreement foresees a maximum area 
eligible for direct payments. The formulae include these aspects. 8 However, 
with the Agenda reforms these payments will be reduced to the level of 
cereal payments by the year 2003. Consequently, the area restriction as set 
forth in the Blair House Agreement will be phased out. 
Economically, the effective direct payments are relevant only for the area 
allocation and not for yields as the payments are based on historical yields, 
which are below actual yields. 
The second component of crop supply is yields. These depend on own 
prices and costs of non-agricultural intermediates as well as neutral technical 
progress. The generalized formula for yields is: 










is the yield intercept, 
is the elasticity of yield with respect to prices, 
is the producer price or shadow price for quota products, 
is the elasticity of yield with respect to costs of 
non-agricultural intermediates, 
is the cost index of non-agricultural intermediates, 
is technical progress. 
Cereal and oilseed supply consists of effective area and yields (see Equation 
2.3 in Table 2.2). Both parts of the supply function are homogenous of 
degree zero in prices and costs (-/3cr,c = 0cr,c) and are positively sloped. 
8The calculation of direct payments for oilseeds is based, as in the regulations, 
on a reference cereal price, the adjustment factor of 2.1, a historical world market 
price, and the reference yield for oilseeds. 
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Cross-price relations are not included in the yield equations because farmers 
decide production in two stages. Initially, they allocate the area in which 
the relative competitiveness of each crop is considered. Then with this 
decision, the intensity of production (yields) depends only on the price of 
the commodity and the costs. 9 Area allocation directly takes into account 
those policies, which affect area. In the CAP these are set-asides and direct 
payments for cereals and oilseeds as well as, indirectly, supply quotas. 
Though most of the CAP policies affecting area use are included, limits arise 
from the confined selection or usage of area. Yet the selection ensures that 
those crops included usually have strong cross-commodity relationships in 
production as well as in consumption. However, effects such as moving an 
area between arable and permanent crops or grassland is not an endogenous 
result of simulations, but can only be integrated by shifting the parameter 
total area. This effect might be of considerable importance in accession 
countries where farmers optimize area use envisioning direct payments by 
turning grazing or idle areas to the production of grandes cultures. 
A restriction in interpretation of the model results stems from the non-
modeled land markets. Distribution effects of the CAP related to land 
ownership could not possibly be captured in such a system. This issue is of 
particular importance at the sectoral level, if large sections of the landowners 
are not members of the agricultural sector, as in some CECs. 
2.2.2 Livestock Supply 
The livestock sector comprises cattle, pork, poultry, and eggs. The supply 
function consists of two parts: herd size and yield. Similar to the acreage 
allocation function, herd size is determined by commodity prices, costs, and 
policies. As for crops, the underlying assumption is that an increase of 
capacity requires additional investments and labor. The general form of the 
function determining the size of the national herd (H) is: 
9Earlier versions of the model contained an economic slippage factor. This 
factor related the amount of set-aside to yields by assuming more factors of pro-
d uction (mainly labor) would be available and increase production. Though this 
might be the case if set-aside area is left totally idle, current EU regulations leave 
farmers the opportunity to grow non-food crops as well as committing them to care 
for the area. Therefore, in reality the additional factors of production available 
to increase intensities of production seem to be rather marginal. 
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Hivst,c = exp(lncint1vst,c + :~:::i::lvst,j,c -ln(PP3,c + EDP3,c) 
j 
+ 0ivst,c • ln capcc + 'W/vst,c · In wagcc) (2.26) 
where 
cint1vst,c is the herd size intercept, 




is the producer price or shadow price for quota products, 
is the effective direct payment per ton of produce, 
is the elasticity of herd size with respect to capital costs, 
is the index of capital costs, 
Wtvst,c is the elasticity of herd size with respect to labor costs, 
wagcc is the index of labor costs. 
For beef cattle production in the EU, and especially in the CEC context, 
dual use cattle breeds predominate national herds. The assumption is that 
beef cattle is a highly complimentary good to dairy cattle, i.e. the respec-
tive cross-price elasticities of herd size with respect to prices are positively 
valued. 
Similar to crops, livestock yields (Y) per unit are defined as: 
Ytvst,c = exp (In yint1vst,c + f31vst,c · In P Pivst,c 
+ O/vst,c · In CFivst,c) · tpivst,c (2.27) 
where 
yint1vst,c is the intercept of cattle product yield, 
f31vst,c is the elasticity of yield with respect to prices, 
P Pivst,c is the producer price or shadow price for quota products, 
O/vst,c is the elasticity of yield with respect to feed costs, 
CF1vst,c is feed cost, 
tp1vst,c is the actual yield. 
The simple product of yields and herd size determines supply (see Equation 
2.6 in Table 2.2). For quota products, the shadow price of the economic 
activity is used for herd and yield functions instead of the market price and 
the effective direct payment. The calculation of effective direct payment 
adjusts the policy parameter bound to heads, to a payment per ton of 
actual produce. 
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2.2.3 Supply Quotas 
Supply quotas remain important in the model of European agriculture. The 
CECs, on the other hand, have increasingly introduced them into their 
agricultural policies. The CAP foresees farm level supply quotas for milk 
and sugar. Several CECs have already introduced a farm level supply quota 
for sugar (e.g. Poland); however, their regulations usually have been more 
flexible in quantity shifts than those of the EU. 
The sugar quota comprises an A- and a B-quota. This part of sugar pro-
duction benefits from high domestic prices. A third category of sugar, the 
so-called C-quota sugar is produced outside the quota. It is left without 
any direct subsidies and has to be exported subject to world market condi-
tions.10 Production in the model distinguishes between two types of sugar: 
quota sugar and sugar outside the quota. For milk a similar system exists, 
enforced by fines, which leads to a significantly lower producer price outside 
the quota. 
Figure 2.1 shows the stylized supply effects of introducing a binding supply 
quota. Under given market price Pint, and supply curve S, domestic supply 
is Q. The government introduces a binding quota of the amount Qquota· 
This leads to a reduction of net exports from Q-Qd to Qquota -Qd- At the 
same time the need for export subsidies diminishes from (Q-Qd)-(Pint-Pw) 
to (Qquota - Qd) · (Pint - Pw)-
However, Qquota was also to be produced under the price P •. This price is, 
therefore, the shadow price of the economic activity as this producer price 
would lead to exactly the same supply as the quota. The producer rent 
under the quota constraint is therefore the crosshatched area marked by 
Pw, P., and Qquota• Additionally, producers receive the quota rent marked 
by P., Pint, and Qquota• With technical progress the supply curve shifts 
to S' which decreases the shadow price, decreases the producer surplus, 
but increases the quota rent such that producers actually gain more quota 
rent than they lose producer surplus, i.e. the black triangle. This nicely 
illustrates the supply incentives under a quota system as producers gain 
twice by increasing efficiency. 
10Formally the CAP does not provide any direct subsidies for C-quota sugar. 
However, C-quota beet prices are usually higher than converted world market 
sugar prices. For a further elaboration on the purchase policy of the German 
sugar industries, see Schmidt (1991). 
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Qd Qquota Q Q 
Figure 2.1: Effects of a Supply Quota. 
Consumers, on the other hand, do not benefit from a supply quota system. 
Their losses stay constant because market prices remain unchanged. They 
represent the losers of such a system. The beneficiaries are taxpayers and 
producers who are partly compensated by the quota rent. 
In the model, the shadow price, or effective producer price (P PE), is cal-
culated by solving the supply function (capacity times yield) for the price 
of the respective commodity, and substituting the supply quantity by the 
quota (if the quota is binding): 11 
11The area of sugar is, as in EU regulations, not included in the base area 
for grandes cultures. Therefore, area for sugar production is not scaled to the 
maximum area available (see 2.24), which allows for directly calculating shadow 
prices instead of calculating shadow prices by area allocation for all crops. 
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( qui,c [( 1 ) ( '°' PPEi,c=exp E:·· . - E:·· /3· lninti,c+L..,e:i,j,c i,i,c + /3,,c i,i,c + i,c j,fl 
- ln(P Pi,c + EDP3,c) + E:i,J,c · ln EDPi,c + COSTSi,c)] · tpi,c) (2.28) 
where 
ln inti,c = ln cinti,c + ln yinti,c (2.29) 
COSTSi,c = 0i,c - lncapcc + a:Ti,c • lnwagcc 
+ Oi,c · ln CFi,c + Oi,c · ln intci,c (2.30) 
The shadow price is used in the supply system for capacity allocation and for 
yield to ensure the conditions of symmetry and quasi-convexity of supply. 
Moreover, it enables the precise calculation of the producer welfare effects 
for introducing this kind of regulation. In this way the model fully captures 
effects of newly introduced supply quotas to markets, i.e. sugar and milk 
quotas on CEC markets. The full effects of an already introduced quota, 
as in the EU, can only be captured if the shadow price of the activity is 
known and the model is calibrated on it. That part captured with unknown 
shadow prices is, however, the effect of technical progress, which leads to 
more efficient supply curves. In this process market and shadow prices 
deviate from each other over time. 
2.2.4 Demand 
The use side of the model consists of four components: human demand, 
seed demand, feed demand, and demand of processing industries. Human 
demand was already discussed in Section 2.1.2. Seed demand is a function 
of effective area (see Equation 2.10). This section, therefore, concentrates 
on the remaining part of domestic use, i.e. feed demand and processing 
demand. 
The concept for feed demand is similar to that implemented in the OECD's 
Ministerial Trade Mandate Model (see OECD, 1987; 1989). The formula-
tion ensures that feed demand responds directly to changes in relative feed 
prices and the size and structure of livestock production. Feed demand is 
determined in two equations. The first equation describes the component 
demand of a feed for a livestock product (DFR): 
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is the intercept of feed component demand, 
is the elasticity of feed component demand with respect 
to feed prices, 
is feed price, 
is the feed efficiency shifter. 
This equation takes into account the changes of relative price and the as-
sumed development of feeding efficiency for calculating the component de-
mand. The elasticities ei,j,lvst,c are chosen such that feed component de-
mand is homogenous of degree zero in prices. Moreover, they reflect the 
symmetry conditions. The second function simply aggregates the feed com-
ponents over livestock production to calculate total feed demand (DF): 
where 
DFi,c = "'I:,(DFRi,lvst,c 'Stvst,c) 
lvst 
DF Ri,lvst,c is feed component demand, 
Stvst,c is livestock supply. 
(2.32) 
Livestock production itself responds to developments of feed costs, which are 
derived from component demand valued with the respective market price. 
The feed demand system as modeled in ESIM captures the substitution as 
well as the capacity effect of changes of feed prices. The first effect relates 
to changing structures of components in livestock feed due to price changes. 
The second captures the level and structure of livestock production. 
2.2.5 Processing 
The model contains two processing activities: oilseed crushing and dairy. 
The demand of agricultural raw materials (oilseeds) for processing activities 
depends on prices of raw materials and of processed goods. The processing 
demand for oilseeds (DC) is determined by the following functions, which 
are homogenous of degree zero in prices: 
DCi,c = exp ( ln crinti,c + ei,c · P Di,c + L "-i,proc,c · P Dproc,c) · CSi,c (2.33) 
proc 
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is the intercept of processing demand, 
is the elasticity of processing demand with respect to 
raw material prices, 
is market prices of raw materials, 
elasticity of crushing demand with respect to oilseed 
product prices, 
is market prices of processed products, 
is a capacity shifter for processing industries. 
The supply of oils and meals is a linear transformation of the above demand 
function. It is modeled by technical coefficients that represent the relevant 
yield coefficients: 
where 






is the supply of processed products, 
is the intercept of processing supply, 
is a processing yield factor, 
is processing demand. 
(2.34) 
Generally the model of the processing sector contains fewer details than 
the agricultural sector. Raw material and product prices determine the 
allocation of raw materials. The scope of ESIM to model food processing 
activities is very limited, as important aspects such as costs and capacity 
changes of processing industries are not endogenous elements. 
The dairy component, however, contains important differences. The cen-
tral assumption is that storable dairy products, i.e. skimmed milk powder, 
butter, and cheese serve as a residual use for milk that is not used for value-
added products such as fresh milk and fresh milk products. The demand 
of the latter is combined in the human demand for milk. The supply of 
storable dairy products changes in response to the residual quantity of milk 
as well as to the prices of those products and the milk price. The reference 
price for milk is calculated in a CAP fashion out of butter and skimmed 
milk powder prices. 
Considering the multitude of different dairy products within each product 
category represented in the model, and the complexity of dairy production, 
the scope of modeling dairy production in ESIM is at most only a very 
rough approximation of reality. 
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2.2.6 Elasticities and Calibration 
The matrices of elasticities determine the reaction of market agents in ESIM 
to price, cost, and income changes. For the CECs little literature exists on 
estimations of supply systems, as structural breaks and deficiencies of the 
statistical system during the early phase of transition limit the usability of 
the data and restrict the length of the time series available for econometric 
estimates (see Jackson and Swinnen, 1994). For food demand, however, a 
body of literature is beginning to develop (see Brosig, 1999, p.3). 
More recent estimates serve as sources for human demand elasticities: Brosig 
(1999) estimated demand systems for Polish households for the period 1990-
96 and from 1991-96 for Czech households. These highly disaggregated 
estimates are carried out with a normalized quadratic demand system based 
on monthly data (see Brosig, 1999, pp. 39, 51-58). Banse (1994) estimates 
demand elasticities for Hungary from 1970-91 with a LA-AIDS model for 
six food aggregates. Finally the elasticities for eleven food aggregates based 
on an LA-AIDS model in Erjavec et al. (1997) are used for generating the 
human demand elasticities in Slovenia. 
In this model, the demand elasticities have been adjusted for empirical 
reasons, i.e. the sample of commodities and the aggregation differ between 
model and estimates. A more important restriction preventing direct use is 
the conceptual difference between demand in the model, which is in physical 
terms, and demand in the estimates, which is related to expenditure. 
The initial elasticities are constrained and then modified so as to be consis-
tent with the constraints imposed by homogeneity and symmetry conditions 
as well as the negative own substitution effect and adding up. While the 
latter is imposed on the income elasticities valued by the respective expen-
diture share in an isolated way, the matrix of uncompensated price and 
income elasticities is simultaneously constrained for symmetry, homogene-
ity, and the negative own substitution effect. 
The theoretical background for these matrix operations is the Slutzky-Hicks 
decomposition c:i,J = (c:i,J)u - v1 · TJi,m, which yields compensated price elas-
ticities ( c:i,J )u from the initial values of ordinary price elasticities. Symmetry 
then is imposed on the matrix of elasticities by the concept of Allen's elas-
ticities of substitution, which are derived from the compensated elasticities 
ai,J = (€~!)" = (€;~;>" = a1,i (see Layard and Walters, 1987, p. 142). 
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By constraining the elasticities for symmetry in this way, the structure of ex-
penditure is included into the matrices of demand. As described above, the 
functional form assures global homogeneity of all other conditions, fulfilled 
only locally at the point of calibration. 
In a similar way as for demand, homogeneity and symmetry are imposed 
on the supply elasticities and with that these are adjusted to the structure 
of production of an individual country. 
The procedure to impose the microeconomic conditions has been pro-
grammed as an optimization, which minimizes the deviation of the sum 
of elasticities from zero. In this process the upper triangular part of the 
matrix of elasticities is subject to changes while the lower triangular part 
is determined through the symmetry conditions. In an iterative process 
the matrices have been tested for sensitivity as well as adjusted to expert 
judgments in light of simulation results, i.e. on the changeable part of the 
matrices, restrictions have been imposed. The lack of directly estimated 
elasticities for model purposes requires this ad-hoc procedure. 
The lack of individual country feed demand and of agricultural supply elas-
ticities made it necessary to base these elasticities on those estimated for 
the EU (OECD, 1995; Roningen and Dixit, 1989). Appendix B shows the 
elasticities for Poland. 
The model is calibrated on all parameter and base data. The parameters 
describing economic behavior are the elasticities of supply and demand, and 
the transformation coefficients for seed demand and oilseed processing. The 
base data is comprised of all quantity components of supply and domestic 
use, wholesale prices, and wholesale and processing margins for the countries 
as well as for the ROW. In calibration, the behavioral functions are shifted 
with the intercepts such that model results exactly match the base values 
of prices and quantities. Therefore, each behavioral function contains an 
intercept or an equivalent parameter. 
2.3 Modeling of Price and Trade Policies under CAP 
For modeling purposes, price and trade policy instruments in the acceding 
countries of Central Europe have been assumed to be of the CAP type, 
though at different levels of intensity. Therefore, policy instruments in the 
CECs and in the EU-15 are the same. This step is partly a technical con-
69 
Wolfgang Münch - 978-3-631-75691-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 02:55:04AM
via free access
cession to harmonization periods modeled after the example of Spain and 
Portugal. However, it also reflects real developments as most CECs gradu-
ally introduce CAP policy instruments. 
The CAP consists of a set of sophisticated instruments to elevate prices 
of agricultural raw materials above world market levels and substantially 
above related prices in the CECs. The market and price policy instruments 
aim at wholesaling and first stage food processing industries. The down-
stream sector, therefore, plays a crucial role in transmitting the support to 
agriculture. In order to distinguish between all these influences, two price 
levels have been introduced to the model. Wholesaling and processing mar-
gins separate the price levels: Wholesale prices, which consist of domestic 
and the world market prices (PD and PW), and farmgate prices (PP). 12 
The latter category drives agricultural supply while the first determines 
processing and domestic use. 
Price and trade policies influence prices on the wholesale level. For the 
analysis, three main types of CAP market regimes are modeled. The first 
type relies on low or zero tariffs. According to the CAP design of 1999 this 
applies for oilseeds, most oilseed products, as well as grain substitutes (man-
ioc and corn gluten feed). This system is even more relevant for the CECs 
as most of the agricultural markets benefit only from import protection. 
The second type of market regime, the intervention system, establishes a 
minimum price on markets. For cereals the EU supports market prices by 
intervention prices and entry prices. On markets for beef, storable dairy 
products (except most hard cheeses), and sugar a similar system exists 
that enforces minimum prices through intervention and export subsidies. 
In addition to the minimum (intervention) price, these market regimes also 
have an implicit maximum price resulting from import protection. For 
cereals this is 155 percent of the intervention price; for the other products 
such a price is approximated by a combination of specific and ad valorem 
tariffs. 
The third type of market regulation, the restraint export system, shields 
markets from imports, but domestic prices are allowed to vary significantly. 
Other than in the intervention system, the main government actions are 
limited export subsidies and private storage aid. This system is currently 
applied to pork, poultry, and egg markets and might be a future model for 
the beef and veal markets of the EU under Agenda 2000. 
12For quota products, the shadow price (PPE) is included. 
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Section 1.1 discusses the economic implications of the most common market, 
trade, and price policy instruments. This part shows the implementation of 
these different trade and price policy instruments in a non-spatial net trade 
model. 
2.3.1 Tariff-Based Price and Trade Policies 
In this regime the only trade policy instrument is a specific or ad valorem 
tariff. These market regulations do not provide for export subsidies and 
other direct market interventions. 13 For a net importer the domestic prices 
are a function of world market prices and tariffs. In the presence of non-




is domestic price, 
is world market prices in USD, 
is exchange rates (USO/domestic currency), 
is ad valorem tariffs. 
(2.35) 
In a net importing country any positive ad valorem tariff leads to an in-
crease of domestic prices above world market prices. The world market 
price transmits to the domestic market. This kind of price transmission 
function is ubiquitous in simulation models. Often the policy parameters 
used instead of tariff rates are Nominal Protection Rates (NPRs), or in some 
models, subsidy equivalents, i.e. PSE or CSE (see Banse, 1997b; Roningen, 
Sollivan and Dixit, 1991; Frohberg, 1998). 
2.3.2 Intervention System 
The intervention system is a key ingredient of the CAP. Shortly after the 
beginning of transition reforms, the CECs introduced intervention systems 
to provide a safety net for farmers. Such intervention systems have been 
increasingly introduced for products that are not subject to intervention 
in the EU. Poland and the Slovak Republic, for example, introduced an 
13 Note that for some products, support is delivered through direct payments, 
which are coupled to production. 
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intervention system for pork. Moreover, the intervention systems expanded 
from just providing a safety net to lifting market prices above world market 
levels. 
Figure 2.2 presents the effects of intervention systems. The intervention 
price Pmin lifts market prices above the world market price Pw. As a result, 
supply expands from Qsw to Qs and demand declines from Qvw to Qv. 
The resulting higher net exports of Q s - Q D require refunds of the shaded 
area. In such a system, technical progress, which shifts S to S', directly 
translates to higher export refunds of the crosshatched area while demand 
stays constant. The amount of export subsidies varies directly with the 
domestic-world market price difference. Domestic prices remain unaffected 
if the world market price stays below domestic prices. In cases where it 
is above domestic prices the intervention price is non-binding, if no other 
measures like export taxes are put into effect. If interventions change from 
unlimited to a system with limited intervention, market prices usually are 
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Often combined with intervention-related measures are import-related mea-
sures such as entry price systems (e.g. for cereal in the EU). In the CECs, 
entry price systems have been introduced for a variety of products; however, 
due to the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(URA) in 1995, these systems have been modified such that they comply 
with the URA. 
The entry price represents the maximum price for the imports, i.e. the 
difference between maximum prices and world market prices is bridged by 
a variable levy (see Figure 2.3). With technical progress, additional supply 
is directly translated into lower net imports. However, such a graph only 
applies if the entry price is non-prohibitive, i.e. imports take place. 
This intervention model must be extended by another factor. In reality we 
see exports and imports of commodities happen at the same time. One 
of the reasons for this effect is differences in quality that make commodity 
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Figure 2.3: Entry Price System. 
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at the maximum price while exports leave the market at the minimum price. 
As world market prices are decoupled from domestic prices, the amount of 
imports and exports relative to the market size determines, among other 
things, the average domestic price level between the upper and the lower 
price bounds. 
This ideal intervention price system with variable export subsidies and entry 
prices is applied to cereals in the EU. The intervention systems for dairy, 
beef, and sugar vary the instruments. Especially on the import side, do the 
instruments differ. With the implementation of the URA, variable levies 
have been tariffied (see Josling and Tangermann, 1994). These provide for 
high import barriers, often higher than in 1986-88, the base period for tariff 
bounds within the URA framework. Hathaway and Ingco (1995) concluded 
that " ... the EU declared base tariffs which were higher than the level in 
1986-88 for eight out of the nine products ... ". These tariffs often include 
an high prohibitive part, which Gerken (1997, p. 232) demonstrated for 
non-annex II products. 
Prohibitive tariffs mean that no imports occur in their presence as prices 
for imports and domestic products differ so hugely that lower-priced domes-
tic products of comparable quality substitute them in consumption. This 
principle of the so-called community preference is one of the fundamentals 
of most CAP commodity regimes. However, the EU grants preferential 
tariffs in numerous bilateral trade agreements such as in the Europe Agree-
ments and the African-Caribbean-Pacific Agreement (see Overberg, 1996; 
CAP Monitor). These regulations provide for a small quantity of imports 
even in presence of prohibitive Most-Favored-Nations tariffs. Because of the 
positive supply effect of increasing prices, one could expect that domestic 
prices reach only import prices, if imports have a high share of domestic 
consumption. 
The algebraic representation of the CAP intervention system has to consider 
export and import policies. A gross trade model might be able to separately 
capture policy details for export supply and import demand functions as well 
as the transmission of export and import prices to the domestic market. A 
net trade model of the ESIM type, however, has to combine these elements 
in one price transmission function. For this reason some simplifying as-
sumptions are made: 
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2. The net export status and the share of net imports in total domestic 
use is the main determinant for the level of prices on the market. 
3. The world market price only transmits to domestic markets if the 
lower and/or the upper bounds are below actual world market prices. 
The first and the last assumptions can be directly deducted from Figure 2.2 
and 2.3. The second assumption is necessary to simplify the price formation 
for the purpose of a net trade model. As a result, the price transmission 
function contains sections for three different price intervals, which make the 
function non-smooth. 
The first section of the function describes the relationship between domestic 





P Di,c = pmini,c if N Xi,c ~ 0 
is the domestic price, 
is the minimum price, 
is net exports. 
(2.36) 
The second section calculates the domestic price under the condition of 
negative net exports, i.e. net import status: 










if NXi,c < Onp~in < PDic ~p~ax (2.37) 
i,c i,c 
is an iteration index, 
is the domestic market price in the net import situation, 
is net exports, 
is supply use, 
is a damping factor, 
is the intervention price, 
is the entry price. 
The main technical problem to overcome in these types of price transmission 
functions is to avoid jumps between the minimum and maximum price once 
net exports reach zero. For this reason domestic prices move relative to the 
importance of net imports in terms of market size. Domestic prices change 
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less, if net exports are small compared to domestic supply and change more 
if imports are an important part of the market. 
The fourth part of the function takes care of the price transmission of world 
market prices to domestic markets: 
PD . _ PWi,e 
t e -, ere if 
PWie . 
--' >pmm ere i,e (2.38) 
This part of the price transmission can be varied in the presence of vari-
able export taxes or market deficiencies, which leave comparable domestic 
market prices below world market price levels. 14 
The price transmission function includes most of the ingredients of the CAP 
intervention system on the import and export side, though with some nec-
essary simplifications. Such a function is especially important if countries 
such as some CECs reverse their net trade status and face different levels 
of import or export protection that is impossible to model with a price 
transmission function of the NPR type. 
2.3.3 Restraint Export System 
These CAP market regimes comprise high import tariffs, export subsidies 
and some private storage aid. In comparison to the intervention system, 
the quantities of subsidized exports are less variable than those of the inter-
vention system. 15 This type of market regime primarily shields the markets 
of pork, poultry, and eggs from imports with some export subsidies pro-
viding a modest amount of price support. As any stochastic element is 
missing in ESIM the analysis of storage policies would be only of limited 
scope. The modeling effort therefore concentrates on the remaining instru-
ment, i.e. subsidized exports. These are supposed to be pre-fixed for a given 
period. 
14The technical realization of the intervention system within the model frame-
work takes place with a series of minimum and maximum conditions in the func-
tions. 
15For pork, the Management Committee fixes poultry and eggs export subsidies 
for three months, in practice, however, subsidies and quantities of exports remain 
unchanged for longer periods. Quantities in particular are oriented to the WTO 
ceilings which are subject to reduction until 2000 (see CAP Monitor; ZMP, 1997, 
pp. 141, 157, 171). 
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Such a system does not impose a certain price on the market, but leaves 
an outlet of a constant quantity of subsidized exports. Figure 2.4 shows 
the basic mechanism. The amount of the predetermined exports SD - Q D, 
which might represent the maximum quantity of subsidized exports allowed 
under the URA, leads under demand of Q D and a supply of SD to the 
market Pv. In case supply expands, due to,for example, technical progress 
and decreasing feed costs, domestic prices fall to Pb because the additional 
amount produced has to be consumed by demand, such that Q'v-Qv equals 
Sb- Sv and subsidized exports stay constant. Contrary to the intervention 
system, consumers benefit from increasing supply efficiency through lower 
prices. 
With such an instrumental setting, domestic prices have to be found which 
determine supply and demand at those levels that net exports exactly match 
the given level, if domestic prices are higher than world market prices. 
A major part of production costs for intensive livestock products is feed 
costs, especially cereal prices. Once these prices change, pork, poultry, 
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increased supply puts pressure on domestic prices as the level of net exports 
is fixed for these products and domestic use has to adjust. In this process 
domestic prices might reach world market levels. In this case exports can 
take place free of a need for subsidies. 







is an iteration index, 
is the domestic price, 
is net exports, 
is maximum net exports. 
PW"' if PD"' > __ ,,_c 
i,c er C (2.39) 
In (2.40) the difference between the N Xi,c and maxexi,c is set relative to 
supply quantities, which determine the size of price changes. By defining 
maxexi,c as a positive number, import tariffs are assumed to be prohibitive. 
By slightly modifying this function, the spending for export subsidies can 
be used as the determinant for domestic price formation; however, this has 
not been done for the analyses presented in this study. Markets are allowed 
to export freely, if domestic prices reach world market level. This part of 
the price transmission function assures that domestic prices are not below 
world market prices. 
2.4 Modeling of Accession 
Accession of new member countries to the EU has several implications. 
For the framework of this analysis the two most important ones are the 
harmonization of agricultural policies of the new member with those of the 
EU, and the integration of their markets into the Single Market. Two role 
models of EU integration exist. The first, Spain and Portugal, had a long 
transition period during which the countries gradually adjusted to the CAP. 
These countries were only recently fully integrated into the Single Market. 
Though these countries adjusted domestic policies to the instruments of 
the CAP, several mechanisms assured that administrative price levels only 
gradually adjusted to those of the rest of the EU. For this purpose, border 
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controls had to remain in effect, though for other sectors the rules of the 
Single Market applied. 
The second model was the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, which 
were immediately integrated on January 1, 1995, into both the CAP frame-
work and the Single Market. The question of which model will be applied 
to the applicant countries of Central Europe depends on the outcome of 
the accession negotiations. To evaluate effects of EU integration, it is fairly 
important for the methodology to be able to capture these different types 
of accession policies. 
2.4.1 The Harmonization of Agricultural Policies 
In a gradual adjustment, CAP policies are introduced stepwise in the ac-
ceding country. In reality this happens in two ways. First by implementing 
the Acquis Communautaire the necessary institutions are formed and the 
policy instruments are put into effect. Then in a second step, the intensities 
of policies are gradually adjusted to CAP levels. This is generally true for 
price policies, if we take the example of Portugal and Spain. However, the 
analysis also takes into account other policies, i.e. income support ( direct 
payments) and direct supply-constraining policies (set-aside, supply quo-
tas). From the technical point of view, direct payments and set-aside may 
also be implemented gradually. Supply quotas, on the other hand, only 
make sense if their implementation takes place in one step, although an 
adjustment of quota levels might be an option for a harmonization period. 
The process of adjusting domestic policies to the CAP in the acceding coun-
try is simplified in the model, especially for the intervention and export 
quota regimes. Here we assume that the CECs have already put these poli-
cies into effect though on a different level than in the EU. This is true for 
some of the commodities, but not for all (see Hartell and Swinnen, 1997). 
Therefore, in the loosely defined harmonization period, administrative prices 
are adjusted to EU levels. 
The main instrument of gradual adjustment of Portuguese and Spanish agri-
cultural policies to CAP levels was the Accession Compensatory Amount 
(ACA). The end of the transition period for Spain and Portugal was fixed at 
ten years after accession (seven years for some products). During that time, 
administrative prices gradually adjusted to EU levels at a predetermined 
pace. The ACA was applied in order to bridge the price gap between the 
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EU-10 and the acceding countries' prices. For regimes with an intervention 
system, the references for their calculations were the administrative prices; 
for other products, the market prices were used (see CAP Monitor, 1990). 
ACAs also adjusted export refunds and to certain extent, variable levies. In 
general terms, import measures were immediately set at the EU level when 
the two countries joined the customs union. 
For modeling the ACAs, it is important to define the beginning and the end 
date of the transition or adjustment period. At the end of the adjustment 
period the intervention prices equal those of the EU, while entry prices and 
specific tariffs are adjusted in one step. Direct payments and set-aside can 
be implemented in one or several steps. Quotas, on the other hand, come 
into effect in one step at the beginning of a transition period, though their 
level can be further adjusted. 
2.4.2 The Single Market 
When the new member country is eventually integrated into the Single Mar-
ket, the bilateral trade between the EU and the country is totally liberalized. 
The size of commodity markets in the EU expands by supply and domestic 
use of that country. Referring again to the principle of community prefer-
ence, which shields most EU markets from third country imports, excess 
supply and consumption of member countries or regions of the Union first 
equalize on the Single Market. 
An analysis of trade diversion in an expanding customs union cannot really 
be satisfactorily solved within the framework of a net trade model. The 
biggest Single Market effects, though, are integrated. These can be expected 
for markets in acceding countries which have a different net trade status 
than the EU. Consider for example, the case of Poland, a net importer 
of wheat, while the EU is a net exporter. If the same price and trade 
policy instruments are applied, the domestic price in the acceding country 
is driven by the entry price, while in the EU, export policies (intervention, 
export subsidies) determine the EU price. As a result domestic prices within 
the Union could be very different. With integration in the Single Market, 
prices decline in the acceding country as exports from the rest of the EU 
enter the market. 
The same example holds for a strongly net-exporting acceding country on 
markets where the EU is net importing or largely self-sufficient (e.g. Hun-
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gary and corn), where additional supplied quantities could lead to a decline 
of prices in the rest of the EU. Integration into the Single Market, therefore, 
can lead to price changes in the countries concerned. 
2.5 Welfare Calculations 
The welfare effects of a policy change are measured compared to a reference 
situation. This could be total liberalization, or an alternative second best 
situation. The reference situation in previous studies has been continuing 
domestic policies without integration into the EU. Here also, a scenario of 
total liberalization has been introduced which mainly serves to determine 
the welfare effects when compared to EU integration and non-integration. 
Welfare effects are one of the fundamental economic results of the evaluation 
of policies. 
Two levels of domestic prices exist in the model: producer prices and whole-
sale prices. These are separated by a relative margin. During accession it is 
assumed that one effect of integration into the Single Markets is the averag-
ing of margins to those of the EU-15. Under total liberalization the margins 
in the CECs also move to those of the EU-15, as EU food processing and 
wholesaling, other than the farm sector, is assumed to be highly efficient. 
Another complication arises from the fact that government expenditure re-
lated to market guarantee is adjusted to reflect the actual expenditure under 
CAP conditions, i.e. including storage and administrative costs. 
Figure 2.5 shows the graphic analysis of welfare effects for a commodity 
market. Due to the model specification the graphical analysis is slightly 
more complex than the textbook examples. Under world market conditions 
with perfect price transmission, the country produces Sw at the producer 
price P Pw and consumes Cw at the wholesale price P Dw and exports 
N X w. With agricultural policies the supply is SD and consumption is CD. 
The resulting net exports are NXv. 
Wholesale prices determine domestic consumption, therefore, the area 
P Dw, Cw, PD D, CD is the loss in consumer rent. Producer prices induce 
supply, thus the gain in producer rent is then the area P Pw, Sw, P Pv, SD• 
In this scenario of protective market and trade policy, government interven-
tion at the wholesale level results in export subsidies of the crosshatched 
rectangle marked by PDv, PDw, Cv, and Sv. Other measures, which are 
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Figure 2.5: Welfare Effects of Agricultural Policies in ESIM. 
not represented in ESIM, such as storage and administrative costs result 
in budgetary expenditure of the crosshatched rectangle. The exact size is 
determined from the model results by applying coefficients estimated from 
actual budget figures of the EU (see Section 2.6). In welfare terms this 
spending represents a loss in net exports and a gain in the net import situ-
ation. The black triangles represent the trade and specialization loss. 
During transition the CECs often underwent periods where producer and 
consumer prices were below world market prices, such that liberalization 
results in a gain in welfare as domestic markets integrate into world markets. 
Other CECs, like Bulgaria and Romania, until recently maintained price 
controls by which the agricultural sector was actively taxed to reduce food 
prices. 
Producer welfare is measured by producer surplus. This simple measure-
ment has been chosen because the area distribution for most of the crops 
is constrained by the base area ( except for sugar). This scaling of area 
constrains the part of the supply function that distributes the area. The 
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calculation of the producer welfare with more sophisticated measures, like 
determining integrals below supply curves, does not provide any meaningful 
results as long as base area is effectively restricting the total amount of area 
for oilseed and cereals. 
On the consumption side, consumer surplus and the compensating variation 
alternatively measure consumer welfare. The results of both calculations 
are compared later in Section 3.4. The compensating variation, i.e. the 
area below the compensated demand curve, is a precise measurement for 
consumer surplus. The definite integral of the compensated demand curve 
DH;* between the prices PD? and PD} for ei,i ;:/; -1 is: 
1P~ • • . dhint: . p D:··· . IT p D~i,j dP Di 
pno . J 
' J 
= _l_. (PD1 • DH~1 - PD~· DH~0 ) (2.40) 




g! . .,. 
DH 
is the intercept of the compensated demand curve, 
is domestic price, 
is the compensated own-price demand elasticity, 
is the compensated demand function. 
The necessary parameter for the compensated demand curve can be gen-
erated from the model resources. The elasticities of substitution can be 
obtained out of ordinary elasticities with respect to prices via the general 
Slutzky equation ei,j = ei,j + 11J · 1Ji,m• From demand theory we know that 
compensated demand curves are homogenous of degree Lj ei,i = 0. The 
third important parameter of the compensated demand curve is the inter-
cept dhint;, which is obtained by calibrating the function on prices and 
quantities of the subsequent years. 
Theory tells us that the calculation of the compensated variation is inde-
pendent from the direction of calculation, i.e. the sequence of introducing 
the changes of own- and cross-prices. 16 Additionally, for each year price 
changes have been included by introducing them in a stepwise manner, i.e. 
the first price is allowed to change to that of the period t + 1; in a second 
calculation the next price, until all prices have been changed to that oft+ 1. 
16See Layards and Walters (1987). 
83 
Wolfgang Münch - 978-3-631-75691-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 02:55:04AM
via free access
The main conceptual drawback for this partial approach is the confined 
selection of consumer goods with agricultural products explicitly modeled 
and the aggregated rest implicitly included via the matrices of elasticities. 
As food is only a part of the expenditure, expenditure for the aggregate 
must either be assumed or obtained in a more rigorous way, i.e. as model 
solutions of CGEs. 
2.6 Budgetary Calculations 
As far as budget implications are concerned, ESIM generates projections 
only for net expenditure on trade measures, i.e. export subsidies minus 
tariff revenues, as well as compensatory and headage payments. To make 
the model results comparable to FEOGA guarantee spending, conversion 
factors have been applied to include expenditure on administration and 
storage. 
The calculations of conversion factors proceed in three steps: First, average 
actual spending for market guarantee for the model products are calculated. 
Second, average spending is calculated per ton of net exports in the base 
period. Third, spending is set relative to the endogenous results of the 
model. These conversion factors apply for the calculation of government 
spending for the further simulations. The portion of dairy products and 
beef not supported by export subsidies has a high share of government 
spending for supports. 
The budget reports of the European Commission do not show the revenues 
customs duties per commodity (European Commission, 1997). This data 
restriction prevents more sophisticated calculations using net spending for 
the model results. However, most of the imports of agricultural and food 
products are still prohibitive such that only preferential imports enter the 
EU. For other products, such as wheat, import barriers are lowered. How-
ever, even here imports are usually comprised of high quality commodities 
such as Hard Red Winter, which are of higher quality than the EU average. 
The introduced bias in these calculations for the EU is, therefore, limited. 
The calculations for adjusted direct payments proceed in a similar way. This 
is less problematic for area but more for cattle payments, which are subject 
to several restrictions such as such as the maximum ceiling of ninety head 
per farm and global ceilings on regional and national levels. Here the model 
is less precise than for area (see Table 2.3). 
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The advantage of applying these budgetary adjustments for the CECs is in 
the comparability of model results to more realistic government expendi-
tures. However, by applying the coefficients, the CECs are assumed to have 
the same structure of storage and other costs related to their net exports 
than that of the EU-15. 
The calculation of total welfare effects includes the determination of pro-
ducer and consumer surpluses, quota effects, and budgetary expenditure. 
The total welfare effects are determined by aggregating the effects over the 
markets for agricultural commodities. 
2. 7 Macroeconomic Linkages 
Partial equilibrium models that concentrate on a particular sector of an 
economy rely on assumptions of the development of macroeconomic key in-
dicators. For ESIM, these variables are the real equilibrium exchange rate, 
income, capital costs, labor costs, and costs of non-agricultural intermedi-
ates as well as the price developments of non-food consumer goods. 
Two alternative approaches to these assumptions have been chosen. In the 
stand-alone version, the development of these variables is set exogenously, 
while in the recursive structure ESIM is linked to country CGEs, which 
provide the variables concerning macroeconomic and input price indicators. 
Exchange rate effects on relative output and input prices as well as their 
conceptual implementation are discussed in this section. Moreover, the 
recursive link to CGEs is shown in this part. 
< 
Banse (1997a; 1997b) based his CGE models on structures developed by 
Adelman and Robinson (1978), which have been further developed and ex-
tended by country- and transition-specific elements. Among other things, 
the models have a recursive-dynamic structure of capital allocation with a 
one period time lag for the installment of new capital. The new invest-
ments are treated as sector specific, i.e. installed capital is immobile and is 
depreciated at sector-specific rates. Labor, on the other hand, is perfectly 
mobile across all eight sectors (heavy industry, agriculture, food, chemical, 
machine and consumable industries, construction, and services). The third 
type of input is the intermediates. Production activities in the CGE are 
modeled by production functions of the Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES) for labor and capital and Leontief for intermediate inputs. 
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The final demand component of the CGEs includes government consump-
tion, which is kept constant in real terms within each period. Between 
years, government demand is adjusted relative to the GDP of the previous 
period. Private household demand is modeled with a Linear Expenditure 
System (LES) for three types of households. Demand for investment goods 
by sector, the last part of final demand, is derived from sectoral invest-
ment decisions ( destination of investments) by coefficients fixed for the base 
period in the Social Accounting Matrix. 
Bilateral foreign trade is modeled by the Armington approach, i.e. com-
modities of domestic and foreign origin are imperfect substitutes. Two-stage 
Constant Elasticities of Transformation (CET) and CES functions split com-
modities into domestic and imports and exports, respectively. Foreign trade 
is split in a second step into trade with the ROW and the EU. The closure 
rule is the constant current account balance, leaving the model to calcu-
late the real equilibrium exchange rate to bring markets of tradables and 
non-tradables into equilibrium. 
In the CGE model, all sectors are represented as a one-firm-one-commodity 
activity. Sector-specific policies are equally highly aggregated as ad valorem 
tariffs on imports and ad valorem subsidies on exports. Other policies are 
taxes on capital profits for sectors and households as well as production 
taxes or subsidies, respectively. The gradual implementation of the CAP 
is modeled by a stepwise increase in ad valorem import tariffs and export 
subsidies for agricultural and food products within a given period. 
Contrary to ESIM, financing of agricultural policies plays an important role 
in the endogenous process of the CG Es. With EU membership, the financial 
solidarity needed for trade and price policies is realized. The FEOGA guar-
antee budget pays for export subsidies, but also receives the revenues from 
import tariffs. This is technically implemented in the CGEs by increasing 
the c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices to EU levels while at the same time removing 
export subsidies and import tariffs for agricultural and food products. 
As structural funds and direct payments are not taken into account, small, 
net-importing countries, such as Slovenia, tend to receive less than large, 
net-exporting countries such as Hungary. The level of GDP and the im-
portance of the agricultural and food sectors are substantial factors and 
determine the size of the effects on macroeconomic feedback and equilib-
rium exchange rates. 
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The conceptual differences between the CGEs and ESIM are manifested 
on all levels of the model. First of all, the levels of aggregation are dif-
ferent. While ESIM, as a partial model, focuses on individual markets of 
agricultural products and a few selected processed goods with numerous 
commodity-specific policies, the CGE analyzes economy-wide effects on a 
much higher level of aggregation with a necessary simplification of sector 
policies. Second, the behavioral functions are of a different nature. And 
finally, the CGEs are country models while ESIM is a world model. There-
fore, a complete integration of ESIM into the macroeconomic framework 
the CGEs provide for is not possible without almost completely changing 
the nature of the ESIM. 
The evaluation of macroeconomic developments caused by changing agricul-
tural policies and financial flows is the specific strength of a CGE. ESIM, 
on the other hand, models commodities and policies in great detail. The 
combination of both models enables one to overcome the bottleneck of the 
partial equilibrium model, i.e. to include the macroeconomic repercussions 
of changing agricultural policies. On the other hand, the CGEs integrate 
agricultural protection measured as weighted average NPR on the sectoral 
level as a result of detailed simulation of agricultural markets and policies. 
The combination of both models in simulations has been applied in Banse 
and Tangermann (1998) and in Banse and Miinch (1998). This approach 
is further developed by including input prices into ESIM. The models are 
not formally linked, however, a recursive structure of simulations enables 
the use of results of ESIM in the CGEs and vice versa. In a first step ESIM 
simulates the policy scenarios. Then derived NPRs are used in the CGEs 
for a simulation of agricultural policies. In a third step, macroeconomic 
indicators and input prices from the CGE are used in ESIM for the final 
partial analysis. Chapter 4 explains the recursive simulation structure in 
detail. 
2.8 Data 
ESIM relies on numerous data and parameters for calibration and parame-
ters for simulation. The database for calibration contains three categories: 
market balances, price data, and policy data. Besides the data, other param-
eters, most notably elasticities, are necessary to define economic behavior. 
For simulations, the development of key macroeconomic figures, population 
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growth, technical progress, and policies describe the economic framework in 
which the market agents operate. 
Contrary to econometric models, elasticities and intercepts are not direct 
estimates. In this type of model, elasticities are predetermined and the 
intercepts, which serve as parameters of levels, are found in the calibra-
tion. The base data covers all endogenous variables, the only undetermined 
parameter of the behavioral functions is the intercept. In the calibration, 
the matrix of intercepts is calculated such that the calculation value of the 
functions exactly matches the base data. 
The market balances contain data for every variable concerning supply and 
domestic use. For supply, these are area, national herds, and yields. Use, 
on the other hand, requires data for human demand, feed demand, seed 
demand, and processing demand. As twelve countries and twenty-seven 
products are modeled, several sources provide the huge amount of mar-
ket data. The main national sources are statistical yearbooks, agricultural 
yearbooks, and monthly statistical bulletins. Good market overviews give 
frequent market reports published by the respective national institutes of 
agricultural economics, which do most of the market surveys. The interna-
tional data sources are mainly the EU-Commission, the FAO, the OECD, 
the USDA, and WTO Schedules. These sources also serve as sources for 
policy data. 
In order to better distinguish between effects of price and trade policies 
and those of downstream efficiency, farmgate and wholesale/processing level 
prices are explicit price variables. All sources mentioned above, especially 
publications of the national institutes of agricultural economics, provide 
price data. Recently, wholesale and processing prices have been published, 
as the wholesale level becomes a more important player on markets in CECs. 
Notable additional sources are studies, literature, and expert estimates from 
OECD (see OECD, 1994a; 1994b; 1995; 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1997; Gorton, 
Buckwell and Davidova, 2000; Miinch, 1997a; Tangermann and Miinch, 
1997). 17 
17The data set used for this study is available on request from the author. 
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2.9 Model Validation 
The usual way to validate a simulation model is by the sensitivity analysis 
of the elasticities. Such an analysis shows how far the results remain stable 
when the elasticities are varied by, say, ten percent. Naturally, interpreta-
tions of the results remain limited in respect to the ability of the model to 
trace reality. This aspect is particularly important for the numerous simula-
tion models, which, like the present one, base their elasticities on literature. 
A more meaningful test, therefore, is a simulation of a past period and a 
comparison of model results and actual data. 
Nolle (2000) validated the EU module of ESIM by calibrating the model on 
a base period of 1989-91, pursued a simulation of the period 1993-97, and 
compared the results with statistical data for the EU. This analysis is also 
very relevant for the analyses of CEC-EU accession effects on agricultural 
markets as the elasticities for the CECs are based on those of the EU (see 
Section 2.2.6). 
One of the scenarios in Nolle uses exogenous EU market prices of the period 
1992-97. The scenarios show a surprising accuracy of the model results 
compared to the actual development of area allocation and herd sizes in the 
EU in this period. For arable crops, Nolle showed that ESIM elasticities 
slightly underestimate the development of wheat area (by 4 to 5 percent) 
and overestimate the barley area (2 to 13 percent), while the ESIM figures 
for other grains, rice, and sugar match reality (see Appendix C Figures C.l 
and C.2). 
On the livestock side, the simulation of the national herd of the EU and 
the real development are also quite close. However, some higher differences 
exist for laying hens (see Nolle, 2000, p. 39; Appendix C Figures C.3 and 
C.4). Human demand in the EU is also well traced in the ESIM simulations 
with some overestimation of butter and skimmed milk powder demand (see 
Nolle, 2000, pp. 42-50). Nolle concludes that ESIM elasticities in general 
closely trace the developments of supply and demand. 
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2.10 Properties and Limits of ESIM and 
Comparison to Other Models 
ESIM is a multi-country, multi-commodity, comparative, static, non-spatial, 
price-based, partial equilibrium model. This section summarizes the prop-
erties and limits of this simulation framework and compares it with related 
large-scale partial equilibrium models. The characteristics of several models 
are summarized in Table 2.4 and 2.5. The Central European Agricultural 
Simulation Model ( CEASIM) was recently developed and is based on flexible 
functional forms (Frohberg et al., 1998). Also included in the comparison 
are the Static World Policy Simulation Modeling (SWOPSIM), the OECD's 
Ministerial Trade Mandate Model (MTM), and its successor, AGLINK. 
All compared models are based on standard neoclassical assumptions of per-
fect markets, i.e. no country or economic agent can exploit market power, 
where commodities are homogeneous and perfect information is available 
at no cost. The assumption of perfect competition is a clear simplification 
of the oligopolistic behavior found on domestic and world markets. For 
example, EU sugar markets are characterized by cooperative behavior (see 
Schmidt, 1991) and trade policy instruments such as variable export sub-
sidies, which when combined with restrictive licensing might invite large 
countries to act strategically on world markets. Among the models, only 
CEASIM has included monopsonistic behavior on milk markets. 
The most commonly chosen way to include transport costs in net trade 
models is to impose mark-up coefficients on domestic price transmission 
functions, as has been done in AGLINK. This methodology distinguishes 
world market prices according to geographical regions, which makes bud-
getary calculations more precise. 18 However, limits arise in simulations of 
trade flows as world markets are still point markets. For this reason, and 
because of the limited ability of partial models to include markets for trans-
port services, ESIM does not recognize transport costs. 
The third aspect, closely linked to transport costs in a conceptual way, is 
the assumption of homogenous commodities. As in all the other listed mod-
els, ESIM commodities are treated as being perfect substitutes regardless of 
their origin and destination. Reality, again, is more complex. The ubiqui-
181n fact AGLINK takes a step further by distinguishing several world markets 
for beef and pork-logical if different trends on these markets prevail in the model 
simulations. 
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tous general way to model bilateral trade is the Armington approach which 
assumes domestic and foreign goods to be imperfect substitutes by applying 
CET functions for producing domestic and exportable goods, and CES func-
tions to determine consumption of imported and domestic goods. 19 Though 
widely used, especially in CGEs, this concept brings with it strong empirical 
problems (see Banse, 1997a). An alternative is a modified demand system, 
such as the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), which has been recently 
applied for modeling bilateral trade (see Weyerbrock, 1996). Though the 
latter concept provides for an empirically and theoretically sound base, it 
lacks the depth needed for a detailed trade policy analysis. 
ESIM is a comparative static model. Though capable of simulating a time 
series, every equilibrium produced is independent from that of prior years. 
Only the World Food Model and AGLINK contain a dynamic component, 
i.e. a lagged adjustment of production of the Nerlovian type. Prices and 
costs of previous years determine production, usually with decreasing im-
pact the further in the past the respective year lies. This lagged adjustment 
makes sense if prices considerably fluctuate between years within the sim-
ulation period. This is the case in the World Food Model, which includes 
stochastic elements to model effects of weather and other related exoge-
nous influences on production and storage. Most of the ESIM commodities, 
except for pork, poultry, and eggs, are characterized by highly regulated 
markets in the EU and, at least after their accession, in the CECs such that 
this element has not been recognized. 
As listed in Table 2.4, all models except CEASIM and MTM are based 
on types of constant elasticity functions. This functional form guarantees 
the condition of homogeneity globally. The other neoclassical conditions, 
such as symmetry, are kept locally. Of the compared models, only CEASIM 
is based on a functional form that guarantees the global fulfillment of all 
supply and demand conditions. 
The implemented policies differ between the compared models according to 
their analytical objective (see Table 2.5). The World Food Model aims at 
analyzing global effects and extends its view to stabilization policies and 
effects of storage. Country- and commodity-specific policies are reflected 
by price transmission elasticities. SWOPSIM, on the other hand, uses CSE 
and PSE percentage protection measures and imposes them on the price 
transmission functions, which is done in a similar way in CEASIM. Both 
19Global CGEs provide a good framework to include transport costs as one 
determinant of bilateral trade {see Hertel and Tsigas, 1997). 
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Table 2.4: Properties and Structural Differences of Partial Equilibrium Models. 
ESIM SWOPSIM MTM AGLINK CEASIM World Food Model 
Roningen OECD, 1987 OECD, 1992 Frohberg Anderson and 
and Dixit, OECD, 1989 et al. 1999 Tyers, 1993 
1989 
Countries 12 36 Selected OECD plus Single 30 
OECD selected country 
countries 
Commodities 27 22 21 9 7 
Homogeneous Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes, Yes 
goods, perfect monopsonistic 
markets behavior in 
some markets 
Spatial No No No No No No 
Transport costs Parameters to 
calculate local 
c.i.f. and f.o.b. 
prices 
Macroeconomic Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions 
linkages (stand alone 
version), CGE 
( recursive version) 
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BEHAVIOR 
Functional Constant Constant Linear Constant Flexible Constant 





Nature Comparative Comparative Comparative Dynamic Comparative Comparative 
static static static static static/ stochastic 
and dynamic 
Adjustment Immediate Immediate Immediate Lagged Immediate Lagged 
Supply• Indirect Direct Indirect Indirect Direct Direct 
Trade Net trade Net trade Net trade Net trade Net trade Net trade 
Storage Exogenous Exogenous Exogenous 
( stochastic version) 
INPUTS 
Feed Price dependent direct feed Price Price Fixed input-output 
input-output demand dependent dependent coefficients 
coefficients input-output input-output 
coefficients coefficients 
Area Part of supply None Yes Yes None None 
Other inputs Exogenous, CGE None Labor,capital Labor,capital 
• Indirect supply functions distinguish between capacities and yields; direct supply functions combine the two elements 












Table 2.5: Modeling of Agricultural Policies. 
ESIM SWOPSIM 
Roningen 
et al., 1991 
Supply Quotas, Set-aside 
constraining set-aside, direct 
payments 
Non-tariff Minimum and Indirectly 
entry prices, with 
prohibitive transmission 




Tariffs Specific and ad Percentage 
valorem tariffs CSE and 
PSE 
MTM AGLINK CEASIM World Food Model 
OECD, 1987 OECD, 1992 Frohberg Anderson and 
OECD, 1989 et al. 1999 Tyers, 1993 




Minimum and Indirectly with 
maximum transmission 
prices elasticities 
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models also provide for the scope of simulating direct supply constraints 
such as set-aside and quotas. MTM and especially AGLINK are modeled 
in a more detailed way to better reflect the policies of individual OECD 
countries. 
Analyzing the effects of introducing the CAP in Central and Eastern Europe 
requires the detailed modeling of EU agricultural policies for tariff and non-
tariff based trade and price policies as well as for direct supply constraints 
and coupled and non-coupled direct payments. Policies are mirrored in 
a very detailed way in ESIM compared to the other partial equilibrium 
models. As a multi-country model, it is capable of simulating effects of 
the European Single Market. As a result, ESIM is a flexible tool to assess 
accession policies. 
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3 Market and Budgetary Effects of Accession 
of the Ten Central European Countries to 
the EU-15 
All of the applicant countries from Central Europe are in the process of 
introducing the Common Legislation, or Acquis Communautaire, in order 
to be able to adopt EU policies once they join the Union. Consequently, 
institutions and markets in the CECs are becoming increasingly compatible 
with those of the EU-15. Some of this alignment has also taken place in the 
area of agricultural policy. This process mostly concerns institutions and 
standards, but also influences market and trade policies. In recent years 
the level of agricultural protection increased in most of the acceding CECs, 
which might be interpreted as a pre-accession policy. 
From 2000 onwards the EU will introduce gradual changes to its agricultural 
policy as set forth in the Agenda 2000 legislation of the Berlin Council of 
March 1999. Earlier analyses have already shown the potential effects of 
the pre-Agenda CAP on agricultural markets and budgets in the CECs 
(see Tangermann and Josling, 1994). Other work has compared accession 
effects under the CAP of 1992 with those that could be expected under the 
EU-Commission's Agenda proposals (see Miinch, 1997; Banse, Miinch and 
Tangermann, 2000; Banse and Miinch, 1998; Miinch, 2000). 
3.1 Scenarios and Main Assumptions 
Building on this work, several scenarios of CEC-EU accession are consid-
ered. Two of these hinge on the structure of the CAP reform, i.e. how much 
different are the effects on agricultural markets, government spending, and 
welfare under the 1992 CAP (CAP-1992) from those under the Agenda 2000 
(AGENDA). A third scenario simulates continuing domestic policies in place 
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in 1997 without accession (NON-ACCESSION). The policy instruments are 
assumed to be the same as those of the CAP, however, within the current 
definition and protection of CEC market and trade policies. Finally, the 
fourth scenario simulates a complete liberalization of agricultural policies 
(LIBERAL). The last two scenarios serve as benchmark scenarios for the 
analysis by addressing the effects related to EU accession relative to the 
present situation and by providing the basis for analyzing welfare effects. 
The analysis is pursued for Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. This anal-
ysis is within the realm of classic partial equilibrium analyses; the treatment 
of macroeconomic indicators is based on assumptions using the stand-alone 
version of ESIM. 
Despite recent political discussions advocating a country-by-country ap-
proach rather than a first and second wave process, the analysis sticks 
to the latter approach. The main reason for this choice is technical as 
it facilitates the interpretation of results. Therefore, first wave accession is 
assumed to take place in 2002/03 for Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, Slovenia, and, deviating from current EU policies, the Slovak 
Republic. In the second wave Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania 
become full members in 2008/09 after the completion of all Agenda 2000 
reforms. In both cases accession takes place without a harmonization period 
and immediate and full integration into the Single Market. 
With full integration into the EU in 2002 and 2008, the Single Market 
extends price formation from the EU-15 to the EU-21 and then to the EU-
25; the supply and total demand of the new member countries are taken 
into account. When the EU net trade position and hence, the price level 
within the band between intervention and entry price is determined, i.e. the 
domestic equilibrium is sought. With introduction of the Single Market, 
it is assumed that marketing margins in the new member countries adjust 
to reflect the increasing competition as barriers to trade and institutional 
obstacles are removed with full integration. 
In March 1999, the EU Council in Berlin finally decided a new agricultural 
policy for the period of 2000-08. Relevant for the simulations is the stepwise 
reduction of intervention prices for cereals, beef, and, beginning in 2005, 
butter and skimmed milk powder. Additionally, direct payments for area 
and beef cattle are increased and new direct payments coupled to milk 
quotas are introduced in 2005. The area payment for oilseeds is gradually 
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aligned with that for cereals. With these steps, direct payments remove 
some of production incentives for oilseeds. 
The treatment of area payments in the AGENDA scenario changes in com-
parison to the CAP-1992 scenario. The AGENDA scenario considers area 
payments as decoupled between cereals and oilseeds. However, since the 
requirement of production and a maximum base area eligible for direct pay-
ments are still valid under the Agenda 2000 regulations, area is constrained 
in the simulations. Compared to the design of the 1992 CAP reform, the 
instruments of agricultural support are further shifted from market price 
support towards direct payments. Tariffs remain unchanged, only cereal 
entry prices are adjusted to the decline of intervention prices according to 
the 155 percent rule (see EU Council, 1999). 
Another important ingredient in market models is the amount of techni-
cal progress assumed in the future production of commodities. Technical 
progress, here assumed to be neutral regarding different inputs, shifts the 
supply curve at given rates per year. These rates are conventional with slight 
country-specific differences. Wheat, corn, and sugar yields are assumed to 
grow by around 2 to 2.4 percent annually while barley, other grains, rape-
seed, sunflower, and soybean yields increase by rates of 1.5 to 1.8 percent. 
Technical progress in livestock production differs between cattle and other 
livestock. While technical progress in the dairy and beef sector increases by 
0.8 to 1 percent per year, pork, poultry, and egg production rise by rates of 
1.2 to 1.5 percent. Feeding efficiency is assumed to increase by 0.5 percent 
yearly for all countries. These rates are the same for all scenarios. 
Other exogenous variables are income and population growth, which are 
based on projections from several sources such as the World Bank, the EU-
Commission, and the FAO. The other macroeconomic indicators, capital 
and labor costs and the real equilibrium exchange rate, are assumed to 
be unchanging. Exchange rates are set at the level of 1997. The analysis 
pursued in this chapter, therefore, resembles a classic partial equilibrium 
analysis, in which the agricultural sector is assumed to be a small sector 
that is not affected, nor is affected by, the rest of the economy. 
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0 Table 3.1: Scenario Assumptions. 
NON-ACCESSION CAP-1992 AGENDA 
Macroeconomic and 
cost indicators 
Real exchange rates, capital costs: constant 
Income: country-specific rates 
LIBERAL 
labor costs, other consumer prices: increase by 1 percent per year 
Tech n ica I progress 
Policies 
Single Market and 
full implementation 

























Alignment to EU 
margins with 
Single Market 
10% with full accession 
In compliance with WTO 
restrictions on max. 
subsidized exports 
Compensatory payments 
for area and beef 






Alignment to EU 
margins with 
Single Market 
10% with full accession 
In compliance with WTO 
restrictions on max. 
subsidized exports 
Compensatory payments 
for area ( decoupled) 
Headage payments for 
dairy cows and 
beef cattle 
CAP prices and tariffs 
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3.2 The Development of CEC Markets under 
Different Scenarios 
One of the main driving factors in the simulations of CEC-EU accession is 
the price difference between the acceding CECs and the EU. These prices 
represent exactly that price where the lever of CAP price and trade policy 
instruments is applied. At the beginning of transformation, the price gap 
was large. This is explained by significant liberalization of trade regimes, 
missing market institutions, low world market prices, poor average qualities 
of agricultural and food products, and not least, high protection within 
the CAP (see Tangermann and Josling, 1994). In recent years prices in the 
CECs have been closing in on EU levels due to increases in protection, better 
market institutions, restructuring the agricultural and food sector, higher 
world market prices, and decreasing EU market prices. However, large 
country- and commodity-specific differences remain. Figure 3.1 compares 
the 1997 price gap between the EU-15 and the CECs at the wholesale/first 
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Figure 3.1: Relative Wholesale Price in the CECs, 1997. 
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While a large wholesale price gap still existed in 1997 in net-exporter Hun-
gary (prices at 42 to 80 percent of respective EU-15 prices), net importing 
countries such as Poland increased protection and raised prices, and ap-
proached the EU situation in recent years. In second wave countries, es-
pecially Bulgaria (25 to 85 percent of EU prices) and Romania (40 to 98 
percent), large price differences towards the EU remain, sometimes at lev-
els below world market prices, mainly for transitional reasons. These two 
countries only recently underwent substantial transition reforms including 
price liberalization for agricultural and food commodities, almost a decade 
later than Hungary and Poland. In general the CECs have prices close to, 
but typically below EU levels and only Slovenia's wholesale prices remain 
significantly higher; Slovene wheat and beef prices are 160 and 150 percent 
of the EU level. For poultry and dairy products, which are surplus products 
in Slovenia, prices are 10 and 15 percent below those of the EU. 
Looking at commodities, the wholesale price gap is lower for those which 
are less protected by the CAP, i.e. wheat, oilseeds, pork, poultry, and eggs. 
Still a larger gap remains between the highly protected commodities of the 
CAP: coarse grains, sugar, dairy, and beef. Therefore, producer incentives 
during accession remain high, especially in the second wave countries. 
Figure 3.2 compares EU-15 and CEC prices in 2008 after all Agenda reforms, 
including those on the milk market, have been completed. 1 The CAP reform 
diminishes the price gaps for wheat and barley, somewhat for beef, and less 
so for butter and other dairy products. Cereal wholesale prices in the first 
wave countries are on a higher level than those of the EU (except Hungary, 
and additionally for other grains in Poland). With Agenda 2000 reforms, 
the price gap for beef decreases only slightly. The main cause is the change 
from an intervention-based system to a market regime which resembles that 
applied to pork, poultry, and eggs. In these scenarios, the price of beef in 
the EU-15 falls roughly to 75 to 85 percent of the intervention price of 1997 
as net exports sufficiently lift the market price above the safety net price 
of 60 percent of the guidance price. Still large gaps remain for the regimes 
that are minimally reformed (dairy) or unreformed (sugar). 
For the second wave countries Bulgaria and Romania, the price differences 
remain substantial despite the Agenda 2000 reforms, and cereal prices are 
assumed to reach world market price levels as a consequence of transitional 
1The NON-ACCESSION scenario keeps policies constant, i.e. administrative 
prices and tariffs. However, production costs are assumed to increase over time, 
the same as other consumer goods. 
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reforms. For different reasons a similar large price gap also remains for 
Hungary. For the other countries a mixed picture appears. 
While the prices shown thus far are wholesale prices, i.e. the price level at 
which CAP instruments apply, in the simulation model supply depends on 
producer prices. In the model, producer prices are derived from wholesale 
prices using a percentage margin. 2 As the margins adjust to EU-15 levels, 
producer prices change correspondingly with a given wholesale price; a de-
cline of margins increases producer prices while an increase of margins puts 
2The margins for the EU-15 are based on differences in producer and wholesale 
prices from various statistical sources (e.g. ZMP, Eurostat, OECD). Margins for 
the CECs are based on those used by the OECD in their PSE calculations and 
expert estimates. The margins for sugar and dairy are calculated in the fashion 
of the CAP, i.e. calculated with respect to the content of sugar in sugar beets 
and fat in milk, as well as by using the processing margins assumed in the CAP 
regulations for the EU-15 (see CAP Monitor). These calculated reference prices 
are then compared with the actual producer prices for sugar beets and milk (see 
Tangermann and Miinch, 1997). 
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pressure on producer prices. Cereal and oilseed margins in the CECs are 
very different from those in the EU-15. While Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, 
and Romania have significantly higher margins ( around 18 to 24 percent of 
the wholesale price), those in Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and 
the Baltics are close to those of the EU-15 of 8.5 percent in 1997. Sugar beet 
and milk processing on the other hand are roughly 18 to 32 percent and 15 
to 26 percent less efficient than in the EU-15. Livestock slaughtering gives 
a different picture. Here margins are around half of those in the EU-15, 
which might be interpreted as differences in standards and technology. 3 
In each CEC, the overall change in agricultural price level due to accession 
will depend on the product composition of its agricultural output. The 
exposure of the countries towards the effects of accession in agriculture 
becomes visible in Figure 3.3, where commodities are grouped according 
to their degree of protection under the CAP after Agenda 2000. Highly 
protected commodities under Agenda regulations are sugar, rye, dairy, and 
barley, while less protected commodities are wheat, corn, oilseeds, beef, 
pork, poultry, and eggs. Poland and the Baltic countries have the highest 
exposure to CAP incentives, with over 50 percent of agricultural production 
value in highly protected commodities. Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria 
have the lowest exposure; less protected commodities make up only 10 to 
25 percent of agricultural production. 
In the CAP 1992 scenario, coarse grains, beef, and dairy enjoy higher prices 
than in the AGENDA scenario. This leads to a higher percentage of highly 
protected commodities and thus to a higher exposure of CECs towards the 
effects of the CAP. 
Future market balances in the CECs will change over time in response to 
price changes as resulting from accession and from market developments, 
but also from external factors such as macroeconomic developments and 
technical progress. Tables 3.2 to 3. 7 summarize the results for the base 
period (the average of 1995-97), for 2002 when the first group of CECs joins 
the Union, for 2008 when the second wave countries become EU members, 
and finally, 2012 when the extended Union is several years old. Results are 
presented for the aggregates of the six first wave countries (Tables 3.2-3.4) 
and for the four second wave countries (Tables 3.5-3.7). 
3Livestock prices in the CECs represent quality levels for intervention prices 
(R3 young bulls for cattle and E quality carcasses for pork). Chicken carcass 
prices for standard qualities in the EU represent poultry prices for the CECs. 
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Figure 3.3: Share of Highly Protected Commodities in the CEC-10 under the 
AGENDA Scenario, 2012 (share in production value). 
Continuing domestic policies in the first wave CEC-6 in the NON-
ACCESSION scenario causes crop production to grow more rapidly than 
domestic use. The first wave countries shift from importing cereals, espe-
cially coarse grains, to exporting 3 Mill. tons in 2012. Most of these exports 
are wheat. Net exports on the other crop markets increase. For livestock a 
mixed picture appears: Net exports of pork increase from 0.17 Mill. tons in 
1995-97 to 0.51 Mill. tons until 2008, and decline afterwards to 0.44 Mill. 
tons in 2012. For poultry, the CEC-6 turn from net exporters in 1995-97 to 
net importers in 2012. Consumption of poultry increases more than that of 
other livestock, especially beef. Net exports of beef and eggs remain fairly 
constant. 
Results for intensive livestock products are caused by modeling CEC policies 
slightly differently than those of the EU (see Equation 2.40). The CECs are 
allowed to export pork, poultry, and eggs in accordance with their WTO 
commitments for the maximum amount of subsidized exports, if domestic 
prices are higher than world market prices. This allows some countries to go 
from net-importing to net-exporting status. Should domestic prices reach 
world market levels, the countries may export without constraints. 
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Table 3.2: Development of Production in the First Wave Countries under Different Scenarios (Mill. tons) . 
First Wave 1995-97 2002 
NON- LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION ACCESSION 
Cereals 48.06 45.65 52.26 55.85 53.03 49.70 
of which 
Wheat 18.76 18.89 20.62 17.71 17.41 20.75 
Coarse grains 29.30 26.76 31.64 38.14 35.62 28.95 
Oilseeds 2.40 2.58 2.78 2.03 2.26 2.88 
Sugar* 3.41 3.12 3.30 3.77 3.82 2.98 
Milk 19.43 19.46 19.88 23.80 23.80 20.08 
Butter 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.30 
Beef 0.85 0.86 0.83 1.11 1.13 0.86 
Pork 3.14 3.31 3.51 3.24 3.42 3.64 
Poultry 1.12 1.21 1.15 1.79 1.82 1.28 











































LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION 
55.42 62.64 66.90 60.52 59.91 
23.37 25.14 21.83 20.72 25.44 
32.05 37.50 45.06 39.79 34.47 
3.17 3.26 2.47 2.69 3.39 
3.39 4.00 3.90 3.89 3.70 
22.41 23.39 23.80 24.27 24.10 
0.30 0.27 0.34 0.33 0.30 
0.96 0.97 1.12 1.14 1.04 
3.97 4.19 3.67 3.70 4.19 
1.38 1.40 0.89 1.01 1.13 












Table 3.3: Development of Total Domestic Use in the First Wave Countries under Different Scenarios (Mill. tons). 
First Wave 1995--97 2002 
NON- LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION ACCESSION 
Cereals 48.09 53.33 50.92 44.13 48.36 56.53 
of which 
Wheat 18.24 18.55 19.34 17.98 18.99 19.61 
Coarse grains 29.86 34.78 31.58 26.15 29.38 36.92 
Oilseeds 2.28 2.39 2.23 2.21 2.23 2.33 
Sugar 2.91 2.92 2.93 2.66 2.60 2.95 
Milk 19.43 19.46 19.88 23.80 23.80 20.08 
Butter 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.25 
Beef 0.80 0.91 0.81 0.75 0.77 0.92 
Pork 2.97 3.21 3.01 3.05 3.22 3.30 
Poultry 1.03 1.02 1.11 0.92 0.93 1.08 










































LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION 
61.89 59.35 49.89 53.37 66.00 
21.51 22.85 20.70 20.93 23.14 
40.38 36.51 29.01 32.44 42.86 
2.60 2.61 2.60 2.61 2.76 
3.19 3.37 2.94 2.80 3.40 
22.41 23.39 23.80 24.27 24.10 
0.28 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.30 
0.99 0.94 0.87 0.88 1.06 
3.75 3.75 4.02 4.05 4.19 
1.30 1.57 1.26 1.17 1.54 











Table 3.4: Development of Net Exports in the First Wave Countries under Different Scenarios (Mill. tons). 
First Wave 1995-97 2002 
NON- LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION ACCESSION 
Cereals -0.03 -7.68 1.34 10.70 4.11 -6.83 
of which 
Wheat 0.52 0.34 1.28 0.73 -0.52 1.14 
Coarse grains -0.55 -8.02 0.06 14.83 9.17 -7.97 
Oilseeds 0.11 0.19 0.55 -0.18 0.03 0.55 
Sugar 0.50 0.20 0.36 1.11 1.22 0.03 
Milk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Butter 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.05 
Beef 0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.36 0.35 -0.06 
Pork 0.17 0.10 0.50 0.19 0.20 0.35 
Poultry 0.10 0.19 0.05 0.87 0.89 0.20 
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LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION 
-6.47 3.29 15.86 6.49 -6.09 
1.86 2.29 2.29 0.96 2.30 
-8.33 0.99 19.31 10.60 -3.56 
0.56 0.65 -0.13 0.08 0.63 
0.20 0.63 0.96 1.09 0.30 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.09 0.00 
-0.03 0.03 0.25 0.27 -0.02 
0.22 0.44 -0.35 -0.35 0.00 
0.07 -0.34 0.97 1.00 -0.09 











Table 3.5: Development of Production in the Second Wave Countries under Different Scenarios (Mill. tons) . 
Second Wave 1995-97 2002 
NON- LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION ACCESSION 
Cereals 25.51 26.60 27.58 27.57 27.56 29.40 
of which 
Wheat 9.11 9.67 9.82 9.80 9.79 10.81 
Coarse grains 16.41 16.93 17.76 17.78 17.77 18.59 
Oilseeds 1.67 1.41 2.03 2.04 2.05 1.36 
Sugar* 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 
Milk 7.68 10.22 7.10 7.08 7.08 9.80 
Butter 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Beef 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.44 
Pork 1.04 1.12 1.37 1.38 1.39 1.23 
Poultry 0.46 0.31 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.40 










































LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION 
32.89 33.57 38.60 35.01 35.86 
12.27 12.06 13.79 12.65 13.49 
20.62 21.51 24.81 22.36 22.37 
1.33 1.91 0.92 1.06 1.30 
0.44 0.48 0.40 0.40 0.49 
11.07 8.42 9.30 9.30 12.12 
0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
0.47 0.35 0.54 0.54 0.50 
1.36 1.80 1.45 1.38 1.46 
0.46 0.66 0.79 0.74 0.50 











Table 3.6: Development of Domestic Use in the Second Wave Countries under Different Scenarios (Mill. tons). 
Second Wave 1995-97 2002 
NON- LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION ACCESSION 
Cereals 25.55 25.97 27.81 27.91 27.85 28.43 
of which 
Wheat 8.95 9.27 9.55 9.56 9.55 10.06 
Coarse grains 16.60 16.70 18.26 18.35 18.30 18.37 
Oilseeds 1.59 1.42 1.84 2.19 2.14 1.40 
Sugar 0.73 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.68 
Milk 7.68 10.22 7.10 7.08 7.08 9.80 
Butter 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Beef 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.40 
Pork 1.04 1.32 1.29 1.30 1.30 1.39 
Poultry 0.45 0.34 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.42 









































LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION 
31.35 33.05 34.68 32.96 33.89 
11.12 11.24 12.29 11.68 12.03 
20.24 21.81 22.39 21.28 21.85 
1.36 1.70 0.75 0.88 1.33 
0.73 0.81 0.67 0.66 0.78 
11.07 8.42 9.28 9.30 12.12 
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
0.42 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.44 
1.50 1.62 1.61 1.56 1.60 
0.47 0.64 0.75 0.70 0.52 












Table 3.7: Development of Net Exports in the Second Wave Countries under Different Scenarios (Mill. tons). 
Second Wave 1995-97 2002 
NON- LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION ACCESSION 
Cereals -0.03 -7.68 1.34 11.72 4.66 -6.83 
of which 
Wheat 0.52 0.34 1.28 -0.27 -1.58 1.14 
Coarse grains -0.55 -8.02 0.06 11.99 6.24 -7.97 
Oilseeds 0.11 0.19 0.55 -0.18 0.03 0.55 
Sugar 0.50 0.20 0.36 1.11 1.22 0.03 
Milk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Butter 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.05 
Beef 0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.36 0.35 -0.06 
Pork 0.17 0.10 0.50 0.19 0.20 0.35 
Poultry 0.10 0.19 0.05 0.87 0.89 0.20 
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LIBERAL NON- CAP-1992 AGENDA LIBERAL 
ACCESSION 
-6.47 3.29 17.19 7.15 -6.09 
1.86 2.29 1.14 -0.21 2.30 
-8.33 0.99 16.06 7.35 -8.39 
0.56 0.65 -0.13 0.08 0.63 
0.20 0.63 0.96 1.09 0.30 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.09 0.00 
-0.03 0.03 0.25 0.27 -0.02 
0.22 0.44 -0.35 -0.35 0.00 
0.07 -0.34 0.97 1.00 -0.09 
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Freeing the markets as assumed under the LIBERAL scenario has only lim-
ited effects on production compared to the scenario with unchanged agri-
cultural policies. While wheat production remains almost at the levels of 
NON-ACCESSION in 2002, coarse grain production for the first wave coun-
tries is about 2.7 Mill. tons lower. Oilseeds become more attractive, because 
domestic prices slightly increase. Livestock production benefits from lower 
cereal prices for feeds and production expands slightly. All producer prices, 
except those for livestock, benefit from the assumed decrease of processing 
margins in cereals, oilseeds, sugar, and milk as well as in the case of com-
modities little protected from increasing world market prices. Some world 
market prices in small world markets (e.g. cheese, sugar) sharply increase as 
a result of total liberalization, especially dropping the CAP in the EU-15. 
In these small markets, even a slight change in net exports of big coun-
tries result in relatively high changes in world market prices. Consumption 
of agricultural products is higher than in the NON-ACCESSION scenario. 
Consumption of livestock products in particular increases, to the highest lev-
els of all scenarios. As a result the first wave countries have lower levels of 
net exports of almost all agricultural products ( except poultry and initially 
oilseeds) in the LIBERAL scenario than under current policies. Under free 
market conditions, the first wave countries turn into significant importers 
of coarse grains and then decrease in the simulation period, mainly due to 
technical progress and increasing world market prices. This development 
continues up to 2012. 
In the second wave countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania), 
developments are different. This is mainly due to the fact that agricultural 
production in Romania and Bulgaria was partly taxed during the base pe-
riod of 1995-97 due to transition-based deficiencies in the agri-food chain. 
In contrast, protection was positive in the first wave countries ( except partly 
in Hungary). In the second wave countries, liberalization leads to higher 
domestic market prices and higher production of cereals, milk, beef, and 
pork. Production of other positively protected commodities, i.e. oilseeds, 
sugar, poultry, and eggs, drops under world market conditions (see Tables 
3.5-3.7). Consumption, on the other hand, rises in Latvia and Lithuania 
because of lower prices in the LIBERAL scenario, but partly suffers in Bul-
garia and Romania. This development leads to increasing net imports in 
the free market situation. 
Upon accession in 2002, production of cereals in first wave countries reacts 
most strongly under CAP-1992 policies: coarse grain production is 6.6 Mill. 
tons higher than under NON-ACCESSION conditions. Rye production in 
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Poland, corn production in Hungary, and barley production in the Czech 
Republic are the main beneficiaries from the incentives of the CAP. Wheat 
production, on the other hand, decreases by 3 Mill. tons, because relative 
prices change in favor of coarse grain production. Total cereal production 
is 3.6 Mill. tons above NON-ACCESSION levels. Set-asides prescribe land 
use, though to different effective rates. The calculation of effective set-aside 
takes into account the amount of arable area under small-scale holdings and 
administrative slippage. The area of small holders falls under the simpli-
fied scheme and is exempted from set-aside. Administrative slippage is the 
disparity between the area which should be under set-aside and that actu-
ally set-aside. This kind of slippage is also applied in the CECs. The area 
of small-scale holders is assumed to be increasing and, after EU accession, 
slightly decreasing by country-specific rates. 
In sectors with predominantly small-scale farms, like in Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Estonia, effective set-aside is only a fraction of the nominal 
10 percent. In sectors with small-scale farming like in Hungary and the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, effective set-aside is close to 10 percent (see 
Table 3.8). Since most of the arable area in the CECs is in countries with 
predominantly small-scale holdings, the instrument of set-aside is far less 
effective as a production control than in the EU-15. Compared to the EU-15 
with 6.5 percent set-aside, only 2.6 percent of the area in the CECs is taken 
out of production. 
The AGENDA scenario is providing less producer incentives as EU inter-
vention prices for cereals decrease by 15 percent. Coarse grain production 
is only 4 Mill. tons higher than in the NON-ACCESSION scenario. In the 
AGENDA and CAP-1992 scenarios, wheat production remains at 17 Mill. 
tons in 2002, because wheat prices only moderately change and because 
world market prices become higher than the intervention price. CAP-1992 
clearly sets signals for coarse grain production. As a result, oilseed produc-
tion is 0.2 Mill. tons higher in the AGENDA scenario than under CAP-1992 
conditions, despite the fact that the area payments of oilseeds are signifi-
cantly higher than under AGENDA scenario conditions. However, some 
potential effects are not included in the model. Such effects could include 
roughage area transformed into cereal and oilseed production once farmers 
anticipate impending introduction of direct payments. Moreover, the effect 
of increased production of silage maize, which is also eligible for direct pay-
ments, is not incorporated. Hence, the model probably underestimates the 
potential effects of direct payments on overall area allocation. 
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Table 3.8: Effective Set-Aside under 10 Percent Set-Aside Rate, 2012. 
Effective Set- Small-scale Effective Set- Base Area 
Aside Holders Aside 
(%) (% of area ) (Mill. ha) (Mill. ha) 
Lithuania 1.0 88.0 0.010 1.065 
Poland 1.2 85.0 0.110 9.133 
Romania 1.5 81.0 0.107 7.053 
Estonia 1.8 77.0 0.006 0.314 
Latvia 1.9 76.0 0.009 0.448 
Bulgaria 2.0 74.7 0.051 2.501 
Slovenia 2.1 73.4 0.002 0.100 
Hungary 7.1 10.9 0.238 3.339 
Slovak Rep. 7.6 5.0 0.073 0.968 
Czech Rep. 7.7 3.7 0.144 1.874 
CEC-10 2.6 67.5 0.693 26.795 
EU-15 6.5 18.6 2.884 44.376 
Source: National statistics; own calculations. 
In the livestock sector, milk production responds considerably to accession. 
In 2002, around 4 Mill. tons more milk is produced under AGENDA and 
CAP-1992 conditions than under NON-ACCESSION conditions. Equally 
responsive are poultry and beef production. Only pork and egg production 
is lower under accession as EU-21 prices are lower than domestic prices in the 
NON-ACCESSION scenario. Compared to CAP-1992, livestock production 
benefits from lower feed costs in the AGENDA scenario. Milk production 
increases to the assumed quota of 23.8 Mill. tons. Under the AGENDA 
scenario, quotas increase by 2 percent under reforms scheduled for 2005-07. 
The 15 percent decrease of butter and skimmed milk powder prices has only 
limited effects on production of these dairy products. 
Some distortions of the CAP are not visible in the market results, namely the 
supply side effects of quotas for highly protected sugar and dairy products. 
If higher quotas are assumed, average protection rapidly increases because 
the share of highly protected commodities enlarges. 
Quotas distort production by containing supply to a predefined level. At 
the same time, market prices stay on a high level via intervention systems 
and export subsidies. In the simulations, shadow prices for the quota prod-
ucts are calculated. The shadow price is the price at which farmers produce 
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exactly the amount of the quota. Figure 3.4 compares market and shadow 
prices for sugar in four CECs under the AGENDA scenario in 2006. In 
Slovenia, sugar quotas are not binding, consequently shadow prices remain 
at the market price level. In Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, 
quotas restrict production by varying degrees, i.e. most severely in Hungary 
and less so in Poland and the Czech Republic. This means the Czech Repub-
lic would produce the same amount of white sugar (0.38 Mill. tons), if the 
sugar price were 543 EUR/ton instead of the market price of 679 EUR/ton. 
This shows the extraordinary protection given by the CAP's sugar regime 
which is not visible in market balances. Sugar producers in Poland would 
need roughly 220 EUR/ton less than the guaranteed CAP price to produce 
the assumed quota of 1.78 Mill. tons; in Hungary a price of 289 EUR/ton 
would be sufficient to induce production of 0.35 Mill. tons of white sugar. 
The difference between market and shadow price is the so-called quota rents 
per ton, which producers receive without providing extra economic activ-
ity. These rents increase with technical progress over time. Generally lower 









Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovenia 
I 0 Market price D Shadow price I 
Figure 3.4: Market and Shadow Prices for Sugar in Four CECs under 
AGENDA Scenario Conditions, 2006. 
-
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Domestic use responds in an analogous way; increasing coarse grain prices 
lead to higher wheat use and lower coarse grain use in animal feed. As a 
result, in the CAP-1992 scenario, net exports of coarse grains expand by 
14. 77 Mill. tons in 2002, while at the same time in the first wave countries, 
exports of wheat decrease and oilseeds are net imported. In the livestock 
sector, dairy products in particular are increasingly exported, as are beef 
and poultry. In the AGENDA scenario, some of the distortions produced 
on agricultural markets during accession diminish; the first wave countries 
have 6 Mill. tons less in cereals exports. 
Accession raises prices higher in the second wave countries than in the first 
wave countries. However, the lines of development are similar. The CAP 
design of 1992 increases net exports of cereals considerably on accession 
in 2008. At the same time oilseed production is lower than under NON-
ACCESSION conditions. Therefore, the second wave countries turn into 
net importers of oilseeds. In the livestock sector, milk and beef production 
again increase while pork and egg production enjoy less favorable conditions 
under accession. Some of the effects in Bulgaria and Romania depend on 
the ability of the downstream sector to restructure and compete on the 
Single Market. In these simulations it is assumed that downstream efficiency 
adjusts to EU-15 levels. 
From 2008 the CEC-10 members of the EU are considerable net exporters 
of cereals: 29 Mill. tons under the CAP-1992 scenario and 13 Mill. tons 
in the AGENDA scenario. Dairy, beef, and poultry are equally exported 
under these two scenarios, while pork and egg exports are smaller compared 
to the NON-ACCESSION scenario. The Agenda reforms remove much of 
the incentive to produce that existed in the unreformed CAP, though they 
ingrain significant protection to leave the CEC-10 considerable net exporters 
of agricultural commodities in 2012 compared to a free market situation and 
to current policies. 
3.3 Budgetary Effects 
As far as budget implications are concerned, ESIM generates projections 
only for net expenditure on trade measures, i.e. export subsidies minus tariff 
revenues and compensatory and headage payments. To make the model 
results comparable to FEOGA guarantee spending, conversion factors have 
been applied to include expenditures for administration and storage. These 
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conversion factors are based on model results for the EU-15 for the base 
period, that is the average of 1995-97, and the actual budgetary outlays for 
the model products in the same period (see Table 3.9). 
These comparisons, calculated with the help of the model results and actual 
FEOGA spending, show that the pure model results for budgetary outlays 
underestimate actual spending, but overestimate direct payments for beef 
and export subsidies for eggs. There are several reasons for this. First, the 
EU-15 is exporting to different markets which requires different levels of 
export subsidies not displayed in the model. Moreover, intervention storage 
for beef and dairy products is actually more expensive than the pure export 
refunds. On the other hand, some commodities like poultry, eggs, and pork 
are partly exported without refunds, e.g. about 50 percent of pork and the 
majority of egg exports. This explains the overestimation of budgetary 
results for eggs. 
On the other hand, area payments are quite accurately mirrored by the 
model results, except for beef premiums, which can be explained by the 
various ceilings for maximum payments. For example, farms only receive 
premiums for up to 90 heads; moreover, national and partly regional ceilings 
for maximum payments exist. The model therefore overestimates these 
payments. 
It is difficult to apply these coefficients to the CECs as budget results assume 
they use intervention storage and exports from the so-called "free market" 
in equal proportions as the EU-15. This might not be the case as argued in 
Section 4.8. However, this simple method allows for some interpretations of 
aggregated results, which otherwise would not be possible. 
Table 3.9: Model Results: EU Budget Expenditure as Percentage of Actual 
Spending for the EU-15 (actual outlays= 1). 
Market Guarantee Direct Payments 
Cereals 0.80 0.95 
Dairy 0.23 




Source: EU-Commission, 19976; own calculations. 
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Figure 3.5 shows the development of market guarantee spending, i.e. out-
lays for export subsidies, storage, and other related spending items. The 
less distorting effects of the AGENDA scenario are clearly visible as market 
guarantee spending increases less under AGENDA than CAP-1992 scenario 
conditions. While the unreformed CAP increases spending to 6 Bill. EUR 
in 2008, the AGENDA scenario results in roughly 2.5 Bill. EUR less for 
market guarantee outlays. The main reason is lower intervention prices. 
Corresponding to smaller incentives to produce together with lower net ex-
ports, world market prices for key commodities are generally higher in the 
AGENDA simulations than in the CAP-1992 simulations. This, in turn, 
contributes to less need for export subsidies. However, compared to do-
mestic policies, either of the two CAP designs proves to be costly in market 
guarantee spending. The sources of the costs are the highly protected coarse 
grains (barley and other grains), dairy, and in the CAP-1992 scenario, also 
beef. 
Figure 3.6 depicts spending for direct payments in the CEC-10. Direct 
payments are lower in the unreformed CAP. In 2008 direct payments under 
the AGENDA scenario amount to 10.3 Bill. EUR, of which around 6.2 
Bill. in direct payments benefit the first wave countries. In the CAP-1992 
scenario, direct payments are around 1 Bill. EUR less for the CEC-10 in 
2008. The difference between the two scenarios is a result of stepwise dairy 
payments introduced beginning in 2005, increased beef cattle payments, and 
differences in arable area payment. 
Figure 3.7 shows the development of total budgetary outlays for the CEC-10 
in different scenarios. Total liberalized markets cause no budgetary outlays 
because domestic prices are the same as world market prices. In the NON-
ACCESSION scenario, spending for the products included in ESIM total 
0. 7 Bill. EUR for all CECs. On accession of the first wave countries in 2002, 
budgetary spending in the CAP-1992 scenario increases to 10 Bill. EUR. The 
AGENDA scenario causes 8 to 9 Bill. EUR of direct payments and market 
guarantee expenditure. When the second wave countries accede in 2008, 
total expenditure for the CEC-10 increases to 15 Bill. EUR in the CAP-1992 
scenario, while the AGENDA scenario shows 13 Bill. EUR in budgetary 
outlays. Two factors explain the difference between the CAP-1992 and 
the AGENDA scenarios. First, the lower spending on direct payments is 
a result of oilseed area receiving the same payments as cereals under the 
AGENDA scenario. Second, the AGENDA scenario prices give less incentive 
to produce, especially in the first wave countries. 
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Figure 3.6: Direct Payments for the CEC-10 in Different Scenarios. 
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Figure 3. 7: Direct Payments and Market Guarantee Outlays for the CEC-10 
in Different Scenarios. 
Most budgetary spending, therefore, is caused by direct payments for area 
and cattle. Direct payments form the largest portion of total spending, 
which clearly shows their political importance in the accession negotiations. 
Each country's share of market guarantee spending is shown in Figure 3.8. 
The largest outlays go to Poland and Romania with 28 and 23 percent, 
respectively. The Czech Republic and Hungary have a share of 12 and 11 
percent, respectively. The remaining outlays go to the smaller agricultural 
producers. 
3.4 Policy Assumptions and Budgetary Expenditure 
The simulations show that direct payments of all kinds represent the ma-
jority of agricultural expenditure in the EU-15 as well as in the CEC-10. 
Actual market expenditure accounts for only a fraction of the expenditure. 
Agenda 2000 policies further increase the importance of direct payments. 
This element of expenditure for the CEC-10 depends primarily on the out-
come of the accession negotiations, which define base area, base yields, cattle 
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Figure 3.8: Share of Budgetary Outlays in the CEC-10, 2008. 
premiums, and, by fixing the appropriate level of milk quotas, the level of 
direct payments for milk. The majority of the expenditure is therefore com-
pletely policy determined and varies with the political success of the EU-15, 
which seeks to restrict additional spending, and the ability of the CEC-10 to 
invest political capital in these areas. This section examines the variability 
of agricultural expenditure relative to the political assumptions. 
Market guarantee costs are highly sensitive to assumptions made about the 
milk quota in the CEC-10. 4 As the amount of quota finally granted to the 
new members is a political question rather than a technical or statistical one, 
the sensitivity of market guarantee costs towards higher quota assumptions 
is calculated (see Table 3.10). 
The calculations outside the model framework assume constant prices on 
world and domestic markets. It is also assumed that liquid milk and fresh 
milk products are the favorable produce of dairies, giving milk higher value 
4 Market expenditure assumes that all the surpluses of the EU-15 and the CEC-
10 are to be exposed by government intervention and exports to world markets. 
Some cost-dampening effects could appear for those commodities, that are in 
deficit in one group of countries and in surplus in the other. These effects are not 
taken into account. 
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Table 3.10: Supply, Use, and Market Guarantee Spending under Different Assumptions for Milk Quotas in the 
CEC-10, 2008. 
-1 Mill. tons 2008 +1 Mill. tons +2 Mill. tons +3 Mill. tons 
CEC-10 Quota 32.57 33.57 34.57 35.57 36.57 
Supply 
SMP 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.45 
Butter 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.46 
Cheese 0.71 0 .74 0.77 0 .80 0.83 
Domestic Use 
Liquid milk 8.89 8.89 8.89 8.89 8.89 
Manufactured use 23.68 24.68 25.68 26.68 27.68 
SMP 0 .10 0.10 0 .10 0 .10 0.10 
Butter 0 .35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Cheese 0.72 0.72 0 .72 0.72 0.72 
Net Exports 
SMP 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.35 
Butter 0 .04 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 
Cheese -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 
Market Guarantee Expenditure (Mill. EUR) 
SMP 386.35 410.72 435.09 460.45 485.81 
Butter 720.83 1017.79 1314.76 1623.76 1932.75 
Cheese 0.00 8.80 25.89 43.67 61.45 
Sum of dairy 1107.17 1437.31 1775.74 2127.87 2480.01 
Total market guarantee 2705.46 3035.60 3374.03 3726.17 4078.30 
spending (Mill. EUR) 
Total market guarantee 89 100 111 123 134 
(2008 = 100) 
Total milk production 97 100 103 106 109 
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added than the production of butter, SMP, and cheese. As a result of these 
two assumptions, domestic use of dairy products, liquid milk, and fresh milk 
products stays constant. However, for the supply side the model mechanism 
applies to the distribution of manufactured milk in the individual dairy 
products (see Section 2.2.5). The calculations change the milk quota in 1 
Mill. ton steps starting from the assumed quota of 2008 for the CEC-10 
under the AGENDA scenario. As domestic consumption stays constant, 
net exports balance the market. With all these restrictions, including the 
rather limited dairy sector modeling of ESIM, some simple conclusions can 
be drawn. 
Market expenditure for market guarantee in dairy changes significantly for 
different levels of quotas. Regarding the high share of dairy in total mar-
ket guarantee expenditure (45 percent for the CEC-10 in 2008), the total 
is highly sensitive to changes in the milk quota. An increase of the milk 
quota by 1 Mill. tons increases overall spending by 11 percent, 2 Mill. tons 
by 22 percent. This also works for a quota decrease. The setting of quotas, 
therefore, has much leverage on total market guarantee expenditure. Addi-
tional costs or savings arise under Agenda 2000 policies as these link direct 
payments for dairy cattle to the quota. 
Equally sensitive are the calculations for direct payments of area. Statis-
tical data for the CECs shows that arable area remains relatively stable, 
while yields vary considerably depending on weather and market condi-
tions. Political maneuvering room for the CECs on the area side seems to 
be lower than the possibility of arguing for higher base yields, especially 
in the context of transition, bad weather, and tight markets. It is likely 
that arguments will be similar to those used by Spain and Portugal in the 
aftermath of the 1992 reform to negotiate higher base yields than justified 
by any reference period. 
The scenarios as presented above are relatively generous regarding the choice 
of base yields. It is assumed that the CECs would be able to negotiate 
base yields to 2008 levels, even when entry takes place in 2002 for the first 
wave countries. If one assumes lower base yields, expenditure could be 
significantly less. The same holds for beef and for milk premiums as these 
crucially depend on reference levels. 
Table 3.11 shows a calculation of different levels of area payments per coun-
try depending on the levels of base area and base yields. If the CEC-10 
succeed in negotiating the implementing of base yields at possible 2008 
yields, total payments would sum up to 6. 7 Bill. EUR. With lower yields, 
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set at the average of 1995-97, total spending would be 5.2 Bill. EUR. This 
simple example shows that 23 percent of the direct payments for area, or 
1.5 Bill. EUR, depends on the level of base yields chosen. 
In the AGENDA scenario, cattle and milk premiums add up to approxi-
mately 3. 7 Bill. EUR. This amount depends again on the political choices 
of the amount of milk quota and number of cattle premiums. In simulations, 
quotas and premiums represent a generous choice giving all CECs room to 
expand production. A restrictive base for this category of direct payments, 
i.e. based on the assumption that the CECs should not increase production, 
both direct payments for cattle and milk as well as related market expen-
diture would drop. With this political model, direct payments for livestock 
could be restricted to about half of the 3. 7 Bill. EUR. 
Depending on the political choices for milk quotas, direct payments for 
area, and the number of cattle premiums, the possible range of budgetary 
costs for direct payments could range from 6.5 to 10.3 Bill. EUR under 
Agenda 2000 policies. Total spending, including market guarantee, would 
then add up to 9.2 to 13.3 Bill. EUR. This difference shows the considerable 
incentives for both the EU-15 and the CEC-10 to invest political capital into 
the negotiations. 
Despite the considerable variation of budgetary costs, further calculations 
use the standard assumption on the outcome for budget, i.e. 10.3 Bill. EUR 
for direct payments and 3 Bill. EUR for market guarantee. 
3.5 Welfare Effects 
The reference situation for welfare calculations is the LIBERAL scenario, 
the scenario with no market intervention policies in either the EU-15 or the 
CECs. The year 2008, which marks the start of the EU-25 in the simula-
tions, serves as a focal point for the detailed discussion· of welfare effects. 
The calculation of welfare effects is displayed for the sectoral level, tak-
ing into account the producer surplus, the compensated variation, market 
guarantee spending, and direct payments. 
The modeling of the area allocation under direct payments prevents the use 
of more sophisticated welfare measures than the simple producer surplus 
(see Section 2.5). For the consumer side, however, simple consumer surplus 
and the more elaborate compensating variation have been calculated. The 
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Table 3.11: The Sensitivity of Expenditures for Direct Payments for Area and the Choice of the Base Yield 
(AGENDA Scenario). 
Standard Assumption Alternative Assumption 
Base Area Base Yield Direct Base Yields Direct Direct 
Payments Payments Payments 
(av. 1995-97) (2008) (2008) (av. 1995-97) (av. 1995-97) (2008 = 100) 
(Mill. ha) (tons/ha) (Mill. EUR) (tons/ha) (Mill. EUR) 
Bulgaria 2.5 2.9 457.4 2.4 384.3 84 
Czech Rep. 1.87 5.1 604.4 4.1 479.5 79 
Estonia 0.31 2.3 44.3 1.9 37.5 85 
Hungary 3.34 5.1 1073.1 4.0 841.7 78 
Latvia 0.45 2.6 74.8 1.9 54.4 73 
Lithuania 1.07 3.2 213.7 2.3 154.4 72 
Poland 9.13 3.6 2093.7 3.0 1696.8 81 
Romania 7.05 3.9 1736.6 2.8 1252.5 72 
Slovak Rep. 0.97 5.7 350.8 3.9 238.3 68 
Slovenia 0.1 5.9 37.2 4.6 28.9 78 
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difference between the compensating variation and the consumer surplus 
is small. A greater difference can be expected for those products which 
have a high share in expenditure and a high income elasticity. This is not 
the case for the products used in this modeling exercise. For all CECs, 
the consumer surplus overestimates the consumer rent by 2 percent (see 
Table 3.12). In the following calculations, the compensating variation is the 
exclusive measurement of consumer welfare. 
Table 3.13 shows the welfare effects of the NON-ACCESSION scenario. 
Among the CECs, large differences appear. Bulgaria, Hungary, and es-
pecially Romania show positive protection of consumers. Producers are 
negatively protected as some producer prices remain below comparable ref-
erence prices at the farm gate. The main cause for this trucing of producers 
is the downstream sector with its relatively high wholesale and processing 
margins. While this seems to be a characteristic in Slovenia and Hungary 
(see Sections 4.6 and 4.7), the situation in Bulgaria and Romania might 
also be driven by strong transitional effects, which the other CECs already 
faced in the early 1990s (see Gorton, Buckwell and Davidova, 2000). These 
kind of policies produce distortions, which are difficult to measure in a mar-
Table 3.12: Results of Different Measurements of Consumer Welfare Effects 
in the NON-ACCESSION Scenario, 2008. 
Consumer Compensating Error of 
Surplus Variation Consumer 
Surplus 
(CS) (CV) (% of CV) 
Bulgaria 88.57 87.63 -1.1 
Czech Rep. -839.89 -846.27 0.8 
Estonia -52.62 -52.71 0.2 
Hungary 54.46 54.54 0.1 
Latvia -46.77 -46.86 0.2 
Lithuania -208.10 -208.92 0.4 
Poland -1832.86 -1837.63 0.3 
Romania 1464.83 1444.95 -1.4 
Slovak Rep. -211.74 -213.22 0.7 
Slovenia -476.65 -481.28 1.0 
CEC-10 -2060.76 -2099.78 1.9 
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Table 3.13: Welfare Effects in the CECs and the EU-15 in the 
NON-ACCESSION Scenario, 2008 (Mill. EUR). 
Producer Rent Consumer Rent Budget Total 
Bulgaria -32.84 87.63 59.39 -4.60 
Czech Rep. 528.70 -846.27 213.27 -530.84 
Estonia 48.19 -52.71 0.11 -4.63 
Hungary -123.37 54.54 17.15 -85.99 
Latvia 61.16 -46.86 16.26 -1.96 
Lithuania 91.36 -208.92 105.54 -223.09 
Poland 1431.87 -1837.63 -2.52 -403.24 
Romania -773.50 1011.46 272.78 -34.81 
Slovak Rep. 236.85 -213.22 47.95 -24.33 
Slovenia 231.65 -481.28 16.41 -266.04 
CEC-10 1700.07 -2533.27 746.33 -1579.53 
EU-15* 55777.0lt -35287.78 23377.44t -2888.21 
* Agenda 2000 policies. 
t Including 21402 Mill. EUR in direct payments. 
ket model. In the other countries, domestic policies lead to protection of 
producers and taxing of consumers. This is especially the case in Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Slovenia. 5 
In total, agricultural policies in the CEC-10 prior to EU membership lead to 
a loss of welfare of 1.6 Bill. EUR. The EU-15, on the other hand, completed 
its Agenda 2000 reforms in the simulations. Despite reforms for cereals, 
oilseeds, dairy, and beef, the welfare loss amounts to 2.9 Bill. EUR in 2008. 
This is still lower than under the unreformed CAP (for a rough comparison, 
see Table 3.12}. Of particular note, the consumer surplus, including direct 
payments, is considerably lower than under CAP-1992 policies. 
The accession scenarios require a more differentiated welfare analysis. Wel-
fare effects for the individual CECs depend to a large extent on their net 
payment position as new members in the EU, i.e. the question of how much 
of the costs of agricultural trade, price, and market policies the new mem-
bers will have to bear. Their exact net payer position in the enlarged EU 
5Slovenia has slightly positive budgetary outlays for market guarantee, despite 
being a net importer of agricultural products. Exports of dairy products, though 
small in comparison to other countries, compensate for the tariff revenues from 
other products, e.g. cereals. 
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depends on the outcome of the accession negotiations. Therefore, four dif-
ferent net payer positions are calculated. 
Another important factor is to what extent CEC farmers become eligible 
for direct payments. In the scenarios, CEC farmers instantly get direct 
payments for area and for cattle. In welfare terms, direct payments are 
treated like neutral transfers from taxpayers (government) to farmers. 
The calculations show that the CAP is highly distortive for the CECs. 
Compared to the NON-ACCESSION scenario, consumer losses triple in the 
CAP-1992 scenario from roughly 2.5 Bill. EUR to 8.8 Bill. EUR. Pro-
ducer prices increase compared to the NON-ACCESSION scenario, driven 
by increased wholesale prices as well as through changes of wholesale and 
processing efficiency (except most livestock). Agricultural production ex-
pands and producer rents exceed consumer rents as most of the countries 
become net exporters of agricultural commodities. Under the CAP-1992 
scenario, producer rents in the CEC-10 total nearly 9 Bill. EUR, contrast-
ing with 1.7 Bill. EUR under the NON-ACCESSION scenario. The biggest 
jump in producer rents takes place in the second wave countries Bulgaria 
and Romania, but also increases significantly in Poland and Hungary (see 
Table 3.14). 
Generally, the same trends prevail for the AGENDA scenario (see Table 
3.15). Though the reformed CAP is also highly distortive, CEC consumers 
face imposed costs of 2 Bill. EUR less compared to the CAP-1992 scenario. 
Still, the consumer bill more than doubles to 6.8 Bill. EUR compared to 
the NON-ACCESSION scenario. The gain of producer surplus is actually 
smaller than the loss of consumer rent, i.e. production expands less than 
under CAP-1992. Nevertheless, rents almost quadruple to 6.3 Bill. EUR 
compared to the NON-ACCESSION scenario. Of these, 52 percent stem 
from the quota products milk and sugar. If taxpayer costs are neglected for 
the CECs (the budget is paid by the EU-15) and only producer surplus and 
consumer rent are taken into account, pure market results lead to a loss of 
0.5 Bill. EUR under the AGENDA scenario and a slight gain of 0.1 Bill. 
EUR under the CAP-1992 scenario. 
Direct payments as welfare-neutral transfers from governments to producers 
add to producer surpluses such that producer rents for the CEC-10 total 
16.6 Bill. EUR under the AGENDA scenario and 18.5 Bill. EUR under the 
CAP-1992 scenario. As a result, producer rents are three times the producer 
surplus in the AGENDA scenario and almost double that in the CAP-1992 
scenario. This shows the importance of direct payments for producer in-
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come in the AGENDA scenario. The biggest effect of direct payments on 
producer rents in the AGENDA scenario takes place in Bulgaria (eight times 
the producer surplus), Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Slovak Repub-
lic ( two to three times the producer surplus). The producer surplus in 
these countries is relatively small as the agricultural sectors largely produce 
commodities that are little protected under the CAP (see Figure 3.3). In 
other countries, those with a greater share of highly protected commodities 
(Poland or Estonia), producer surplus doubles. In conclusion, direct pay-
ments are shown to have a significant impact on producer welfare within 
the limited scope this market model can offer regarding distribution effects, 
land prices, etc. 
For the EU-25, welfare losses add up to 6.2 Bill. EUR under the AGENDA 
scenario, 5.3 Bill. EUR less than under the unreformed CAP. With the 
accession of ten new members, the welfare loss from agricultural policies 
in the EU increases significantly in both scenarios. In view of the huge 
distortions of the CAP on markets in the CECs, this is not a surprising 
result. 
The central political question, however, is who will bear these losses. Thus, 
in Tables 3.14 and 3.15, welfare losses are distributed among the EU-15 and 
the CEC-10 according to the assumed net payer status or co-financing status 
of the CECs versus the central EU budget. The net payer status defines the 
distribution of taxpayers' burden in the EU-15 and the CEC-10. Should the 
CECs finance 100 percent of the budgetary costs of agricultural policies, the 
ten countries would face a losses of 3.6 Bill. under the AGENDA scenario 
and 5.6 Bill. EUR under the CAP-1992 scenario. The EU-15, on the other 
hand, would hold their losses steady at 2.6 and 8 Bill. EUR, respectively. 
This picture alters dramatically if the CECs become net receivers, i.e. con-
tribute less to the central EU budget than they get back. If the CEC-10 
contribute 66 percent of the budgetary expenditure, the balance changes 
from a loss to a welfare gain of 1 Bill. EUR under the AGENDA scenario 
and a slight loss under the CAP-1992 scenario. The losses in the EU-15, 
however, mount to 7 and 13 Bill. EUR, respectively. This effect of distribut-
ing the losses to the EU-15 and the gains to the CEC-10 naturally increases 
with the lowering of financial net contributions of the new members. In 
the extreme case of zero CEC contribution, the ten new members win a 
healthy welfare gain of 9.8 Bill. EUR and 9.6 Bill. EUR in the AGENDA 
and CAP-1992 scenarios, while the EU-15 would face welfare losses of 16 
Bill. EUR and 23 Bill. EUR, respectively. 
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Table 3.14: Welfare Effects of the CAP-1992 Scenario in the CE Cs, the EU-15, and the EU-25, 2008 (Mill. EUR) . 
Producers Consumers Budget 
Producer Direct Total Compensating Market Direct Total 
Surplus Payment Producer Variation Guarantee Payment Budget 
Rent 
A B C D E F G 
(A+B) (E+F) 
Bulgaria 300.11 596.06 896.17 -368.62 288.87 596.06 884.93 
Czech Rep. 1062.96 1052.01 2114.96 -969.54 694.75 1052.01 1746.76 
Estonia 89.02 65.26 154.28 -101.65 95.04 65.26 160.30 
Hungary 644.08 1239.67 1883.75 -609.57 541.66 1239.67 1781.33 
Latvia 206.64 161.50 368.14 -167.48 188.61 161.50 350.11 
Lithuania 356.61 333.43 690.03 -323.64 546.13 333.43 879.56 
Poland 4321.14 2885.28 7206.42 -3460.76 2202.60 2885.28 5087.89 
Romania 1446.25 2423.58 3869.83 -2220.81 943.49 2423.58 3367.08 
Slovak Rep. 427.96 607.89 1035.85 -392.98 194.72 607.89 802.61 
Slovenia 123.94 182.84 306.78 -255.15 -17.63 182.84 165.21 
CEC-10 8978.71 9547.52 18526.23 -8870.18 5678.25 9547.52 15225.77 
EU-15 36944.92 17613.57 54558.49 -37830.75 7118.60 17613.57 24732.17 














































33% CEC 0% CEC 0% CEC 
Contribution Contribution Contribution 
No Direct 
Payment 
(C+D-G)*.33 (C+D) (A+D) 
235.53 527.55 -68.51 
569.00 1145.43 93.42 
-0.26 52.64 -12.62 
686.35 1274.19 34.52 
85.13 200.67 39.16 
76.14 366.39 32.96 
2066.65 3745.66 860.38 
537.89 1649.02 -774.56 
378.02 642.88 34.99 
-2.89 51.63 -131.21 
4631.55 9656.05 108.53 
-18205.69 -23230.20 -13682.67 












Table 3.15: Welfare Effects of the AGENDA Scenario in the CECs, the EU-15, and the EU-25, 2008 (Mill. EUR). 
Producers Consumers Budget 
Producer Direct Total Compensating Market Direct Total 
Surplus Payment Producer Variation Guarantee Payment Budget 
Rent 
A B C D E F G 
(A+B) (E+F) 
Bulgaria 152.09 1105.75 1257.84 -267.38 175.41 1105.75 1281.16 
Czech Rep. 727.30 1091.39 1818.69 -712.81 414.20 1091.39 1505.59 
Estonia 68.85 65.01 133.86 -73.20 74.22 65.01 139.23 
Hungary 506.90 1287.10 1794.00 -463.92 233.43 1287.10 1520.52 
Latvia 179.84 161.44 341.28 -133.90 155.57 161.44 317.01 
Lithuania 242.82 334.51 577.34 -208.92 399.73 334.51 734.25 
Poland 3038.07 2992.13 6030.20 -2554.19 956.18 2992.13 3948.31 
Romania 982.24 2466.81 3449.05 -1954.29 477.13 2466.81 2943.94 
Slovak Rep. 330.43 627.66 958.08 -289.61 162.11 627.66 789.77 
Slovenia 108.17 186.96 295.13 -202.80 -12.38 186.96 174.59 
CEC-10 6336.70 10318.77 16655.47 -6861.02 3035.60 10318.77 13354.36 
EU-15 34892.45 8542.71 43435.16 -34141.66 3362.96 8542.71 11905.67 














































33% CEC 0% CEC 0% CEC 
Contribution Contribution Contribution 
No Direct 
Payment 
(C+D-G)*.33 (C+D) (A+D) 
567.68 990.46 -115.29 
609.04 1105.88 14.49 
14.71 60.66 -4.35 
828.30 1330.07 42.98 
102.77 207.38 45.94 
126.12 368.42 33.90 
2173.07 3476.01 483.88 
523.26 1494.76 -972.05 
407.85 668.47 40.81 
34.72 92.33 -94.63 
5387.51 9794.45 -524.32 
-11559.60 -15966.54 -5647.77 
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Of the two accession scenarios, the AGENDA scenario brings higher welfare 
gains for the CECs when considering different net payer positions and lower 
additional losses for the EU-15. The simple reason is that Agenda 2000 
policies are less distortive on markets than is the unreformed version of 
the CAP. However, the welfare calculations show that any of these two 
accession policies are highly distortive and produce a high welfare loss in 
the EU-25, however, the losses might be distributed among the member 
countries. More importantly, the general picture shows that consumers 
largely bear the costs of the CAP. In both accession scenarios, the welfare 
loss of consumers far exceeds market guarantee costs. 
Accession also produces some direct effects on the markets of the EU-15, 
which are not discussed in detail here, mainly due to adjustments of market 
prices.6 Compared to the NON-ACCESSION scenario, the AGENDA sce-
nario shows that producer surplus and consumer losses decline by around 
1.5 to 3.3 percent under the same policy assumptions. As a result, welfare 
losses of the EU-15 declined by almost 0.3 Bill. EUR. Accession puts pres-
sure on prices for beef, pork, poultry, and eggs as export constraints for the 
EU-25 become tighter for these products. Moreover, the EU changes from 
net importer to net exporter of maize, which lowers average EU-25 maize 
market prices to intervention price levels. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The results show that the unreformed CAP is more distortive than the 
Agenda 2000 policies for the CECs. In the past, the CECs themselves 
embarked on a path of gradually adjusting protection levels to those of the 
CAP, while the EU-15 itself lowered prices in the Agenda 2000 reforms. As a 
result of these developments, price gaps diminish for cereals in the CEC-10. 
In the first wave countries, prices are even higher for most cereals ( except 
for rye and most cereals in Hungary) after the implementation of the new 
policies. The assumed effect of the Single Market on competitiveness of the 
downstream sector, has positive effects on agricultural producer prices. 
As a result, market reactions to the introduction of the CAP are limited. 
Market guarantee spending for export subsidies and storage has only a low 
share in total spending. Under Agenda 2000 policies, market guarantee 
6 See country results in Appendix D. 
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spending amounts to roughly 3 Bill. EUR for the CEC-10. This is 2.6 
Bill. less than under an unreformed CAP. However, even under the less 
protective CAP version, this is roughly four times the spending resulting 
from current CEC agricultural market and trade policies. 
Most of this spending is linked to the highly protected commodities under 
the CAP: Dairy, beef, sugar, barley, and other grains (rye). The Agenda 
2000 reforms remove most of the incentives for beef. The rest of the regimes 
for sensitive commodities remain at highly distortive protection levels. Most 
of these effects are not visible in the market balances because of the supply 
control instruments introduced upon accession. The spending on market 
guarantee depends on the setting of these quotas, especially for dairy; in 
Poland about half the market guarantee spending under the AGENDA sce-
nario is caused by market interventions in the dairy sector. The budgetary 
results are highly sensitive for changes of the dairy quotas for the CECs. 
This may lead to the conclusion that the majority of sensitive market and 
budgetary reactions can be controlled by sufficiently tight quotas and other 
supply-restricting measures (much tighter than in the scenarios discussed 
here). In view of the low effect of set-aside on land retirement in the CECs, 
very high rates need to be applied to even approach a solution to the barley 
and other grain (rye) problem. The milk quota, however, is very efficient in 
capping budgetary costs. At first glance, this may solve the more daunting 
problems and make accession more acceptable for the old EU members 
in political and budgetary terms. However, this would be at the cost of 
depriving the new members of exploiting their production potential under 
the CAP, perhaps too high a political price to be paid by the new members. 
The welfare calculations show that the CAP, whatever its design, is highly 
distortive. In these calculations, even such "budget-neutral" and potentially 
sµrplus-neutral regimes as for sugar or dairy, show their distorting nature. 
Of course producers benefit hugely, but consumers must foot a large part of 
the bill. This result is especially important in the CECs where average in-
come per capita is much lower than in the EU-15, and consequently relative 
food expenditure is significantly higher (see Table 1.1). Consumers in the 
CECs, therefore, will be more harmed by the CAP than those in the EU-15, 
which may cause social problems for less affluent CEC consumers. Setting 
supply control measures even tighter leaves this fundamental problem of the 
CAP far from solved. 
Most of the budgetary costs are caused by direct payments. Market guar-
antee spending is even less important under Agenda 2000 policies. The 
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majority of budgetary spending depends on political choices for direct pay-
ments for area and livestock. With the amount of payments and quotas as 
generous as that used in the simulations, direct payments under the CAP-
1992 scenario amount to 9.5 BillEUR. Agenda 2000 policies increase this 
sum to 10.3 Bill. EUR. In total, government expenditure is at roughly 13 
Bill. EUR under the less protective Agenda 2000 and about 1 Bill. EUR 
more under the CAP-1992 scenario. The sensitivity analysis shows that a 
more restrictive outcome of the negotiations could effectively hold payments 
under Agenda 2000 policies to 6.5 Mill. EUR for direct payments and about 
2. 7 Bill. EUR on market-related spending. 
Depending on the political choices made for milk quotas, direct payments for 
area, and number of cattle premiums, budgetary costs for direct payments 
could be considered somewhere in the range of 6.5 to 10.3 Bill. EUR under 
Agenda 2000 policies. Total spending including market guarantee would 
then add up to 9.2 to 13.3 Bill. EUR. This difference shows the considerable 
incentive for the EU-15 as well as for the CEC-10 to invest political capital 
in the negotiations. 
The question of whether the CAP will cause welfare gains or losses for the 
CECs depends largely on their status as net payers or co-financers. A CAP 
policy financed in total by the CECs causes huge welfare losses of around 
3.6 Bill. EUR and 5.6 Bill. EUR under Agenda 2000 and the unreformed 
CAP, respectively. The less the CECs contribute to the budgetary costs of 
accession, the more they gain. If only a third of the budgetary costs for 
the CEC-10 are contributed by the new members, a healthy welfare gain of 
5.3 Bill. EUR under Agenda 2000 is realized. The other side of the coin, 
however, is that such a distribution raises the losses for the old members; 
welfare losses for the EU-15 increase significantly to 12 Bill. EUR as a result 
of additional taxpayers' costs. 
In general terms, the CEC welfare gain might be interpreted, with some 
justification, as a transfer from the old to the new members to enable the 
CECs to embark on a path of further transitional reform and towards con-
vergence with the old members. In the end, this would enable the CECs 
to foot a larger part of the bill as their economic prosperity increases, thus 
benefiting the old members. 
As net budget receivers, the direct payments make up a large part of the 
welfare gains of the CECs from agricultural policies. This line of reason-
ing, however, requires taking into account additional factors, which go far 
beyond the scope of the market model used in this analysis. Textbook eco-
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nomics tells us that landowners benefit from CAP-like policies in general, 
and direct payments in particular via higher land prices, the more so as 
the regulations additionally link payments to area. 7 This alone will harm 
agriculture in the CECs; as the cost of land increases, structural change 
is hampered ( as currently in the EU). Another important aspect of judg-
ing efficiency at raising agricultural income is how active landowners are in 
agriculture. In countries with large-scale farming (e.g. Hungary, the Czech 
Republic), it is doubtful that the majority of landowners are active in agri-
culture, or even live in rural areas. In small-scale agricultural sectors such 
as Poland and Slovenia, it is unclear how much of the payments would ac-
tually be received by active farmers or used to increase pensions of retired 
farmers who sell or lease their land. 
Significant welfare effects for the CECs can be expected from the transfers. 
The question of who should be the beneficiaries of such transfers and what 
alternative instruments cause the least distortion for further economic inte-
gration and restructuring must yet be answered for the CECs as well as for 
the EU-15. 
7Direct payments for cattle are formally linked to cattle heads and to milk 
quotas. Since cattle production as such is linked to area, and CAP regulations 
for livestock payments foresee a maximum number of cattle per hectare, there is 
a rather strong link to area here, too. 
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4 Effects of Accession to the EU on 
Agricultural Markets and Government 
Expenditure in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia: A Combined 
Partial and General Equilibrium Analysis 
The rapidly changing equilibrium in CECs during transition is caused not 
only by substantial short-term policy changes, but also by considerable 
structural changes and changes in economic fundamentals. This poses spe-
cial problems for policy analysis. This chapter addresses the effects of al-
ternative macroeconomic developments on EU-CEC accession. 
So far most partial equilibrium studies have been built on a constant real 
exchange rate assumption, which reach a limit when applied to inherited and 
new distortions in CEC transition economies. The analysis in the previous 
chapter neglects the special situation in transition economies, i.e. countries 
with a rapidly moving general equilibrium. 
Exchange rates affect the agricultural sector via the price relation of trad-
ables and non-tradables. If currencies appreciate in real terms, prices of 
tradables decline while prices for non-tradables remain constant. This gen-
erally leads to a decline of competitiveness in those industries which rely 
more on non-tradables {labor-intensive sectors), while declining prices for 
tradable inputs compensate some of the losses in input-intensive industries. 
As shown by Bojnec, Munch and Swinnen (1998), strong real appreciation 
of CEC currencies have led to taxation of agriculture. In the context of 
EU-CEC accession, real exchange rates become important; the CAP de-
fines important instruments in EUR which must be converted to national 
currencies in those countries that are not members of the European Mone-
tary Union. A real appreciation could lead to diminishing accession effects, 
including budgetary costs. Prices of labor, capital, and intermediates play 
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an important role for the competitiveness of agricultural production. The 
expected macroeconomic repercussions in the CECs following accession are 
large, because beside economy-wide changes, the agricultural sector plays a 
prominent role in CEC economies (see Banse, 2000). Therefore, the tradi-
tional assumption of a small agricultural sector and the rest of the economy 
in a steady equilibrium is even less valid in the CECs than in stable market 
economies. 
Extending the previous analysis, the macroeconomic figures needed as ex-
ogenous parameters for simulations, i.e. exchange rates, labor costs, capital 
and non-agricultural intermediates, and prices of non-food consumer goods, 
are simulated in an analysis combining partial and CGE models (Banse, 
Miinch, and Tangermann, 2000; Banse, 2000; Miinch, 2000). 
This chapter focuses on agricultural accession effects of the Agenda 2000 in 
a joint general and partial equilibrium analysis for four CECs: The Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, while Chapter 3 shows accession 
effects for ten CECs based on the stand-alone version of ESIM. 
4.1 Accession Scenarios and Main Assumptions 
The analysis of the effects of the future CAP on four acceding countries of 
Central Europe considers four different scenarios. The NON-ACCESSION 
and AGENDA scenarios of the previous chapter are compared with MEM-
BER and AGENDAPPP scenarios. Both of these latter scenarios dif-
fer in the treatment of the following macroeconomic indicators: equilib-
rium exchange rate, opportunity costs of labor and capital, costs for non-
agricultural intermediates, and price developments of non-food consumer 
goods. The first part of this section explains the scenario structure, the 
latter part lays out the joint CGE-ESIM analysis. 
The MEMBER scenario assumes that the CECs become eligible for pre-
accession aid at the level granted to Spain and Portugal during their acces-
sion to the EU, but the CECs continue with their individual agricultural 
policies. Therefore, the NON-ACCESSION and MEMBER scenarios eval-
uate the same agricultural policies, although with different macroeconomic 
settings. When comparing NON-ACCESSION and MEMBER scenarios, 
the effects of increasing economic CEC-EU integration on agricultural mar-
kets without the influences of the CAP are shown (see Table 4.1). 
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These macroeconomic effects of integration result from the assumed effects 
of implementing the Common Legislation of the EU. The new institutions 
reduce the risks for foreign investors and, hence, foreign direct investment in-
creasingly flows into the countries (see Baldwin, Francois and Portes, 1997). 
Banse (2000) additionally assumed levels of FDI inflows similar to those in 
Portugal and Spain. Apart from the simple increase in capital available for 
the economy, FDI in the CGEs is linked to X-efficiency which translate into 
increasing technical progress (see Banse, 2000). Therefore, the MEMBER 
scenario takes into account the current pre-accession developments in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. 
The scenarios for accession are AGENDA and AGENDAPPP. Both sce-
narios assume the same terms of agricultural policies and the same dates 
of agricultural accession. Like the previous pair of scenarios, the treatment 
of macroeconomic indicators differs: AGENDA assumes the development 
of the macroeconomic indicators, while AGENDAPPP takes the variables 
from joint CGE-ESIM analyses. By linking general and partial analysis in a 
recursive joint model structure, key macroeconomic variables, as well as the 
development of protection, which are usually exogenous variables in partial 
equilibrium models and in CGEs, respectively, are made endogenous in the 
overall analysis. 
The indicators are based on a joint scenario structure between ESIM and 
the country CGEs, developed by Banse (2000). Within this joint structure, 
the CGEs receive the weighted average NPR for the agricultural sector,1 
while ESIM uses the development of real equilibrium exchange rates, costs 
of labor, capital and non-agricultural intermediates, and non-food consumer 
goods. 
The CGEs and the partial equilibrium model are not totally integrated, 
i.e. a data exchange between the models takes place when scenario calcula-
tions are completed. The exchanged variables, therefore, differ from those 
that would have been received from a totally integrated model structure as 
both models instantly reacted on changes of the respective variables. In 
order to approach the "real" scenario value as closely as possible, a recur-
sive scenario structure has been chosen. This procedure means to reduce 
the error resulting from not simultaneously solving the model. Figure 4.1 
shows the recursive scenario structure: The scenarios in bold boxes are those 
1The NPRs describe the domestic prices relative to world market prices. The 
sectoral NPRs show the value of production to domestic prices relative to world 
market prices. 
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Figure 4.1: Scenario Structure of the Combined Partial and General 
Equilibrium Analysis. 
displayed in the text, scenarios in dotted boxes are calculations to adjust 
the model results. For example, the NONACCESSION_l scenario in ESIM 
is calculated with the assumption of continuing domestic policies without 
changing macroeconomic parameters. The resulting production-weighted 
average NPRs serve as starting values for the CGE simulations. The result-
ing development of macroeconomic variables is then fed into ESIM for the 
final calculation of MEMBER. The resulting NPRs of MEMBER then serve 
again as starting values for the final CGE simulations for MEMBER. The 
final values for the macroeconomic variables are used in the AGENDA_! sce-
nario in ESIM. This first agricultural accession scenario serves as a starting 
point for four AGENDA scenario calculations. The resulting NPRs again 
serve as starting point of the AGENDA_l scenarios in the CGEs. The re-
sulting macroeconomic developments were used for the final calculation of 
the accession scenarios in ESIM (AGENDAPPP). The resulting NPRs then 
were used in the final CGE simulations. 
The CGE results are discussed in detail in Banse (2000). The financial net 
transfers from Brussels and the increase of labor and capital productivity 
assumed to occur as a result of accession have major impacts on costs ( cap-
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ital, wages, and intermediates) and consumer incomes as well as on real 
exchange rates. While capital becomes more abundant (opportunity costs 
of capital drop by 5 percent in the Czech Republic and 25 percent in Poland 
over the simulation period), wages increase by 50 percent in the Czech Re-
public and Hungary and almost triple in Poland by 2013. At the same time, 
appreciating real exchange rates (4 percent to 40 percent over the period) 
against EUR and USD reduce much of the producer incentives resulting 
from CAP prices, because their value in national currency declines. Also 
taking the price developments of tradable intermediates for agriculture into 
account, which fall by up to 6 percent, macroeconomic development clearly 
favors the supply of products in agriculture that are intensive in capital 
and intermediates (e.g. cereals). For other products that rely mainly on 
domestic factors ( e.g. beef), the situation becomes less favorable. 
4.2 Accession Effects on Agricultural Protection 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the developments of NPRs under different scenar-
ios. The variation of macroeconomic indicators is especially visible in the 
NON-ACCESSION scenario. As the production structure changes in favor 
of capital-intensive and less-protected commodities such as cereals, average 
NPRs are lower in the MEMBER scenario in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland. Slovenia, on the other hand, highly protects capital-intensive 
products such as cereals and oilseeds. As opportunity costs of capital de-
cline, these highly protected commodities gain weight in Slovenia's agricul-
tural sector. Therefore, protection increases for Slovenia in the MEMBER 
scenario. 
The introduction of the CAP in the CECs leads to changes in agricultural 
protection as measured by average NPRs. After the implementation of the 
CAP in 2002, the average NPRs increase in the four CECs. Only in Slovenia 
protection decreases. After 2002, the further development of protection in 
the CECs is determined by the CAP, where support prices are assumed to 
follow the path designed under Agenda 2000 and then remain constant in 
nominal EUR terms. 
In the AGENDAPPP scenario, the changes in macroeconomic variables are 
less significant when compared to the MEMBER scenario (see Appendix 
D). The inflow of capital far outscores the real appreciation as an effect of 
increasing protection in AGENDAPPP, except in Slovenia. Here a decrease 
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Table 4.2: Development of Average NPR under Different Non-Accession Scenarios. 
Base 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
NON-ACCESSION 
Czech Rep. 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Hungary 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Poland 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Slovenia 1.43 1.41 1.38 1.36 1.35 1.34 1.32 1.31 1.30 1.29 1.28 1.26 1.24 1.23 
MEMBER 
Czech Rep. 0.43 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Hungary 0.06 0.05 0.04 O.Dl 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
Poland 0.33 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 
Slovenia 1.43 1.39 1.39 1.40 1.41 1.43 1.45 1.46 1.48 1.50 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.58 
Difference between MEMBER and NON-ACCESSION 
Czech Rep. 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 
Hungary 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 
Poland 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.17 -0.18 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 -0.22 












Table 4.3: Development of Average NPR under Different Agenda Scenarios. 
Base 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AGENDA 
Czech Rep. 0.43 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Hungary 0.06 0.05 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Poland 0.33 0.30 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Slovenia 1.43 1.30 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
AGENDAPPP 
Czech Rep. 0.43 0.39 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 
Hungary 0.06 0.05 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 
Poland 0.33 0.23 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.34 
Slovenia 1.43 1.29 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.51 
Difference between AGENDAPPP and AGENDA 
Czech Rep. 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
Hungary 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Poland 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
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of agri-food protection by 70 percentage points leads to a real deprecia-
tion. Though agriculture is an important sector in the CEC economies, 
the macroeconomic effects of accession move the economy far more than 
agricultural policies. 
While the CAP imposes the same measures in all four CECs, the average 
level of protection across all agricultural products differs across countries. 
The reason is that the CAP affords different rates of protection for different 
products, and production structures differ among countries. Slovenia's pro-
tection is the highest under AGENDA conditions, with an initial level of 62 
percent. Hungary and the Czech Republic are the countries with the lowest 
average NPR. Protection in the EU-15 is close to the Czech level of 45 
percent. When dividing commodities into those with a high NPR (barley, 
other grains, sugar, milk) and a low NPR (wheat, corn, oilseeds, beef, pork, 
poultry, eggs) under AGENDAPPP conditions, Poland has a share of 45 
percent of highly protected products in the total value of production. This 
share increases to 58 percent in 2003. Consequently, average NPR remains 
higher in these countries than in Hungary, where the share of high NPR 
products in total production is only 21 percent in the base period and 22 
percent in 2003 under AGENDAPPP conditions. 2 
From 2002, agricultural protection decreases over time in the CECs un-
der AGENDAPPP conditions, mainly because of increases in world mar-
ket prices and a shift of agricultural production to capital-intensive, less-
protected commodities. The reform of the milk market regime, i.e. a price 
reduction for skimmed milk powder and butter, leads to a slight drop of 
average protection in all countries in 2006. 
In the Czech Republic and Hungary, AGENDAPPP protection is only six 
and nine percentage points higher than MEMBER protection in the first 
year of accession. In the following years, protection develops rather steadily 
despite real appreciating exchange rates. Under accession, administrative 
prices of the CAP defined in EUR determine protection in the CECs. Under 
constant CAP prices, the development of the EUR exchange rate against the 
USD determines the size of price gap, i.e. the NPR. CEC exchange rates 
only partly influence the internal incentives to producers and consumers. 
With accession, the CECs are trapped in the CAP, i.e. CEC exchange rates 
have no effect on the relationship between world market and domestic prices. 
2These shares and those mentioned in Chapter 3 differ because the structure of 
agricultural production changes with different assumptions regarding opportunity 
costs for capital and labor as well as prices for intermediates. 
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4.3 Market Effects 
When taking the macroeconomic effects into account, the results of the pol-
icy simulations alter market reactions. By 2008 in the NON-ACCESSION 
scenario, arable crop and intensive livestock production in the four CECs ex-
ceeds early transition levels. Only production of milk and beef remains lower 
than the average of 1990-91 (see Table 4.4). The macroeconomic effects of 
pre-accession dampen this development. In the MEMBER scenario, produc-
tion of some products is lower compared to the NON-ACCESSION scenario, 
especially as a response to real appreciation of CEC exchange rates. How-
ever, in the long run, the decreasing opportunity costs of capital and lower 
prices for non-agricultural intermediates outweigh appreciating exchange 
rates and the increase of opportunity costs of labor. Thus the production 
of capital-intensive agricultural products, i.e. crops and intensive livestock, 
are consistently above the levels of the NON-ACCESSION scenario by 2012. 
Labor-intensive beef production, on the other hand, suffers from increasing 
labor costs as well as appreciating exchange rates. Compared to the NON-
ACCESSION scenario, in 2012 cereal production is about 1 Mill. tons higher 
under the MEMBER scenario. Milk production is roughly 3.3 Mill. tons 
lower, mainly as a response to increasing labor costs. Intensive livestock 
production benefits from lower real feed costs and decreasing capital costs 
under the MEMBER scenario conditions; production is between 19 percent 
(eggs) and 26 percent (poultry) higher than under the NON-ACCESSION 
scenario. 
The above general development also takes place in the AGENDAPPP sce-
nario compared to the AGENDA scenario. On accession in 2002, appreci-
ating exchange rates and higher labor costs lower production significantly 
compared to a situation without changes in exchange rates, capital, and 
labor costs. In the long run, however, production shifts to capital-intensive 
crop and livestock production. A comparison of the AGENDA and AGEN-
DAPPP scenarios leaves the production of crops roughly four percent higher 
than under unchanged macroeconomic indicators. Consumption, on the 
other hand, is only one percent higher in the AGENDAPPP scenarios than 
the AGENDA scenario. Pork production is five percent higher; lower capital 
costs far outweigh appreciating real exchange rates. 
Compared to the AGENDA scenario, livestock prices in AGENDAPPP on 
the Single Market are less competitive for production because of the real 
appreciation of CEC currencies against the EUR, despite the fact that real 
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Table 4.4: CEC-4 Development of Production under Different Policy Scenarios (Mill. tons) . 
1990-91 1995-97 2002 
NON- MEMBER AGENDA AGENDAPPP 
ACCESSION 
Cereals 51.42 44.19 48.15 48.56 49.09 50.21 
Oilseeds 2.38 2.16 2.44 2.62 1.99 2.05 
Sugar* 3.31 3.21 3.11 2.93 3.57 3.51 
Milk 24.58 17.58 17.95 16.74 21.14 21.14 
Butter 0.44 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.32 
Beef 1.32 0.77 0.75 0.69 0.99 1.03 
Pork 3.66 2.91 3.26 3.37 3.25 3.15 
Poultry 0.98 1.04 1.07 1.03 1.56 1.48 
Eggs 0.96 0.98 1.05 1.06 0.73 0.72 
2012 
Cereals 57.63 58.41 55.98 62.41 
Oilseeds 2.88 3.83 2.37 2.72 
Sugar* 3.77 3.45 3.64 3.65 
Milk 21.13 17.76 21.66 21.67 
Butter 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.30 
Beef 0.87 0.66 0.99 0.98 
Pork 3.89 4.70 3.52 3.70 
Poultry 1.16 1.46 1.85 2.32 
Eggs 1.24 1.48 0.88 0.98 














Table 4.5: CEC-4 Development of Total Domestic Use under Different Policy Scenarios (Mill. tons) . 
199~91 199~97 2002 
NON- MEMBER AGENDA AGENDAPPP 
ACCESSION 
Cereals 50.04 43.07 46.32 46.61 42.60 43.30 
Oilseeds 1.94 1.89 1.91 1.70 1.72 1.72 
Sugar 2.79 2.65 2.66 2.60 2.42 2.31 
Milk 24.58 17.58 17.95 16.74 21.14 21.14 
Butter 0.42 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.27 
Beef 1.17 0.77 0.75 0.69 0.93 0.97 
Pork 3.47 2.87 3.09 3.17 3.53 3.42 
Poultry 0.72 0.91 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.88 
Eggs 0.93 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.67 0.66 
2012 
Cereals 54.27 53.15 46.03 51.82 
Oilseeds 2.43 3.14 2.20 2.50 
Sugar 3.05 2.82 2.60 2.24 
Milk 21.13 17.76 21.66 21.67 
Butter 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.27 
Beef 0.85 0.66 0.90 0.88 
Pork 3.58 4.13 3.94 4.02 
Poultry 1.10 1.32 1.06 1.36 
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Table 4.6: CEC-4 Development of Net Exports under Different Policy Scenarios (Mill. tons). 
1990-91 1995-97 2002 
NON- MEMBER AGENDA AGENDAPPP 
ACCESSION 
Cereals 1.38 1.12 1.83 1.95 6.49 6.91 
Oilseeds 0.44 0.27 0.53 0.92 0.27 0.32 
Sugar 0.52 0.57 0.45 0.34 1.15 1.21 
Milk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Butter 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 
Beef 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 
Pork 0.19 0.04 0.17 0.20 -0.29 -0.27 
Poultry 0.26 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.63 0.61 
Eggs 0.03 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.06 
2012 
Cereals 3.36 5.26 9.94 10.59 
Oilseeds 0.46 0.69 0.17 0.22 
Sugar 0.72 0.63 1.04 1.40 
Milk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Butter 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 
Beef 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.10 
Pork 0.31 0.57 -0.42 -0.32 
Poultry 0.05 0.13 0.79 0.96 
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appreciating exchange rates lower feed costs. Production, therefore, is lower 
than under MEMBER scenario conditions, although real appreciating ex-
change rates do not change the relative prices of commodities. As in the 
AGENDA scenario, relative prices in the AGENDAPPP scenario favor poul-
try production. 
4.4 Budgetary Implications 
Figure 4.2 shows the effects on budgetary expenditure of different agri-
cultural policies and macroeconomic assumptions. Under current policies 
(NON-ACCESSION), agricultural expenditure for market guarantee totals 
350 Mill. EUR which would gradually decline to 130 Mill. EUR. 3 Should 
policies maintain their current nominal level and real appreciating curren-
cies are assumed (MEMBER), expenditure would increase rapidly to 910 
Mill. EUR. This shows the protective potential of the current agricultural 
policies in the CECs, if combined with appreciating real exchange rates. 
With implementation of the Agenda 2000 in the four CECs, expenditure for 
market guarantee including direct payments, increases significantly to 8 Bill. 
EUR (Figure 4.2). Surprisingly, the expenditure under the AGENDAPPP 
scenario is 500 Mill. EUR higher than the AGENDA scenario spending. 
This is because macroeconomic developments influence the development of 
production, which reshuffles the structure of trade and, therefore, expendi-
ture for market guarantee. As capital becomes increasingly less expensive 
for agriculture, capital and purchased inputs for intensive production are 
favored; more cereals and intensive livestock products are produced. The 
main reason for the additional 500 Mill. EUR in spending is the increased 
net export of some highly protected and capital-intensive commodities ( e.g. 
rye, barley). 
As can be seen by comparing overall expenditure (including direct pay-
ments), the largest part of the extra expenditure is for direct payments for 
arable crops and for cattle. The spending on these items is less dependent 
on exchange rate developments as market guarantee because they are fixed 
in EUR and, as far as arable payments are concerned, only slightly coupled 
to production. 
3 As support prices are assumed to be set in national currencies, exchange rate 
revaluation raises the level of protection. 
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Figure 4.2: Development of Budgetary Expenditure for Market Guarantee in 
the CEC in Different Scenarios, 2001-13. Source: Model results, 
data from EU-Commission (1997b). 
4.5 Conclusions 
The results show that macroeconomic developments matter when analyzing 
the effects of accession on agricultural markets in the CECs. The develop-
ment of capital and labor costs favor capital-intensive production. Labor-
intensive products become less advantageous. At the beginning of accession, 
agricultural production develops less ·favorably when appreciating real ex-
change rates are taken into account. 
The sensitivity of the results to changes in macroeconomic equilibrium con-
ditions show the importance of extending the traditional scope of partial 
equilibrium analysis when examining transition economies. Bojnec, Miinch 
and Swinnen (1998) used a stand-alone version of ESIM and varied the ex-
change rate assumption from the traditional constant exchange rate towards 
adjustment to PPP levels over the simulation period. The results showed 
a serious decline of competitiveness in CEC agriculture as the currencies 
strongly revalued in real terms. 
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In comparison, this analysis extends the variation of macroeconomic con-
ditions towards other production-relevant indicators. Decreasing capital 
costs and a decline in purchased input prices compensate the effect of real 
exchange rate appreciation on producer prices. 
The analysis in this chapter shows that the increasing availability and falling 
opportunity costs of capital in transition economies positively affects agri-
culture and its long-run competitiveness. Increasing opportunity costs of 
labor mainly affect labor-intensive products, though even for these prod-
ucts decreasing capital costs compensate for some labor cost-induced ef-
fects. Under this condition, Agenda 2000 policies prove to be more costly in 
the long run than those under unchanged macroeconomic conditions. The 
additional costs mainly arise from extra net exports of the highly protected 
cereals, feed barley, and rye. 
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5 Specific Case Studies: The Importance of 
Marketing Margins and Technical Progress 
in CEC-EU Accession 
Two specific case studies highlight some of the effects not discussed in Chap-
ters 3 and 4. One of the important questions of EU accession is the effect 
of integration on the efficiency of the downstream sector. As CAP price 
and trade policy instruments apply on the wholesale level and on first stage 
processing, protection at the farm level depends on the efficiency of the 
downstream sector. The more efficient the downstream sector, the higher 
the producer price. The scenarios in the previous chapters assume a con-
version of marketing and processing margins to EU averages once the coun-
tries join the Single Market. In this chapter, this assumption is altered by 
comparing the effects of a conversion of the margins on accession, holding 
margins constant. Slovenia has been selected because its downstream sector 
is highly inefficient compared to the EU. 
This chapter also addresses the alterations in market risks in the CECs 
brought by introducing the CAP. One of the results might be an increase 
in investments and technical progress. This assumption is tested for Hun-
gary, which is the biggest exporter of agricultural commodities among the 
CECs. Other reasons for selecting Hungary are the generally competitive 
farm structure, especially in crop production, and a long history of high-
performing agriculture. Compared to other CECs with less favorable struc-
tures, an intensification in Hungarian crop production on accession seems 
most probable. 
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5.1 Marketing Margins and Accession: The Case of 
Slovenia 
Agricultural markets and policies in Slovenia have never been liberalized to 
the extent in other CECs, resulting in farmgate prices higher than in the 
other CECs, even approaching EU price levels. Wholesale and processing 
sectors have a special structure as Slovenia is a small country with high 
import barriers. Slovenia is a net-importing country, thus domestic prices 
are driven by imports. This excursus, therefore, looks a bit closer into 
Slovenia's agricultural policies and briefly compares them to those of the 
EU, before discussing the possible implications of EU integration. 
5.1.1 A Comparison of Slovenian and EU Market and Trade 
Policies 
The prime objective of Slovenian agricultural policies and the CAP is to 
provide income support for agriculture. 1 However, the most visible differ-
ences in price, trade and market policy instruments, and support systems 
results from the difference in the net trade position between the EU and 
Slovenia (Bojnec and Miinch, 2000). The EU is a substantial net exporter 
of agricultural commodities, while Slovenia is a net importer. Therefore, 
market price support in Slovenia is delivered through import protection 
measures and state marketing systems rather than export subsidies. While 
the CAP covers a large range of products from wheat to silkworms, Slovenia 
focuses its support on a smaller number of products, i.e. wheat and wheat 
flour, sugar, and dairy. For these products, price policies are applied, while 
for the majority of agricultural and food products, import measures shield 
domestic markets. 
For efficiency reasons, CAP trade and price policy instruments aim at the 
first stage of processing or wholesaling, e.g. intervention prices for cereals are 
wholesale prices not farmgate prices. Slovenia's price policies aim addition-
ally at farmgate and, to some extent, consumer prices. The price support 
mechanism in Slovenia is based on direct intervention by the government in 
different levels of the markets (farm, wholesale/processing, retail). In com-
parison with the EU, Slovenia's price support system relies more heavily 
1This section is based on Bojnec and Mi.inch (2000}. 
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on administrative approaches and ad hoc measures. The downstream sec-
tor in Slovenia is dominated by monopsonistic structures because markets 
are small in size such that often only one first-stage processing enterprise 
exists (e.g. sugar and oilseed) in a highly protected environment. However, 
government involvement in business objectives of the monopsonies is often 
unclear. These kinds of policies need institutions and regulations other than 
those found in the CAP. Therefore, substantial differences of instrumental 
settings and levels of market control exist between the EU and Slovenia. 
The main focus of Slovenian agricultural support is the dairy sector. The 
government sets a basic price for milk, fixed for a certain quality, while the 
producer price of milk for farmers is derived from the basic price considering 
the quality of milk delivered to the dairy. Similarly, the CAP sets a refer-
ence price for milk. This price, however, serves only as a general guideline 
from which actual milk prices may deviate substantially. Dairy products 
are among the few products for which a surplus exists on Slovene markets. 
No special government intervention purchases of dairy produce for State 
Storage Reserves have been required in recent years. However, the govern-
ment has from time to time provided official support for dairy promotion 
activities abroad. The main instruments of protection for the domestic milk 
and dairy markets are custom duties consisting of ad valorem and specific 
tariffs (Bojnec, 1994; 1996). The EU delivers support to the dairy sector 
in four ways: Direct constraints on milk production (quotas), intervention 
purchases of storable dairy products, export subsidies for a wide range of 
products, and prohibitive import barriers. 
Direct payments play an increasingly important role in Slovenian agricul-
tural policy. These have been introduced for cattle and sheep in moun-
tainous areas, for suckler calves as well as for wheat area, and are being 
considered for sugar beet and corn area. Similar to EU regulations, direct 
payments are coupled to actual area and livestock heads. This type of pol-
icy design also indicates an alignment of agricultural support towards the 
CAP. However, the Slovenian scheme of direct payments rather resemble 
per hectare aid paid for disadvantaged areas in the EU. Therefore, these 
have not been included in the analysis. 
In summary, agricultural markets in Slovenia are influenced by direct in-
terventions of the government at the micro level through state and private 
monopolies and state trading. Their role may be diminishing as Slove-
nia adjusts agricultural policies to those of the CAP, and as competition 
increases with integration into the Single Market. The most striking differ-
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ence is that CAP price policy instruments generally are not directly aimed 
at the farm level. Institutional prices in the CAP are applied to agricultural 
commodities at the first stage of wholesaling or processing. Crucial for the 
support to arrive at the farmgate under CAP conditions, is the vertical price 
transmission through the marketing and processing chain. 
5.1.2 Effects of Accession to the EU 
Erjavec, Rednak and Majcen (1996), Rednak and Volk (1997) and Erjavec 
et al. (2000) indicate that the impact of EU accession on Slovenian farm in-
come levels largely depends on the conditions under which Slovenia joins the 
CAP. If Slovenian farmers join with the same status as present members, 
farm incomes may slightly increase. However, it is possible that the agricul-
tural and food sector in Slovenia will be among those sectors where negative 
effects of EU accession are felt (Potocnik and Majcen, 1996). Hence, Er-
javec, Rednak and Volk (1997) and Erjavec et al. (2000) concluded that 
Slovene farm incomes would increase if the EU grants Slovenian farmers 
the CAP including market price support, direct payments, and structural 
policies. In the event that compensation payments are not a part of the 
accession package, overall Slovenian farm incomes will still increase due to 
price increases and budgetary supports, but will decline for those products 
where producer prices are currently higher than in the EU. 
As for other CECs, the downstream sector plays a prime role in the ac-
cession effects in the farm sector. Bojnec and Munch (1999) show that 
restructuring of the downstream sector is crucial to transmit support prices 
of the CAP to the farm gate. An unadjusted downstream sector would lead 
to a significant decrease of major producer prices. The marketing margins 
of Slovenia and the EU-15 differ greatly. Cereal and oilseed margins are 21 
percent in Slovenia versus 9 percent in the EU-15, while those for livestock 
processing are closer, 12 versus 22 percent in Slovenia and the EU-15, re-
spectively. Also Slovene sugar and milk processing margins are significantly 
higher than in the EU-15. While the cereal margins are based on price dif-
ferences between farmgate and wholesale prices, the others are calculated 
by determining the reference prices for milk and sugar beets as laid down 
in the respective CAP regulations. 
For these calculations, the CAP fixes certain processing margins related 
to the content of sugar in beets and protein and fat in milk. The CAP 
formulae convert prices of white sugar and skimmed milk powder and butter, 
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which are subject to price policies, back into the respective raw material 
prices, i.e. sugar beets and milk. In a variation of this procedure, Slovene 
prices for white sugar, skimmed milk powder, and butter are converted 
using the CAP formulae to reference prices. These artificial reference prices 
for milk and sugar beets are then compared to actual producer prices. The 
difference between these prices is lower than the calculated reference prices, 
by about 30 percent for sugar beet processing and around 24 percent for 
milk processing. 
There are three main reasons for the differences in margins. First, the farm 
structures are small, which explains higher transport costs. Second, large 
portions of the downstream sector are monopsonistic in structure, result-
ing in taxes on agriculture; and, third, there are technical inefficiencies in 
comparison to EU competitors (see Gorton, Buckwell and Davidova, 2000). 
Since the CAP applies its instruments at the wholesale level, the down-
stream sector is the avenue for transferring support to the farm gate. To 
specifically address the issue of marketing and processing efficiency, three 
scenarios are simulated. The MEMBER scenario continues Slovene agricul-
tural policies as found in 1997 for the period of 2000-13. Accession takes 
place in two scenarios, i.e. AGENDAPPP and AGENDAPPP(no down-
stream adjustment). 
AGENDAPPP holds the standard assumptions with respect to policies, 
macroeconomic developments, technical progress, and adjustment of whole-
sale and processing margin to EU-15 levels as in the previous chapter. The 
other accession scenario, AGENDAPPP (no downstream adjustment), just 
varies the latter assumption and presumes that the integration into the 
single market would not change the downstream efficiency in Slovenia (see 
Table 5.1). 
The wholesaling and processing margin describes the difference between 
market prices and farmgate prices. Keeping the margin constant neglects 
any consideration concerning monopsonistic or oligopolistic behavior; de-
mand follows an ordinary demand curve. The basic reason for treating food 
processing in Slovenia, as well as in the other CECs, in this simplistic way 
is the lack of information on competitive behavior in the CECs. Moreover, 
governments often dominate important marketing channels through market 
agencies and by ownership of firms. In particular, market agencies domi-
nate markets as they pursue price and trade policies with a great degree 
of freedom. Slovenia is surely an extreme example because the State Stor-
age Reserve acts as state trader. This implies that behavior might not be 
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pure profit maximization as textbook theory on monopsonies and oligopolies 
suggests, but rather aims to finance a relative large bureaucracy or seeks 
other policy-related objectives. In light of these conditions, a conversion 
of Slovene marketing and processing margins might be expected between 
the two extremes simulated, i.e. total conversion in AGENDAPPP and no 
conversion in AGENDAPPP(no downstream adjustment). 
5.1.3 Simulation Results of Slovene Accession to the EU 
The simulation results are displayed in Table 5.2. Slovenia actually faces 
a decline in agri-food protection when accession to the Agenda 2000 takes 
place. With a continuing of domestic policies in the MEMBER scenario, 
the weighted average NPR decreases from 143 percent in the base to 123 
percent in 2013 due to increasing world market prices. In 2002, when ac-
cession to the CAP takes place, alignment to CAP prices decreases Slove-
nian agricultural and food protection at the wholesale/processor level by 70 
percentage points. In AGENDAPPP, this decrease of wholesale/processor 
protection is only partly transmitted to the farm level because handling and 
processing margins decline with accession, due to improved efficiency of the 
downstream sector. The increased efficiency of the downstream sector offset 
some of the reduction in wholesale and processing prices. Therefore, agri-
cultural producer prices decline less when Slovenian agricultural and food 
prices adjust to average EU levels (except for sugar and dairy). Maize pro-
ducer prices slightly increase as margins of around 20 percent fall to EU 
averages, offsetting the decline of wholesale protection. Prices for wheat, 
however, drop slightly. This, and set-asides, are the biggest factors reducing 
cereal production from 510,000 tons to 487,000 tons. Poultry and butter 
are the only markets where a surplus remains at 45,000 tons and 1,700 tons, 
respectively. Under constant marketing and processing margins, however, 
producer prices generally decrease further, resulting in lower production and 
higher net imports compared to AGENDAPPP. 
The effects of margins on the livestock sector are quite different. The in-
crease of margins, which may be interpreted as higher operation costs under 
common standards in the Single Market, further depress producer prices and 
lead to production declines. Unchanged margins, on the other hand, lead 
to higher production levels than in the MEMBER scenario. The effect of 
increasing marketing and processing efficiency on production is between 7 
and 20 percent. 
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Table 5.2: Development of Production and Net Exports in Slovenia under Different Policy Scenarios {1,000 tons). 
2002 2012 
1995-97 MEMBER AGENDA AGENDA MEMBER AGENDA AGENDA 
PPP PPP PPP PPP 
(No downstream (No downstream 
adjustment) adjustment) 
Production 
Cereals 456.59 510.65 487.11 453.49 652.96 596.83 555.64 
Oilseeds 0.77 0.79 0.81 0.73 0.79 0.98 0.88 
Sugar 60.74 63.29 54.97 48.63 79.12 68.86 60.92 
Milk 588.00 650.95 603.43 497.91 780.99 735.82 607.15 
Butter 2.10 2.12 2.55 2.10 2.14 2.45 2.02 
Beef 51.93 55.60 57.80 68.49 60.31 79.38 94.05 
Pork 59.83 56.56 48.30 57.06 54.13 47.53 56.14 
Poultry 62.18 56.38 87.22 105.08 47.06 111.43 134.26 
Net exports 
Cereals -475.61 -394.67 -373.73 -407.34 -254.52 -428.97 -470.15 
Oilseeds -1.79 -1.77 -1.76 -1.84 -1.77 -1.61 -1.71 
Sugar -47.81 -48.46 -57.79 -64.13 -49.92 -57.57 -65.51 
Butter 1.07 1.07 1.70 1.25 0.98 1.52 1.09 
Beef -4.73 0.56 -26.58 -18.89 1.09 -17.20 -2.52 
Pork -21.83 -26.38 -67.54 -58.78 -40.23 -91.89 -83.28 
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In terms of budgetary spending, Slovenia's accession increases overall gov-
ernment outlays only slightly. Net spending on market guarantee is nega-
tive, i.e. tariff revenues are higher than export subsidies. The net revenue 
is around 50 Mill. EUR. As in the other acceding CECs, the main spending 
item is direct payments. For area as well as dairy and beef cattle, these sum 
up to 200 Mill. EUR. Net total spending for Slovenia is, therefore, in the 
area of 150 Mill. EUR. 
5.1.4 Conclusions 
Slovenian farmgate prices are close to EU levels, while wholesale and pro-
cessing prices exceed EU prices due to larger processing and handling mar-
gins in Slovenia. Some food processing branches are highly concentrated 
( e.g. sugar and oilseeds) due to the small size of the country. Regarding the 
relatively low market efficiency, the downstream sector could well be among 
the losers during and after accession. The positive or negative effects of 
implementing EU price policies on farms will, among others, significantly 
depend on the ability of the downstream sector to adjust to the competitive-
ness of the Single Market. The scenarios indicate that without adjustment 
and restructuring of Slovenia's wholesaling and processing sector, farmgate 
prices will decline during accession. In this case, direct payments would 
have an even greater political importance. 
The Slovenian example shows how important the analysis of the downstream 
sector is, when effects of accession on the agricultural sector are considered. 
Slovenia certainly is an extreme example with little competition on their 
agri-food markets, however, other countries like Hungary also face sizeable 
inefficiencies in the downstream sector. Agriculture has shown its ability 
to adapt to new situations during transition. The Single Market, therefore, 
seems to be a greater challenge for the food processing industry in the 
CECs. Much of the possible positive benefits of accession for agriculture, 
especially its ability to sell, depend on the capability of the downstream 
sector to become competitive on the Single Market. 
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5.2 Rapid Technical Progress and Accession: The 
Case of Hungary 
Compared to the other accession candidates, Hungary is the only country 
consistently net exporting agricultural and food products throughout the 
transition period. Moreover, the agricultural sector faces the lowest prices 
for most commodities ( except sugar) in the four CECs. This can be partly 
explained by its landlocked geography. Consequently, Hungary must rely on 
relatively more expensive means of transporting its exports to the nearest 
seaport. Thus, Hungarian f.o.b. prices are generally lower than the standard 
North Sea f.o.b. prices of the EU-15. Another explanation lies in highly 
variable quality of cereals from year to year caused by frequent drought. 
A third reason is the concentrated downstream sector, though it sees less 
government involvement than in Slovenia. Gorton, Buckwell and Davidova 
(2000) show that these conditions lead to a taxation of agriculture, i.e. the 
policy transfers to agriculture actually remain in the downstream sector. 
Out of this complexity, the focus of this analysis is on effects resulting from 
bridging the price gap between Hungary and the EU-15. The second aspect 
to be explored is the response of market in Hungary on a higher rate of 
technical progress (AGENDAPPP+TP). 
Banse, Guba and Munch {1998) identify the evolution of comparative ad-
vantages in Hungary during accession in a disaggregated CGE of the type 
developed in Banse {1997b). The results were used to calculate Domestic 
Resource Costs, which measure international competitiveness, and Private 
Resource Costs, which measure competitiveness within the economy under 
given policy conditions. The results show that Hungarian agriculture has 
comparative advantages in the area of crop production and disadvantages 
in livestock production. 
To capture some of the effects of increasing competitiveness for arable 
crops, the scenario AGENDAPPP has been extended by increasing tech-
nical progress by 50 percent above the annual rates for crops (AGEN-
DAPPP+TP). Table 5.3 summarizes the scenarios. 
5.2.1 Selected Results 
The price gap between the EU-15 and Hungary is the largest among the first 
wave countries. The highest price gap is for butter at 42 percent, closely 
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followed by sugar at 46 percent, while the closest is sunseed at 98 percent 
of the comparable EU price. Cereal and intensive livestock prices by and 
large fall between these figures at around 70 to 80 percent of EU-15 prices 
(see Figure 3.1). 
Despite the same regulations for each commodity under the CAP, average 
Hungarian protection after accession is the lowest of the first wave CECs. 
This is the effect of the Hungarian production structure, which has 78 per-
cent of its production value in less-protected commodities, i.e. wheat, corn, 
oilseeds, and intensive livestock. 
During accession, Hungary extends its net exports for crops despite an ini-
tial drop in 2002. Most of the increases take place in cereal, much less in 
oilseeds. Hungary's net exports of cereals consist of wheat and corn, both 
commodities where no export refunds are needed. Net exports grow to 4.39 
Mill. tons; most of these exports are wheat, which is exported without sub-
sidies. Hungarian corn makes up for most of the coarse grain exports, also 
exported without subsidies (see Table 5.4). 
The increased technical progress for crops in AGENDAPPP+TP translates 
into higher production of those crops not controlled by quotas. In 2012, 
cereal production is 3 Mill. tons higher than in AGENDAPPP. Sunseed 
production is almost 25 percent higher. This leads to a 2.6 Mill. ton rise 
to 7 Mill. tons in net exports of Hungarian cereals than in AGENDAPPP. 
The additional net exports are mainly wheat, exported without subsidies to 
world market prices which exceed intervention prices. 
However, the increase of technical progress by 50 percent in AGEN-
DAPPP+TP expands budgetary expenditure by just 33 Mill. EUR in 2012. 
With almost constant direct payments, between AGENDAPPP and AGEN-
DAPPP+ TP, total expenditure for agricultural policies increases by 34 Mill. 
EUR. 
The reason for the low responsiveness of government expenditure for market 
guarantee is that exports are mainly less-protected commodities such as 
wheat and corn. Highly protected crops, such as barley, rye, and sugar, 
are not important in Hungarian agricultural production or are capped by a 
supply quota. In other countries, however, the situation is different as highly 
protected cereals have a higher share in cereal production, e.g. barley in the 
Czech Republic and rye in Poland. 
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Table 5.4: Development of Production and Net Exports in Hungary under Different Policy Scenarios (Mill. tons). 
2002 2012 
1995-97 MEMBER AGENDA AGENDA MEMBER AGENDA AGENDA 
PPP PPP+TP PPP PPP+TP 
Production 
Cereals 11.24 12.46 12.96 13.65 15.41 17.14 20.25 
Oilseeds 0.88 1.06 0.73 0.78 1.69 1.02 1.25 
Sugar 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Milk 2.00 1.93 2.26 2.26 2.10 2.32 2.32 
Butter 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Beef 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.11 
Pork 0.36 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.68 0.49 0.49 
Poultry 0.37 0.38 0.63 0.64 0.51 0.99 0.99 
Eggs 0.39 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.59 0.51 0.51 
Net exports 
Cereals 1.65 2.44 2.58 3.19 1.97 4.39 7.03 
Oilseeds 0.28 0.94 0.34 0.51 0.71 0.23 0.34 
Sugar 0.09 0.02 0.22 0.22 0.09 0.25 0.25 
Milk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Butter -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Beef 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.05 
Pork 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.39 0.16 0.16 
Poultry 0.12 0.12 0.41 0.41 0.21 0.72 0.73 
Eggs 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.31 0.23 0.23 
Budget (adjusted) in Mill. EUR 
Export subsidies 24.63 13.98 259.78 270.15 6.44 317.08 350.13 
Direct payments 0.00 0.00 2227.02 2227.02 0.00 2208.44 2209.19 ,_. 
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5.3 Conclusions 
The analyses presented in this chapter address two questions that are closely 
related to the accession of CECs to the EU. The economic integration into 
the Single Market leads to reducing monopoly power, reducing levels of x-
efficiency ( overmanning, excessive holding of stocks, and other types of slack 
management practices), and finally, reaping economies of scale and learning 
effects (see McDonald, 1999). Inevitably, downstream sector industries, 
which themselves compete for markets in the enlarged EU, need to adjust 
where inefficiencies prevail in order to be competitive. The second question 
relates to the development of farm efficiency in the CECs once economic 
conditions change with integration into the EU. Both effects have potential 
impact on agricultural markets during accession. 
Early in this chapter, the effects of downstream sector efficiency were ad-
dressed using the example of Slovenia, which as a small country with a 
highly protected downstream sector, is currently characterized by high pro-
cessing margins compared to the EU. The Slovenian example shows the 
importance of the role of the downstream sector for the effects of acces-
sion. Slovenia is certainly an extreme example with little competition on 
agri-food markets. However, other countries like Hungary, Poland, and the 
Czech Republic, also face high inefficiencies in the downstream sector. Since 
agriculture has already shown its adaptability to new situations, much of the 
possible positive benefits of accession for agriculture, especially its ability to 
sell, depends on the ability of the downstream sector to become competitive 
on the Single Market. 
The example of Hungary shows the potential effects of the crop sectors 
catching up to their EU equivalents. The effects on markets are relatively 
large and net exports for cereals are roughly 75 percent higher than with 
a lower rate of technical progress. The budgetary effect in Hungary is, 
however, relatively small as the net exports mostly consists of less-protected 
wheat and corn. If higher protected commodities are affected, budgetary 
costs of removing the surpluses would inevitably rise. 
The comparison of the two case studies shows that in reality both the ad-
justment of the downstream sector and the potential catching up are likely 
to be closely linked. Agriculture will only react if price signals are trans-
mitted from the markets through the downstream sector. Under conditions 
such that agriculture is fully exposed to the supply incentives of the CAP, 
suppliers might react by increasing production and efficiency. This shows 
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the potential long-term effects of accession, which might be higher than 
those discussed in previous chapters. Under these circumstances, the CAP 
will become economically less favorable for the EU-25. 
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
6.1 Summary 
The simulations in this study were defined and carried out during the sum-
mer of 1999, before the Candidate Countries and the EU-15 defined their 
initial positions on the agricultural chapter. The policy assumptions on di-
rect payments, cattle premiums, and quota quantities are broadly defined as 
in the Common Positions of the EU-15. Certainly, the position of the EU-
15 would yield lower budgetary costs than those estimated in the present 
work. However, despite all the recent developments in negotiations, the 
identified general trends on agricultural markets and budget expenditure 
have remained valid. 
The methodological aspect of the work focuses on developing and applying 
a partial equilibrium model on the specific questions of CEC-EU accession. 
The model used is ESIM, which had been developed in a joint project be-
tween the USDA/ERS, Institute of Agricultural Economics/University of 
Gottingen, and Food Research Institute/Stanford University between 1992 
and 1994. For this study, ESIM was further developed and adapted in vari-
ous co-operations and frameworks with researchers, governments in Central 
and Western Europe, and the European Commission. 
ESIM is a multi-country, multi-commodity, comparative static, partial equi-
librium model, capable of producing a time series of results. CAP policies 
are modeled in great detail. Moreover, the integration of the EU-15 into 
the modeling framework allows for simulating various aspects of CEC-EU 
integration. For example, transition periods similar to those applied for 
Portugal and Spain as well as immediate accessions like that of Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden may be modeled. 
This study analyzes effects of integrating the agricultural sectors of ten 
CECs into the EU on agricultural markets, government budgets, and the 
CECs' welfare. For this purpose, several scenarios have been applied to 
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the partial equilibrium model, and, in a combined analysis, also on country 
CGEs. The study proceeds in two steps. First, it follows the concepts of a 
classic partial equilibrium analysis for all ten CECs and the EU-15. Second, 
the macroeconomic developments are endogenized in a combined partial 
and general equilibrium analysis. This analysis is pursued for a smaller 
range of countries, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. 
Rather than developing new policy approaches, the study concentrates on 
identifying sensitive areas of existing policies. 
The simulations in the classic partial equilibrium analysis, in which the 
macroeconomic variables are based on assumptions, pursue analyses of dif-
ferent policies: (1) a continuation of current (1997) CEC policies, (2) a 
scenario which assumes abandonment of all agricultural market, price, and 
trade policies in the countries represented in ESIM, (3) an accession sce-
nario under the unreformed, 1992 CAP, and (4) an accession scenario under 
Agenda 2000. Accession is assumed to take place for Estonia, the Czech 
and Slovak Republics, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia in 2002. A second 
step of accession is assumed in 2008 for Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Romania after all envisaged Agenda 2000 reforms have been enacted in the 
EU (see Chapter 3). 
Accession is assumed to take place without a harmonization period, i.e. 
without the need of transition periods for price, trade, and market poli-
cies and an immediate and complete integration into the Single Market. 
Neglecting the transition period for the Spanish and Portuguese accession 
reflects the higher state of integration of the current EU-15 compared to the 
EU-10. Moreover, farmers in the CECs are assumed to become instantly 
eligible for direct payments upon accession, which echoes the discussion in 
the EU, rather than speculating on when these direct payments should be 
implemented in the CECs. 
Compared to a continuation of national policies in the CECs, i.e. no acces-
sion, surpluses increase on accession for the highly protected commodities 
under CAP. These are coarse grains (barley, other grains), and beef. Supply 
quotas effectively cap production of sugar and milk such that price increases 
of 35 to 80 percent for sugar and 25 to 55 percent for dairy products do not 
develop their full supply incentives. 
Coarse grain exports in 2008 mount to 10.2 Mill. tons under Agenda 2000 
policies and 17.5 Mill. tons for the first group of countries joining the EU. 
Slightly lower net exports of 14.4 and 7 Mill. tons appear in the second 
group of countries joining the EU. Of these exports, maize is less problem-
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atic in terms of export subsidies; more budget sensitive are those of barley 
and other grains (rye). On the other hand wheat production becomes less 
attractive as prices actually fall in first wave countries (except Hungary). 
For crops in the CEC-10, set-aside appears to be less an effective instru-
ment of supply control than in the EU-15. However, with country-specific 
differences: Hungary and the Czech Republic are more affected by set-asides 
than Poland and Slovenia. 
For beef, the other budget-sensitive commodity, exports of the CEC-10 
increase from 40,000 tons to 700,000 tons in both accession scenarios. Under 
the unreformed CAP, beef and milk prices increase substantially. Under 
Agenda 2000, the beef price increases less, but direct payments and lower 
feed costs lifts production to slightly higher levels than under the unreformed 
CAP. 
As a result of supply growing more rapidly than demand, the need for export 
subsidies and other market intervention measures increases in the CEC-10 
to 5. 7 Bill. EUR under unreformed CAP conditions and 3 Bill. EUR under 
Agenda 2000 in the year 2008. While the Agenda 2000 reforms seem to 
relax the budgetary expenditure in this area, it is still substantial: 7.6 and 
4 times higher than under a continuation of domestic policies in the first 
and second group, respectively. 
Under the assumptions of a quota of 33.65 Mill. tons for the CEC-10, dairy 
intervention and export subsidies would cause about 45 percent of market 
guarantee spending. The actual level of the quotas in the CECs will be 
a result of the accession negotiations-a political rather than a technical 
question. The results show that an increase of 3 percent of milk production 
lifts total market guarantee expenditure by about 11 percent under Agenda 
2000 policies. The market guarantee costs are therefore highly sensitive 
to the size of milk quotas. Additional costs of different quota levels arise 
from the fact that Agenda 2000 links direct payments for dairy cattle to the 
quotas. 
The largest parts of the budgetary expenditure of accession in the agricul-
tural sector are the direct payments for area and cattle. The amount of these 
payments depends entirely on the political outcome of the negotiations. 
With a generous interpretation of the base for direct payments, these add 
up to 9.5 Bill. EUR under the unreformed CAP and 10.3 Bill. EUR under 
Agenda 2000 policies. Total expenditure for both types of accession policies 
are around 14.5 and 13.3 Bill. EUR for the CEC-10. This is 6 Bill. EUR more 
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than the Agenda 2000 financial projections for enlargement up to 2006. A 
more restrictive outcome, i.e. giving the CECs no room to expand beef and 
milk production and using comparably low reference yields, direct payments 
would add up to 6.5 Bill. EUR and total to 9.2 Bill. EUR in expenditures. 
This would be 3 Bill. EUR more than in the financial perspectives. This 
comparison indicates the incentives of both sides to invest political capital 
into the negotiations on issues related to direct payments. 
The market and budget effects identify some of the distortive elements of the 
CAP. Further distortions, however, are covered up by supply quotas. The 
full distortive effects of the CAP on agricultural markets in the CECs are 
more clearly identified in the welfare calculations. Compared to continuing 
domestic polices, producer surplus without direct payments grows five fold 
under unreformed CAP conditions and almost four fold under Agenda 2000 
conditions. 
At the same time, however, consumer losses increase from 2.5 Bill. EUR 
under continuous domestic policies, to 8.9 Bill. EUR under the unreformed 
CAP and 6.9 Bill. EUR under Agenda 2000 policies. These losses of welfare 
are by far higher than the related market guarantee spending. 
CEC agriculture would benefit even more when farmers become eligible for 
direct payments. In the welfare analysis, the direct payments are assumed 
to be welfare-neutral transfers from taxpayers to farmers (though the model 
recognizes the supply responses, if they are coupled to production as under 
the unreformed CAP). In this case, producer rents would increase from 
1.7 Bill. EUR to roughly 19.2 and 19.5 Bill. EUR under unreformed and 
reformed CAP conditions, respectively. 
The overall welfare effect of introducing the CAP, however, depends on 
the net payer status of the CECs vis-a-vis the central EU budget. Since 
the net payer status of the CECs depends on the political decisions during 
the accession negotiation as well as the applied policy instruments, several 
scenarios are constructed. If the CECs' taxpayers would finance agricultural 
expenditure totally then the economy would have to bear a loss of between 
3.6 and 5.6 Bill. EUR (respectively Agenda 2000 and unreformed CAP). If 
CEC taxpayers only contribute a third of the government expenditure for 
direct payments and market guarantee, the economies would gain 5.3 Bill. 
EUR of welfare under Agenda 2000 and 4.6 Bill. EUR less under unreformed 
CAP conditions. In this case, welfare losses for the EU-15 would sum up to 
11.6 and 15.9 Bill. EUR, respectively. Regardless of the distribution of the 
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taxpayer's costs among old and new members, the EU-25 loses 6.2 Bill. and 
13.5 Bill. EUR welfare under both accession scenarios, respectively. 
The simulations show that compared to the unreformed CAP, the Agenda 
2000 reforms lighten the economic burdens of agricultural policies for the 
CEC-10, the EU-15, as well as for the EU-25. However, the economic losses 
for the consumers in the CECs are still impressive, especially considering 
their relatively low income level. 
The above part of the analysis summarizes the classic partial equilibrium 
analysis, i.e. agriculture is assumed to exist in a framework of stable inter-
sectoral relationships. This assumption, of course, is difficult to maintain 
in stable market economies with a small agricultural sector, but has to be 
regarded as even less valid in transition economies, which have undergone 
massive restructuring and where agriculture is an important part of the 
economy. 
This problem and its likely effects are addressed in the second set of scenarios 
(Chapter 4). It is designed for four CECs, i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovenia. It shows the effects of Agenda 2000 under assumed 
and endogenized macroeconomic variables, i.e. labor and capital costs, prices 
for non-agricultural intermediates, consumer prices, and the development of 
real equilibrium exchange rates. 
The results of the four countries' simulations show that macroeconomic 
developments have an impact on the simulation results. Altering macroe-
conomic variables like costs and exchange rates affect the relative competi-
tiveness of individual commodities. 
In the combined analysis, the partial equilibrium model is linked to four 
country CGEs. Thus, average agricultural protection becomes endogenous 
for the CGEs, labor, capital costs, prices of non-agricultural inputs, real 
equilibrium exchange rates, real income, and prices of non-agricultural con-
sumption goods become endogenous for ESIM. The models link via a recur-
sive simulation structure. 
Accession considerably changes the macroeconomic framework. Increasing 
inflows of foreign direct investment and financial net transfers from Brussels 
(based on the experience of Portugal and Spain) significantly change the 
macroeconomic conditions in the CECs. The increase of labor and capital 
productivity assumed to occur as a result of accession has major impacts on 
costs (capital costs, wages, and intermediates) and consumer incomes as well 
as real exchange rates. While capital becomes more abundant ( opportunity 
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costs of capital drop between 5 percent in the Czech Republic and 25 percent 
in Poland over the simulation period), wages increase by 50 percent in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary and almost triple in Poland by 2013. At the 
same time appreciating real exchange rates ( 4 percent to 40 percent over the 
period) reduce much of the producer incentives resulting from CAP prices, 
because their value in national currency declines. When also taking into 
account the price developments of tradable intermediates for agriculture, 
which falls by up to 6 percent, macroeconomic development clearly favors 
the supply of products that are relatively capital- and intermediate-input 
intensive (e.g. cereals). For other products that rely mainly on domestic 
factors ( e.g. beef), the situation becomes less favorable. 
Typically, capital-intensive products are less protected under the CAP as 
well as under current CEC policies ( except for sugar and for Slovenia in 
general). The macroeconomic developments change in favor of these lower 
protected and capital-intensive commodities. When taking macroeconomic 
developments into account, averaged protection for all products caused by 
national policies falls in the Czech Republic (-6 percent), Hungary (-10 
percent), and Poland (-22 percent) until 2012. Slovenia, on the other hand, 
highly protects capital-intensive products such as cereals and oilseeds. As 
opportunity costs of capital decline, these highly protected commodities 
gain weight in Slovenia's agricultural sector and protection under domestic 
policies increases by 35 percent. 
In the accession scenario for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland the 
inflow of capital by far outscores the real appreciation of exchange rates 
resulting from Agenda 2000 policies such that the exchange rate response is 
relatively modest in the accession scenario. Slovenia, however, experiences 
a huge decrease of agri-food protection by 70 percentage points, which leads 
to a real depreciation of its currency. Though agriculture is an important 
sector in the CECs, the macroeconomic effects of accession generally move 
the economies far more than do agricultural policies. In the Czech Republic 
and Hungary, agricultural protection of Agenda 2000 policies in 2002 is only 
6 and 9 percentage points higher than under non-accession conditions. 
The macroeconomic changes realize their effects in the relatively long run. 
In the CEC-4, the long-run effects lead to a 12 percent higher supply of 
cereals, especially of coarse grains, and slightly contain beef production 
despite increasing producer incentives through prices and direct payments. 
As a result, market surpluses for cereals are higher than under non-changing 
key macroeconomic variables. 
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Market guarantee spending is about 300 Mill. EUR higher with endoge-
nized macroeconomic variables, mainly resulting from market intervention 
for barley and other grains (rye). At the same time, the spending for cat-
tle payments is slightly lower. Total expenditure is slightly less than 300 
Mill. EUR higher for the four CECs than those under constant key macroe-
conomic indicators. In general, however, the market trends presented for 
the CEC-10 under non-changing key macroeconomic variables remain valid, 
though some alteration occurs. 
6.2 Conclusions 
About a decade has passed since the project of EU membership for CECs 
entered the political discussions. It has gained political weight since, but EU 
membership still seems unlikely in the very near future. Judging from the 
state of negotiations at the time of writing, the hugely complex agricultural 
chapter has yet to be negotiated. 
The complexity of the CAP with its mixture of price support, supply con-
trol instruments, and direct payments has a strong impact on agricultural 
markets in the CECs. In terms of market effects, Agenda 2000 policies 
produce less expressive effects than the unreformed CAP. Sensitive market 
reactions and actual budgetary costs greatly depend on the supply control 
mechanisms. 
This may lead to the conclusion that simply setting quotas and set-asides at 
a restrictive enough level can control the majority of sensitive market and 
budgetary reactions. Regarding the low effect of set-aside on land retirement 
in the CECs, very high rates (far above 20 percent) have to be applied to get 
to levels of retired land that would even begin to solve the barley and other 
grain (rye) problem. The milk quota, on the other hand, is more efficient in 
capping budgetary costs. At first sight, this may be an attractive political 
solution for solving the CAP problems for the CECs and the EU-15. 
Such a solution, however, would deprive the CECs of expanding their pro-
duction potential under the CAP, which may be argued as the price the 
new members would have to pay. Set-aside is a bit different in this re-
spect as the rates have to be applied for the whole EU-25 and thus also 
affect the old members. Moreover, set-aside would also affect production 
of more competitive crops like wheat and corn as well as that of oilseeds. 
Though an even tighter CAP might technically solve the problems of market 
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and budget imbalances, market distortions would inevitably increase. The 
major technical question in this respect is whether such a restrictive CAP 
would be workable for the CECs as well as for the EU-15. The experience 
of current EU member countries with initial supply restrictions (such as for 
milk) that were too tight show that under such conditions a circumvention 
of the rules is so profitable for farmers, processors, and wholesalers that 
regulations were impossible to enforce, regardless of their complexity. 
Any simple solution would not solve the underlying problems of the CAP 
in general. The welfare calculations presented for the CECs reveal the large 
distortions generated by the CAP. Producers benefit hugely, but consumers 
have to foot a large part of the bill. This result is especially important in 
the CECs, as their average income per capita is much smaller than in the 
EU-15. Relative household expenditure for food in the CECs is significantly 
higher than in the EU-15. The relatively poorer consumers in the CECs, 
therefore, will have to bear the costs of such a policy and will be much 
more affected by the CAP than their relatively richer counterparts in the 
old member countries. The consumers in the CECs would clearly be the 
losers of accession. 
The question of whether the CAP will cause welfare gains or losses for the 
CECs depends largely on their status as net payers vis-a-vis the central EU 
budget, and whether farmers become eligible for direct payments. Should 
no direct payments be granted, the CECs face global welfare losses, even 
if the EU-15 were to cover all market guarantee expenditure. Should the 
CECs receive direct payments, they would gain welfare as net receivers. 
In total, the EU-25 loses welfare. The distribution of welfare among the 
new and the old members depends on the net payer position of the CECs. 
The calculations show that the CECs are able to gain welfare if they are in 
a net receiver position. For the old members, the increased budget adds to 
the welfare losses of the CAP in their countries. This distribution of gains 
and losses between old and new members is the core of the complications 
in the accession negotiations on the agricultural chapter. 
A potential welfare gain for the CECs as a result of transfers from EU-15 
taxpayers to CEC farmers might be justified as a contribution from the old 
to the new members to enable the CECs to embark on a path of economic 
conversion. This, at the end of the day, would enable the CEC taxpayers 
to foot a larger part of the bill as their economic prosperity increases. 
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As direct payments play such a dominant role in determining welfare gains 
and losses between the CECs and the EU-15, the question arises whether 
such welfare gains could be efficiently distributed to help the CECs pursue a 
path of economic conversion via direct payments to agriculture. Regarding 
the effects of direct payments in increasing land prices, negative effects on 
structural change can be expected, the more so if the CAP were much more 
restrictive in supply control measures in order to control mounting surpluses 
and budgets. 
The underlying problems of the CAP in imposing high costs on consumers, 
the doubtable effects of direct payments on the structure of the agricultural 
sector, and the potential to enormously distort agricultural markets by sup-
ply control measures might have found a fragile balance in the EU-15 under 
current market conditions. Whether in the future such a design of agri-
cultural policies is bearable for the EU-15 as well as for the new members 
remains questionable. 
Enlargement creates new problems as it reveals that the CAP ( as defined in 
Agenda 2000) was constructed for the needs of the current member coun-
tries. The CAP is designed to preserve structures by providing high support 
and direct payments, which, while supporting agricultural income and con-
serving structures, also inhibit the movement of production factors. The 
acceding transition economies, which still have to undergo massive restruc-
turing in the agri-food sector, need a different set of policies than currently 
provided by the CAP. Restructuring will only take place if production fac-
tors get the right signals, which can be more efficiently provided by markets 
than by policies. In this respect the EU can learn from the experience of 
liberalization in the transition economies. This implies a further reduction 
of market price support-related instruments of the CAP and a turn to sup-
porting instruments to cushion and actively support the restructuring of 
agriculture, the food industries, and rural economies in the CECs as well as 
in the EU-15. 
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A Appendix: Price Gaps and Macroeconomic 
Assumptions 
Table A.1: Gap between EU Producer Prices to CEC Producer Prices and 
World Reference Prices (EU-15 = 0). 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000(e) 
WHEAT 
Bulgaria -66 -71 -48 -63 -61 -27 -8 -41 -47 -21 
Czech Rep. -65 -62 -47 -45 -48 -28 -16 -21 -11 -29 
Estonia -49 -53 -46 -28 -3 4 -17 -28 -21 
Hungary -66 -61 -43 -45 -51 -10 -24 -48 -27 -15 
Latvia -27 -61 -48 -27 -3 -8 -20 -25 -1 
Lithuania -74 -65 -59 -28 -5 -13 -28 -16 
Poland -65 -47 -26 -34 -20 20 6 2 -8 25 
Romania -39 -58 -23 -24 -39 -15 -22 -29 -34 -14 
Slovak Rep. -63 -59 -41 -36 -43 -34 -24 -24 -41 -19 
Slovenia -11 -3 12 16 23 35 40 43 -3 
EU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
World -54 -41 -36 -27 -10 9 4 -17 -27 -5 
BARLEY 
Bulgaria -64 -71 -48 -63 -65 -24 -10 -35 -46 
Czech Rep. -65 -61 -42 -46 -48 -29 -15 -20 -14 
Estonia -73 -62 -62 -28 -3 -4 -20 10 
Hungary -60 -60 -44 -46 -54 -5 -16 -42 -32 
Latvia -41 -66 -57 -52 -20 -22 -31 9 
Lithuania -78 -62 -62 -40 -4 -7 -21 22 
Poland -66 -55 -29 -40 -26 8 -4 -4 39 
Romania -45 -70 -9 -38 -48 -5 -20 -32 -4 
Slovak Rep. -65 -62 -40 -38 -43 -31 -16 -16 -3 
Slovenia 95 50 -13 12 
EU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
World -53 -51 -52 -50 -28 -1 -6 -29 -32 
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Table A.1: Continued. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000(e) 
RYE 
Bulgaria -55 -74 -43 -65 -64 -1 0 -44 -40 
Czech Rep. -65 -63 -49 -45 -26 -7 -23 -43 
Estonia -47 -52 -47 -28 2 6 -14 -22 
Hungary -65 -65 -52 -56 -59 -11 -30 -46 -46 -48 
Latvia -19 -64 -58 -36 -1 -1 -25 -23 
Lithuania -67 -63 -68 -36 0 2 -29 -18 
Poland -68 -77 -66 -42 -44 -39 0 -11 -28 
Romania -68 -77 -66 -42 -44 -39 0 -11 -28 
Slovak Rep. -54 -62 -41 -39 -38 -23 -7 -18 -34 
Slovenia 6 13 21 18 28 53 13 -26 
EU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
World -70 -45 -28 -41 -37 -3 -2 -35 -42 
SUGAR 
Bulgaria -51 -55 -54 -SO -51 -56 -50 0 0 
Czech Rep. -43 -54 -45 -47 -59 -.43 -43 -43 -52 
Estonia -67 -58 -31 -41 -70 -81 -84 
Hungary -59 -47 -31 -41 -45 -52 -40 -55 -68 
Latvia 0 -45 -30 -33 -33 -54 -62 -64 
Lithuania 0 0 -31 -37 -35 -44 -52 -58 
Poland -68 -60 -63 -58 -59 -42 -31 -30 -29 
Romania -87 -60 -76 -60 -68 -75 -75 -82 -83 
Slovak Rep. -77 -67 -72 -73 -79 -82 -82 -86 -86 
Slovenia 2 -8 -25 -8 4 -3 4 0 0 
EU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
World -72 -73 -67 -65 -64 -69 -68 -76 -79 
MILK 
Bulgaria -73 -69 -48 -56 -50 -66 -52 -38 -52 -30 
Czech Rep. -52 -46 -40 -40 -38 -35 -34 -29 -34 -26 
Estonia -81 -72 -66 -54 -43 -42 -45 -52 
Hungary -44 -45 -34 -28 -37 -38 -26 -23 -18 
Latvia -72 -74 -64 -59 -54 -53 -54 -57 
Lithuania -89 -80 -79 -68 -64 -61 -60 -61 -52 
Poland -72 -61 -56 -63 -54 -45 -44 -45 -52 -32 
Romania -50 -69 -52 -39 -36 -29 -30 -11 -24 
Slovak Rep. -58 -58 -47 -45 -45 -45 -39 -36 -44 -31 
Slovenia -35 -31 -29 -19 -16 -19 -12 -3 -3 
EU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
World -63 -62 -61 -58 -57 -53 -48 -48 -57 -49 
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Table A.1: Continued. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000(e) 
BEEF 
Bulgaria -66 -63 -58 -65 -44 -47 -37 -52 
Czech Rep. -40 -44 -43 -40 -33 -30 -37 -30 -30 -28 
Estonia -88 -66 -63 -59 -53 -55 -48 -50 
Hungary -49 -50 -49 -45 -41 -46 -48 -43 -36 -37 
Latvia -83 -86 -74 -69 -64 -65 -65 -64 
Lithuania -91 -79 -72 -67 -63 -55 -53 -60 
Poland -70 -67 -62 -57 -51 -30 -33 -34 -43 -48 
Romania -55 -39 -50 -58 -50 -51 -48 -24 -52 
Slovak Rep. -54 -49 -55 -48 -39 -41 -38 -39 -47 -33 
Slovenia -1 -7 -19 -10 13 35 39 37 38 
EU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
World -44 -23 -15 -18 -16 -15 -33 -41 -43 -39 
PORK 
Bulgaria -58 -53 -12 -26 -12 -48 16 34 -7 
Czech Rep. -35 -34 -9 -7 -9 -6 -20 -15 13 -2 
Estonia -75 -38 -2 -7 -8 10 55 20 
Hungary -40 -35 -10 0 -1 -21 -10 18 20 -14 
Latvia -50 -19 35 -7 -14 -2 0 3 14 
Lithuania -80 -21 11 7 12 31 75 51 33 
Poland -33 -38 -15 1 -19 -21 -18 11 4 -8 
Romania -32 -31 -2 -9 0 -8 -12 49 -21 
Slovak Rep. -39 -37 -3 4 4 -5 1 35 14 -2 
Slovenia 27 26 31 18 21 45 52 
EU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
World -33 -37 -18 -19 -28 -23 -20 -5 -3 -5 
Source: National statistics; OECD; Eurostat. 
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Table A.2: Development of Macroeconomic Indicators in MEMBER (1997 = 100). 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Czech Republic 
Exchange rate 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.93 0 .93 0.92 
Capital 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0 .99 
Labor 1.00 1.02 1.05 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.18 1.22 1.25 1.29 1.33 
Price index of non- 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
ag. intermediates 
GDP 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.09 1.13 1.17 1.22 1.26 1.31 1.35 1.40 
CPI 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.04 
Hungary 
Exchange rate 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.99 0 .94 0.92 0.90 0.88 0 .87 
Capital 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 
Labor 1.00 1.02 1.05 1.07 1.11 1.14 1.19 1.23 1.27 1.32 1.36 
Price index of non- 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0 .97 0.96 0.96 0.95 
ag. intermediates 
GDP 1.00 1.04 1.09 1.14 1.19 1.26 1.33 1.40 1.47 1.55 1.63 
CPI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03 
Poland 
Exchange rate 1.00 0.97 0.95 0 .92 0.89 0.87 0 .83 0.81 0.79 0.78 0 .76 
Capital 1.00 1.04 1.09 1.13 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.17 1.15 1.12 1.09 
Labor 1.00 1.07 1.15 1.23 1.32 1.42 1.53 1.65 1.78 1.92 2.07 
Price index of non- 1.00 0.99 0.97 0 .96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 
ag. intermediates 
GDP 1.00 1.05 l.ll 1.16 1.22 1.29 1.36 1.45 1.54 1.63 1.73 
CPI 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.06 
Slovenia 
Exchange rate 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.98 0 .97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Capital 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.09 1.ll 1.10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0 .96 
Labor 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.07 1.08 I.IO 1.12 1.14 
Price index of non- 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
ag. intermediates 
GDP 1.00 1.03 1.05 1.08 l.ll 1.16 1.23 1.28 1.33 1.38 1.43 
CPI 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.98 0 .97 0.97 0 .97 0 .97 0 .98 0 .98 0.98 
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Table A.3: Development of Macroeconomic Indicators in AGENDAPPP (1997 = 100). 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Czech Republic 
Exchange rate 1.00 0 .99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0 .92 0.92 0.91 0 .91 0.91 
Capital 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 .99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0 .98 0.98 
Labor 1.00 1.02 1.05 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.19 1.22 1.26 1.30 1.34 
Price index of non- 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
ag. intermediates 
GDP 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.09 1.13 1.17 1.22 1.26 1.31 1.35 1.40 
CPI 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.04 
Hungary 
Exchange rate 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.99 0 .89 0 .87 0.86 0.85 0.83 
Capital 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.99 0 .98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 
Labor 1.00 1.02 1.05 1.07 1.11 1.14 1.20 1.24 1.28 1.33 1.37 
Price index of non- 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0 .98 0 .97 0.96 0 .96 0 .95 0 .95 
ag. intermediates 
GDP 1.00 1.04 1.09 1.14 1.19 1.26 1.34 1.42 1.49 1.57 1.64 
CPI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.04 
Poland 
Exchange rate 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.87 0 .81 0.79 0.77 0 .75 0.74 
Capital 1.00 1.05 1.09 1.13 1.17 1.20 1.19 1.18 1.16 1.12 1.09 
Labor 1.00 1.07 1.15 1.23 1.32 1.42 1.53 1.66 1.79 1.94 2.09 
Price index of non- 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0 .96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0 .95 
ag. intermediates 
GDP 1.00 1.05 1.11 1.16 1.22 1.29 1.37 1.45 1.55 1.65 1.75 
CPI 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.08 
Slovenia 
Exchange rate 1.00 0 .99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Capital 1.00 1.05 1.09 1.12 1.16 1.15 1.13 1.12 1.11 1.09 1.08 
Labor 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.07 1.08 1.10 1.12 1.14 
Price index of non- 1.00 0.99 0.99 0 .98 0 .98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
ag. intermediates 
GDP 1.00 1.03 1.05 1.08 1.11 1.16 1.23 1.28 1.33 1.38 1.43 
CPI 1.00 0 .99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0 .98 0 .98 0 .98 0 .99 
t-.:> 
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B Appendix: Elasticities 
Table B.1: Elasticities of Yields with Respect to Own Commodity Price. 
EU Poland 
C. Wheat 0.3038 0.15 
D. Wheat 0.11 
Barley 0.2170 0.14 
Corn 0.2733 0.14 
0. Grain 0.3032 0.15 
E. Rice 0.2576 0.00 
E. Sugar 0.0839 0.04 
Soybean 0.3726 0.00 
Rapeseed 0.3572 0.20 
Sunseed 0.3568 0.00 
Milk 0.2786 0.08 
Beef 0.29918 0.07 
Pork 0.9890 0.52 
Poultry 0.3031 0.21 
Eggs 0.7211 0.69 
Note: The Elasticities of Yields with respect to the prices of 
intermediates is the negative value of the elasticity of yields with 
respect to the own price. 
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Table B.2: Elasticities of Area Allocation and National Herd Size, Euroeean Union. 
cw DW BL CN 0G RI SU 
C. Wheat cw 0.70002 -0.00155 -0.01255 -0.05302 -0.00100 -0.01084 -0.19996 
D. Wheat DW -0.15038 0.50000 -0.00022 -0.01992 -0.01927 0.00 -0.01103 
Barley BL -0.02411 0.00 0.59848 -0.03633 -0.05311 0.00 -0.14364 
Corn CN -0.12475 -0.00048 -0.04448 0.69863 -0.03207 0.00 -0.07757 
0. Grain OG -0.00586 -0.00116 -0.16194 -0.07987 0.50066 0 .00 -0.00772 
Rice RI -0.02127 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15506 -0.01568 
Sugar SU -0.23654 -0.00013 -0.08843 -0.03900 -0.00156 -0.00087 0.68829 
Soybean RS -0.03149 -0.00043 -0.16314 -0.08648 0.00 -0.03982 0.00 
Rapeseed SF -0.20969 -0.00011 -0.03568 -0.05009 -0.00171 -0.00737 -0.05136 
Sunseed SM -0.08725 -0.00385 -0.04740 -0.09236 0.00 -0.01934 0.00 
Manioc MN 
CGF CG 
0. Energy ER 









SB RS SF 
-0.00058 -0.02095 -0.00332 
-0.00078 -0.00109 -0.01428 
-0.00580 -0.00685 -0.00347 
-0.00376 -0.01177 -0.00827 
0 .00 -0.00100 0.00 
-0.01566 -0.01567 -0.01566 
0.00 -0.00607 0 .00 
0.60018 0.00 -0.00018 
0 .00 0.59952 -0.00054 




































SM MN CG ER 
cw 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 
DW 
BL 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CN 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 
0G 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 
RI 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 
SU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SF 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 
SM 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 
MN 
CG 









PR DM DN DP BT CH 
0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 
0 .00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 
0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 
2.00 
0.49381 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.04 0 .21 0.31 -0.52 
0.08 -0.31 -0.40 0.71 
0.09282 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 
-0.50280 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 
























































PM 0 .00 
PE -0.52183 
PK PM PE Labor Capital 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.0658 -0.3304 
-0.0470 -0.2360 
0.00 0 .00 0.00 -0.0714 -0.2538 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.0657 -0.3298 
0 .00 0.00 0 .00 -0.0617 -0.1814 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.0220 -0.0491 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.0978 -0.2179 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.0643 -0.2143 
0.00 0.00 0 .00 -0.0542 -0.1888 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.0467 -0.2016 
-0.24737 0.00 -0.09 -0.1750 -0.0402 
-0.26896 0.00 -0.12303 -0.0754 -0.1295 
1.18629 -0.10401 -0.03933 -0.0254 -0.1719 
-0.25306 1.52850 -0.05000 -0.1058 -1.1197 












Table B.3: Elasticities of Area Allocation and National Herd Size, Poland. 
cw BL CN OG RI SU SB RS 
C. Wheat cw 0 .59902 -0.01818 0 .00 -0.05559 0 .00 -0.06 0 .00 -0.01679 
Barley BL -0.05031 0.55006 0 .00 -0.05669 0 .00 -0.03 0 .00 0 .00 
Corn CN -0.02214 0.00 0.53576 -0.07683 0.00 -0.04 0 .00 0 .00 
0. Grain OG -0.05090 -0.02 0.00 0.59666 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.02904 
Rice RI 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 
Sugar SU -0.06597 -0.01 0 .00 -0.06 0.00 0 .56666 0 .00 0 .00 
Soybean RS 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
Rapeseed SF -0.06910 -0.00244 0.00 -0.13053 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .79746 
Sunseed SM 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 
Manioc MN 
CGF CG 
0. Energy ER 









SF SM MN CG ER 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 
0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 
0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 
0 .00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 














C. Wheat cw 
Barley BL 
Corn CN 








0. Energy ER 


























DN DP BT CH BF PK PM PE Labor Capital 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.1091 -0.3386 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.1002 -0.3109 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.0976 -0.3028 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.1087 -0.3373 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.2049 -0.2228 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.1496 -0.4457 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 -0.30632 0.00 0.00 -0.2917 -0.2483 
0.00400 0.21000 0.31000 -0.52000 
0.08000 -0.31000 -0.40000 0.71000 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 -1.12797 -0.06 -0.10 -0.2433 -0.2071 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.18 0.80 -0.03352 -0.08233 -0.1597 -0.1157 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.16 1.23711 0.00 -0.1237 -0.9062 
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Table B.4: Elasticities of Income. 
EU Poland 
Wheat WH 0.3603 0.2760 
Barley BL 0.2801 0.1794 
Corn CN 0.2801 0.1799 
0. Grain OG 0.2800 0.2783 
Rice RI 0.2000 0.3399 
Sugar SU 0.2004 0.1851 
Milk DM 0.5015 0.3083 
Powder DP 0.2400 0.1006 
Butter BT 0.3002 0.3024 
Cheese CH 0.5907 0.5024 
Beef BF 0.2808 0.3101 
Pork PK 0.5611 0.5261 
Poultry PM 0.6004 0.6062 
Eggs PE 0.4403 0.3042 
Soybean Oil so 0.3800 0.2007 
Rapeseed Oil RO 0.3800 0.2020 
Sunflower Oil so 0.3800 0.2006 
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Table B.5: Price Elasticities of Human Consumption with Respect to Prices, Euroeean Union. 
WH BL CN OG RI SU SB MN 
Wheat WH -0.3954 
Barley BL -0.3152 
Corn CN -0.3152 
0. Grain OG -0.3152 
Rice RI -0.2352 






0 . Energy ER 









Soybean Oil so 
Rapeseed Oil RO 
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Table B.5: Continued. 
BT CH BF PK PM PE so RO FO Other 
Wheat WH 0.0351 
Barley BL 0.0351 
Corn CN 0.0351 
0. Grain OG 0.0351 
Rice RI 0.0351 






0. Energy ER 
0. Protein PR 
Milk DM 0.0043 0.00 0.0253 
SMP DP 0.0222 0.00 
Butter BT -0.5690 0.00 
Cheese CH 0.0185 -0.8313 0.2115 
Beef BF -0.4588 0.0011 0.0272 0.1010 0.0100 
Pork PK 0.00 -0.6863 0.0486 0.0666 0.0487 
Poultry PM 0.00 0.00 -0.6167 0.0062 0.0100 
Eggs PE 0.0204 0.00 0.00 -0.4707 0.0100 
Soybean Oil so -0.3979 0.00 0.0079 0.0100 
Rapeseed Oil RO 0.00 -0.3992 0.0091 0.0100 
Sunflower Oil so 0.0091 0.0103 -0.4324 0.0330 











Table B.6: Price Elasticities of Human Consumption with Respect to Prices, Poland. 
WH Bl CN OG RI SU SB MN 
Wheat WH -0.3189 
Barley BL -0.1894 
Corn CN -0.1902 
0 . Grain OG -0.2883 
Rice RI -0.3499 






0. Energy ER 









Soybean Oil so 
Rapeseed Oil RO 
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Table B.6: Continued. 
BT CH BF PK PM PE so RO FO Other 
Wheat WH 0.0429 
Barley BL 0.0100 
Corn CN 0.0103 
0. Grain OG 0.0100 
Rice RI 0.0100 






0. Energy ER 
0 . Protein PR 
Milk OM 0.1717 0.0358 0.1185 
SMP DP -0.0008 -0.0009 
Butter BT -0.3449 -0.0011 
Cheese CH 0.00 -0.5248 0.2147 
Beef BF -0.3803 0.00 0.0601 0.00 0.0100 
Pork PK 0.0087 -0.9810 0.4361 0.00 0.0100 
Poultry PM 0.00 0.00 -0.7703 0.1540 0.0100 
Eggs PE 0.00 0.00 0.0508 -0.5644 0.0100 
Soybean Oil so -0.6676 0.4565 0.0004 0.0100 
Rapeseed Oil RO 0.2408 -0.4605 0.0077 0.0100 













Table B.7: Elasticities of Feed Demand with Respect to Feed Prices, European Union. 
WH BL CN OG SM RM FM MC CG ER PR DP 
DAIRY 
Wheat WH -1.7460 0.3000 0 .3000 0.1000 -0.0140 0 .0300 0.0300 0 .0000 0.5000 0.4000 0.1000 0.0000 
Barley BL 1.0041 -2.6811 0.4980 0.1000 0 .0190 0.0300 0 .0300 0 .0000 0.5000 0.4000 0.1000 0.0000 
Corn CN 0.6049 0.3000 -2.0009 0 .1000 -0.0140 0 .0300 0.0300 0.0000 0.5000 0.4000 0.0500 0.0000 
0 . Grain OG 0.1114 0 .0333 0.0553 -0.4660 0 .0190 0 .0190 0 .0190 0.0000 0 .0050 0 .1040 0.1000 0 .0000 
Soymeal SM -0.0278 0.0113 -0.0138 0.0338 -0.6865 0 .2000 0.2000 0 .0000 0 .2000 -0.1170 0 .2000 0.0000 
Rapemeal RM 0.2212 0.0661 0 .1097 0.1257 0.3300 -1.9248 0.4000 0.0000 0.3890 -0.1170 0.4000 0.0000 
Sunmeal FM 0 .2176 0.0650 0.1079 0.1237 0.7500 0 .9000 -2.8362 0.0000 0 .3890 -0.1170 0 .4000 0 .0000 
Manioc MC 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CGF CG 1.2968 0.3874 0.6431 0.0116 0.2615 0 .1368 0.1391 0 .0000 -3.2763 0 .2000 0.2000 0 .0000 
0 . Energy OE 0.3735 0.1116 0.1852 0.0871 -0.0551 -0.0148 -0.0151 0.0000 0 .0720 -0.7545 0.0100 0.0000 
0. Protein OP 0 .0839 0.0251 0.0208 0 .0753 0.0846 0.0455 0.0462 0.0000 0.0647 0.0090 -0.4549 0.0000 
SMP SP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0 .0000 
BEEF 
Wheat WH -1.8880 0 .3000 0.5000 0.1000 0.0100 0 .0300 0 .0300 0.0000 0 .4000 0 .4000 0.1000 0 .0180 
Barley BL 1.1138 -2. 7970 0.5902 0 .1000 0.0100 0 .0300 0 .0300 0.0000 0.4000 0.4000 0.1000 0 .0230 
Corn CN 0.9436 0.3000 -2.2866 0.1000 0 .0100 0.0300 0.0300 0 .0000 0.4000 0 .4000 0 .0500 0.0230 
0 . Grain OG 0.1103 0.0297 0.0584 -0.3614 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0000 0.0500 0.0500 0.0100 0 .0230 
Soymeal SM 0 .0312 0 .0084 0.0165 0.0283 -1.4535 0 .4000 0 .4000 0 .0000 0.0500 -0.0410 0 .2100 0 .3500 
Rapemeal RM 0.2534 0.0683 0.1343 0 .0766 1.0826 -3.1042 1.0000 0.0000 0 .3000 -0.0410 0.2000 0 .0300 
Sunmeal FM 0 .2522 0.0679 0.1336 0.0762 1.0772 0.8000 -2.8961 0.0000 0.3000 -0.0410 0.2000 0 .0300 
Manioc MC 0 .0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CGF CG 1.1821 0.3184 0.6264 0 .1340 0.0473 0.1050 0 .1055 0.0000 -3.0255 0.3000 0 .2000 0.0068 
0 . Energy OE 0.4159 0 .1120 0.2204 0.0471 -0.0137 -0.0050 -0.0051 0 .0000 0 .1055 -0.8011 -0.1000 0.0239 
0. Protein OP 0.0922 0.0248 0.0244 0.0084 0.0620 0 .0218 0 .0219 0 .0000 0 .0624 -0.0886 -0.7598 0.5305 



































0 . Energy 
0 . Protein 
SMP 
Continued. 
WH Bl CN 
WH -1.3100 0.3000 0.3000 
BL 0.1093 -1.1831 0.0638 
CN 0.6851 0 .4000 -1.9751 
OG 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SM 0.1008 0.0830 0.0221 
RM 0.4943 1.3568 0.2164 
FM 0.5138 1.4104 0.2250 
MC 0.6136 4.2108 0.6717 
CG 1.4859 5.7106 0.3904 
OE 0 .4372 1.2000 0 .1914 
OP 0.1596 0.6573 0 .0350 
SP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
WH -1.6610 0.0000 1.0000 
BL 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CN 0.5433 0.0000 -1.2043 
OG 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SM 0.0494 0.0000 0.0910 
RM 0.0020 0.0000 0.0037 
FM 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MC 2.5508 0.0000 5.8684 
CG 0 .0000 0 .0000 0.0000 
OE 0.0450 0.0000 0.0828 
OP 0.2027 0.0000 0.1866 
SP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
OG SM RM FM MC CG ER PR DP 
0 .0000 0.1000 0.0300 0 .0300 0.2000 0.0500 0.2000 0.1000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0300 0 .0300 0.0300 0 .5000 0.0700 0.2000 0 .1500 0.0000 
0 .0000 0.0500 0.0300 0.0300 0.5000 0.0300 0 .2000 0 .0500 0 .0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 -1.2958 0.4000 0.4000 -0.0500 0.0300 0.0100 0.3000 0.0000 
0 .0000 6.5408 -9.6783 0 .6000 -0.0500 0 .0800 0.0400 0 .4000 0.0000 
0.0000 6.7994 0 .6237 -10.0423 -0.0500 0.0800 0.0400 0.4000 0.0000 
0.0000 -0.1522 -0.0093 -0.0090 -5.2856 0.0300 0.0300 -0.1000 0.0000 
0.0000 0 .8849 0.1443 0 .1388 0.2906 -9.4456 0.2000 0.2000 0.0000 
0.0000 0 .0217 0 .0053 0.0051 0 .0214 0.0147 -2.0968 0.2000 0.0000 
0 .0000 0 .4753 0 .0388 0.0373 -0.0520 0.0107 0.1461 -1.5080 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0 .0000 0.0500 0 .0010 0 .0000 0 .4000 0.0000 0.0100 0.2000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0 .0000 0.0500 0.0010 0 .0000 0.5000 0.0000 0.0100 0.1000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0 .0000 -0.4724 0.0010 0.0000 -0.2000 0.0000 0 .0310 0 .5000 0.0000 
0 .0000 0.0020 0 .0113 0.0000 -0.1000 0.0000 0.0310 0.0500 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0 .0000 -1.2902 -0.3176 0.0000 -6.5624 0.0000 0.0010 -0.2500 0.0000 
0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 
0.0000 0 .1411 0.0694 0.0000 0 .0007 0.0000 -0.3490 0.0100 0.0000 
0 .0000 0 .5127 0.0252 0 .0000 -0.0397 0.0000 0.0023 -0.8898 0 .0000 




























BL 0 .0000 
CN 0 .4427 
OG 0 .4600 
SM 0.1067 






SP 0 .0000 
BL CN OG SM RM FM MC CG ER PR DP 
0 .0000 1.0000 0 .1000 0 .0500 0 .0500 0 .0000 0.4000 0 .0500 0 .0500 0.0940 0.0000 
0 .0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0 .0000 0.0000 
0.0000 -1.2207 0 .1000 0 .0500 0.0500 0.0000 0 .4500 0.0050 0 .0050 0 .1180 0.0000 
0.0000 1.0392 -1.5543 0.0100 0 .0100 0 .0000 0 .0100 0 .0050 0 .0100 0.0100 0 .0000 
0.0000 0.2410 0 .0046 -0.4903 0 .0500 0.0000 -0.4000 0 .0520 0 .0520 0.3840 0.0000 
0.0000 0.2786 0.0054 0.0578 -0.5682 0.0000 -0.0240 0 .0520 0.0250 0 .0500 0 .0000 
0 .0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0 .0000 7.3708 0 .0158 -1.3595 -0.0705 0.0000 -8.6958 -0.0110 0 .0500 -0.2000 0.0000 
0 .0000 2.2807 0.2195 4 .9216 4.2562 0.0000 -0.3063 -21.4672 0.0500 -0.0500 0.0000 
0 .0000 0 .0417 0 .0080 0.0900 0 .0374 0.0000 0.0255 0 .0009 -0.4380 0.0500 0 .0000 
0.0000 0.3319 0 .0027 0.2241 0 .0252 0.0000 -0.0343 -0.0003 0 .0169 -0.6833 0 .0000 











Table B.8: Elasticities of Feed Demand with Respect to Feed Prices, Poland. 
WH BL CN OG SM RM FM MC CG ER PR DP 
DAIRY 
Wheat WH -0.4671 0 .0416 0 .0333 0.1665 0 .0250 0.0291 0 .0000 0 .0362 0 .0000 0 .0754 0.0459 0 .0000 
Barley BL 0 .3141 -0.7211 0 .0390 0.2789 0 .0112 0 .0112 0.0000 0.0162 0.0000 0.0253 0 .0154 0.0000 
Corn CN 0.2482 0.0386 -0. 7209 0.2791 0.0000 0.0112 0.0000 0 .0243 0 .0000 0.0759 0.0308 0 .0000 
0. Grain OG 0 .0600 0.0133 0 .0135 -0.2491 0.0300 0 .0300 0.0000 0 .0225 0 .0000 0 .0451 0.0225 0.0000 
Soymeal SM 0 .1809 0.0107 0 .0000 0 .6033 -0.8575 0.0643 0 .0000 -0.0214 0 .0283 -0.0971 0.0643 0.0189 
Rapemeal RM 0.2351 0 .0119 0 .0121 0.6720 0.0716 -1.0630 0.0000 -0.0213 0 .0297 -0.0963 0.1291 0 .0190 
Sunmeal FM 0 .5221 0.0309 0 .0313 0 .6332 0 .4498 0.4056 -1.1699 -0.0585 -0.0399 -0.6630 -0.0950 -0.0466 
Manioc MC 0 .5221 0.0309 0 .0470 0 .8998 -0.0426 -0.0380 0 .0000 -1.0284 -0.0523 0 .0000 -0.2834 -0.0505 
CGF CG 0.2465 0.0237 0.0148 0 .5139 0.0964 0 .0909 0.0000 -0.0896 -0.9481 0.0415 0.0000 0 .0000 
0. Energy OE 0 .3480 0 .0154 0 .0470 0 .5765 -0.0619 -0.0551 0 .0000 0 .0000 0 .0000 -0. 7726 -0.0798 -0.0237 
0 . Protein OP 0.3480 0 .0154 0 .0313 0 .4739 0.0673 0 .1214 0.0000 -0.1493 0.0000 -0.1313 -0.8059 0.0264 
SMP SP 0.1740 0 .0154 0 .0157 0 .5322 0.1113 0 .1004 0.0000 -0.1493 0 .0000 -0.2188 0 .1482 -0. 7317 
BEEF 
Wheat WH - 0.4412 0 .1410 0.0000 0.0235 0 .0666 0 .0681 0 .0000 0 .0101 0 .0109 0.0822 0.0292 0.0000 
Barley BL 0.0813 -0.9308 0.0000 0.0603 0.1898 0 .1942 0.0000 0 .0287 0 .0310 0 .2345 0.0834 0 .0132 
Corn CN 0.0495 0.2449 -0.5379 0 .0000 0 .0586 0.0599 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0724 0.0257 0 .0000 
0. Grain OG 0.0000 0.0432 0.0000 -0.3532 0.0662 0 .0677 0.0000 0.0100 0.0108 0 .1091 0.0291 0.0000 
Soymeal SM 0.0771 0.3817 0.0000 0.1859 -0.9262 0.3935 0.0156 -0.0700 0 .0943 -0.5721 0.3169 0 .1001 
Rapemeal RM 0 .0771 0.3817 0.0000 0 .1859 0 .3848 -1.0013 0.0147 -0.0444 0.0891 - 0 .6048 0 .4193 0.0946 
Sunmeal FM 0.0771 0.3817 0 .0000 0 .1859 0.3848 0.3719 -0.8477 -0.1008 0.0543 -0.8239 0.2557 0 .0577 
Manioc MC 0 .0771 0.3817 0.0000 0 .1859 -0.4631 -0.3004 -0.0270 -0.1212 -0.0590 0.6707 -0.2643 -0.0835 
CGF CG 0.0514 0.2544 0 .0000 0 .1239 0.3848 0 .3719 0.0000 -0.0364 -1.0339 -0.0549 -0.0585 -0.0139 
0 . Energy OE 0.0771 0 .3817 0 .0000 0 .2479 -0.4631 -0.5006 -0 .0270 0 .0820 -0.0109 0 .1869 0 .0150 0 .0000 
0. Protein OP 0.0514 0 .2544 0 .0000 0 .1239 0.4810 0.6508 0 .0157 -0.0606 -0.0218 0 .0280 -1.5956 0.0705 











Table B.8: Continued. 
WH BL CN OG SM RM FM MC CG ER PR DP 
PORK 
Wheat WH -0.6675 0 .1573 0.0393 0.0629 0 .2452 0.0729 0 .0000 0.0157 0 .0000 0 .0393 0.0243 0 .0000 
Barley BL 0 .2638 -1 .0609 0.1148 0.2031 0.2754 0 .0819 0.0000 0.0133 0 .0000 0.0694 0.0273 0.0000 
Corn CN 0 .3235 0.5632 - 1.0980 0 .1190 0 .0530 0 .0158 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0134 0.0000 0 .0000 
0 . Grain OG 0.0756 0 .1456 0.0174 -0.6027 0 .2467 0 .0493 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0388 0 .0152 0.0000 
Soymeal SM 0.7560 0.5062 0.0199 0 .6326 -1.7776 0.0412 0.0000 -0.0356 0 .0000 -0.1746 0.0240 0.0000 
Rapemeal RM 0 .7560 0 .5062 0.0199 0.4256 0 .1387 -1.6074 0 .0000 -0.0402 0 .0000 -0.1974 0.0000 0.0000 
Sunmeal FM 0 .7560 0 .5062 0.0199 0.3945 0 .1387 0 .0000 -1.3296 -0.0591 -0.0186 -0 .2903 -0.1032 -0.0136 
Manioc MC 1.0010 0 .5062 0.0199 0.3945 -0. 7339 -0.2466 0 .0000 -0.8585 -0.0228 0.0863 -0.1205 -0.0222 
CGF CG 0 .5040 0 .3375 0 .0132 0 .2630 0 .0925 0.0000 0 .0000 -0.0236 -1.1018 -0.0296 -0.0466 0 .0000 
0 . Energy OE 0.6413 0.6749 0.0265 0.5261 -0.9239 -0.3105 0 .0000 0 .0221 0 .0000 -0.5902 -0.0420 -0.0129 
0 . Protein OP 0 .5040 0.3375 0.0132 0.2630 0 .1618 0 .0000 0.0000 -0.0393 -0.014 7 -0.0535 -1.1772 0 .0000 
SMP SP 0.2520 0.1687 0.0000 0.1315 0 .1156 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0393 -0.0110 -0.0892 0.0491 -0.5813 
POULTRY 
Wheat WH -0.7401 0.1505 0 .1075 0.1075 0 .2902 0 .0215 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0322 0.0215 0 .0000 
Barley BL 0 .6398 -1.3330 0 .1297 0.2075 0 .2491 0 .0300 0.0000 0 .0000 0 .0000 0.0418 0.0225 0.0000 
Corn CN 0.3644 0.1034 -1.1908 0 .3115 0.2876 0.0346 0 .0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0 .0483 0 .0260 0 .0000 
0 . Grain OG 0 .1981 0.0900 0.1693 -0.7553 0 .2055 0.0196 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0395 0.0212 0.0000 
Soymeal SM 0.7338 0.1481 0 .2145 0 .2820 -1.4102 0 .0512 0.0000 0.0000 0.0144 -0.0987 0 .0590 0 .0000 
Rapemeal RM 0.5630 0.1848 0.2676 0.2782 0.5299 -1.6914 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 -0.1705 0.0309 0.0000 
Sunmeal FM 0 .6484 0 .1848 0.2676 0 .4022 0.5299 0.0268 -1.5857 0.0000 -0.0286 -0.3196 -0.1171 0 .0000 
Manioc MC 0 .4456 0 .1687 0 .3345 0 .5027 -0.7708 -0.1223 -0.0398 -0.5762 -0.0211 0 .1709 -0.0922 0 .0000 
CGF CG 0.2670 0 .0924 0 .1338 0.2011 0 .3532 0 .0178 -0.0118 0 .0000 -0.6395 -0.1309 -0.2814 0.0000 
0 . Energy OE 0.6056 0.1848 0.2676 0.4022 -0.7333 -0.1223 -0.0398 0 .0000 -0.0396 -0.4821 -0.0478 0.0000 
0. Protein OP 0.3755 0.0924 0.1338 0 .2011 0 .4074 0.0206 -0.0136 0.0000 -0.0791 -0.0445 -1.0913 0.0000 



























WH -0.9698 0.2473 
BL 0.7379 -1.4821 
CN 0.6434 0.2091 
OG 0.7158 0.2091 
SM 0.5887 0.2479 
RM 0.5070 0.2277 
FM 0.4372 0.2789 
MC 0.4944 0.3486 
CG 0.3253 0.1394 
OE 0.4715 0.2789 
OP 0.3504 0 .1394 
SP 0.4139 0.0697 
CN OG SM RM FM MC CG ER PR DP 
0.0927 0.3606 0.2060 0.0155 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0309 0.0000 
0.0899 0.3144 0.2589 0.0207 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0127 0.0367 0.0000 
-1.3102 0.2199 0.1811 0.0145 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0257 0.0000 
0.0629 -1.3889 0 .3055 0.0244 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0150 0.0433 0 .0000 
0.0746 0.4397 -1.4972 0.0251 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0225 0.1247 0.0133 
0.0685 0.4040 0.2887 -1.5283 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0522 0.0749 0.0000 
0.0839 0.4946 0.4242 0.0222 -1.3570 -0.0126 0.0000 -0.0926 -0.2519 -0.0269 
0.1049 0.6183 -0.5029 -0.0497 -0.0428 -0. 7585 0.0000 0.0452 -0.2240 -0.0335 
0.0419 0.2473 0.2828 0.0148 0 .0000 0.0000 -0.5754 -0.0279 -0.3961 -0.0444 
0.0839 0.4946 -0.5139 -0.1040 -0.0428 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5784 -0.0768 -0.0191 
0 .0419 0.2473 0 .4949 0 .0259 -0.0202 0 .0000 0 .0000 -0.0133 -1.2821 0 .0210 
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Basis 1993 1994 1995 1996 
"• • Wheat ESIM • •" Barley ESIM " •" Corn ESIM 
-•-Wheat REAL --Barley REAL _._Corn REAL 
1997 
Figure C.1: Development of Real and Simulated Area Harvested of Wheat, 
Barley and Corn in the EU, 1993-97. Source: Nolle (2000) p. 30. 
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Basis 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
• •· Other Grains ESIM --Other Grains REAL 
• •· Rice ESIM ---Rice REAL 
• •· Sugar ESIM --Sugar REAL 
Figure C.2: Development of Real and Simulated Area Harvested of Other 
Grains, Rice and Sugar in the EU, 1993-97. Source: Nolle 
{2000) p. 32. 
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Basis 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
. •· Dairy Cows ESIM ·• . Beef Slaughtering ESIM 
--Dairy Cows REAL --Beef Slaughtering REAL 
Figure C.3: Development of Real and Simulated Area National Cattle Herds 
in the EU, 1993-97. Source: Nolle {2000) p. 36. 
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Basis 1993 1994 
"• • Pig Slaughtering ESIM 
. • • Poultry Slaughtering ESIM 
• • • Laying Hens ESIM 
1995 1996 1997 
-+- Pig Slaughtering REAL 
--Poultry Slaughtering REAL 
..._ Laying Hens REAL 
Figure C.4: Development of Real and Simulated National Herds for Pork, 
Poultry and Layer Hens in the EU, 1993-97. Source: Nolle 
{2000) p. 39. 
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D Appendix: Selected Scenario Results by 
Country 
Table D.1: Development of World Market Prices in NON-ACCESSION 
(EUR/ton). 
1997 2010 % Change 
Wheat 110.42 114.45 3.6 
Barley 82.21 88.65 7.8 
Corn 95.83 95.83 0.0 
0. Grain 65.68 69.14 5.3 
Rice 207.52 219 5.5 
Sugar 334.76 356.84 6.6 
Soybean 225.93 215.97 -4.4 
Rapeseed 259.21 266.41 2.8 
Sunseed 270.59 277.85 2.7 
Soymeal 172.48 173.89 0.8 
Rapemeal 141.8 138.12 -2.6 
Sunmeal 115.78 112.8 -2.6 
Manioc 65.68 48.36 -26.4 
CGF 74.43 64.11 -13.9 
0. Energy 87.57 88.93 1.6 
0. Protein 87.57 88.93 1.6 
SMP 1344.26 1319.88 -1.8 
Butter 1331.91 1467.87 10.2 
Cheese 1873.41 2259.22 20.6 
Beef 1129.35 1196.48 5.9 
Pork 1218.03 1272.01 4.4 
Poultry 1000.89 897.59 -10.3 
Eggs 808.85 823.21 1.8 
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Table D.2: Scenario Results: NON-ACCESSION, European Union. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 180.90 190.21 210.84 225.35 
of which 
Wheat 88.10 93.19 105.96 114.71 
Coarse grains 92.81 97.02 104.88 110.64 
Oilseeds 12.31 13.60 14.91 15.74 
Sugar* 16.24 16.88 16.88 16.88 
Milk 121.29 121.29 123.17 123.17 
Butter 1.776 1.787 1.721 1.729 
Beef 8.05 8.46 8.76 8.97 
Pork 16.34 18.76 20.16 20.52 
Poultry 7.83 8.34 8.73 8.88 
Eggs 5.50 7.30 7.87 8.26 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 165.31 179.72 186.50 189.52 
of which 
Wheat 74.80 82.70 85.14 85.88 
Coarse grains 90.51 97.02 101.36 95.62 
Oilseeds 24.14 24.98 26.95 27.78 
Sugar 12.91 13.18 13.53 13.59 
Milk 121.29 121.29 123.17 123.17 
Butter 1.651 1.667 1.672 1.693 
Beef 7.27 7.68 7.98 8.19 
Pork 15.38 17.80 19.21 19.56 
Poultry 7.26 7.77 8.16 8.31 
Eggs 5.34 6.60 6.77 6.78 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals 15.60 10.49 24.34 35.83 
of which 
Wheat 13.30 10.49 20.81 28.84 
Coarse grains 2.30 0.00 3.53 15.02 
Oilseeds -11.83 -11.38 -12.04 -12.04 
Sugar 3.32 3.70 3.35 3.29 
Butter 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.04 
Beef 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 
Pork 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Poultry 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Eggs 0.16 0.70 1.10 1.48 
• Includes C-quota sugar. 
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Table D.3: Scenario Results: NON-ACCESSION, Poland. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 25.88 28.01 30.88 32.95 
of which 
Wheat 8.77 9.64 10.77 11.59 
Coarse grains 17.12 18.37 20.11 21.36 
Oilseeds 0.71 0.78 0.86 0.92 
Sugar* 2.12 2.06 2.33 2.53 
Milk 12.01 12.34 13.58 14.58 
Butter 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Beef 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.54 
Pork 2.01 2.24 2.47 2.64 
Poultry 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.53 
Eggs 0.43 0.46 0.51 0.54 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 27.08 28.61 31.38 33.44 
of which 
Wheat 9.39 9.91 10.96 11.77 
Coarse grains 17.70 18.70 20.42 21.67 
Oilseeds 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Sugar 1.65 1.71 1.91 2.08 
Milk 12.01 12.34 13.58 14.58 
Butter 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 
Beef 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.54 
Pork 1.87 1.91 2.24 2.54 
Poultry 0.49 0.54 0.71 0.87 
Eggs 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.55 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals -1.20 -0.60 -0.50 -0.49 
of which 
Wheat -0.62 -0.27 -0.19 -0.19 
Coarse grains -0.58 -0.33 -0.31 -0.31 
Oilseeds -0.19 -0.12 -0.05 O.Ql 
Sugar 0.46 0.35 0.42 0.45 
Butter 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
Beef 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 
Pork 0.15 0.33 0.23 0.10 
Poultry -0.02 -0.05 -0.19 -0.34 
Eggs 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 
* Includes C-quota sugar. 
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Table D.4: Development of World Market Prices in CAP-1992 (EUR/ton). 
1997 2010 % Change 
Wheat 110.42 112.34 1.7 
Barley 82.21 78.82 -4.1 
Corn 95.83 94.93 -0.9 
0. Grain 65.68 68.29 4.0 
Rice 207.52 218.94 5.5 
Sugar 334.76 353.81 5.7 
Soybean 225.93 216.57 -4.1 
Rapeseed 259.21 275.87 6.4 
Sunseed 270.59 289.59 7.0 
Soymeal 172.48 175.72 1.9 
Rapemeal 141.80 143.40 1.1 
Sunmeal 115.78 121.01 4.5 
Manioc 65.68 66.73 1.6 
CGF 74.43 77.56 4.2 
0. Energy 87.57 88.93 1.6 
0. Protein 87.57 88.93 1.6 
SMP 1344.26 1341.58 -0.2 
Butter 1331.91 1425.02 7.0 
Cheese 1873.41 2238.76 19.5 
Beef 1129.35 1138.31 0.8 
Pork 1218.03 1290.04 5.9 
Poultry 1000.89 884.78 -11.6 
Eggs 808.85 858.96 6.2 
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Table D.5: Scenario Results: CAP-1992, European Union. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 180.905 201.434 224.223 240.24 
of which 
Wheat 88.098 97.738 110.437 119.533 
Coarse grains 92.806 103.696 113.786 120.703 
Oilseeds 12.307 13.566 14.769 15.508 
Sugar* 16.238 16.733 16.744 16.751 
Milk 121.288 121.288 121.288 121.288 
Butter 1.776 1.785 1.767 1.755 
Beef 8.046 8.527 8.998 9.325 
Pork 16.338 17.081 17.989 18.515 
Poultry 7.825 7.774 8.081 8.222 
Eggs 5.499 6.857 7.227 7.533 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 165.307 170.747 176.761 179.756 
of which 
Wheat 74.800 78.070 80.381 81.127 
Coarse grains 90.507 92.678 96.380 90.280 
Oilseeds 24.137 25.166 27.009 27.747 
Sugar 12.914 13.178 13.530 13.588 
Milk 121.288 121.288 121.288 121.288 
Butter 1.651 1.667 1.672 1.693 
Beef 7.267 7.185 7.395 7.421 
Pork 15.384 16.299 16.925 17.213 
Poultry 7.259 7.885 8.270 8.419 
Eggs 5.344 6.306 6.513 6.505 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals 15.598 30.687 47.463 60.480 
of which 
Wheat 13.298 19.668 30.057 38.406 
Coarse grains 2.300 11.019 17.406 30.423 
Oilseeds -11.830 -11.600 -12.240 -12.240 
Sugar 3.324 3.555 3.214 3.163 
Butter 0.124 0.117 0.095 0.062 
Beef 0.779 1.343 1.603 1.903 
Pork 0.954 0.783 1.064 1.302 
Poultry 0.566 -0.110 -0.189 -0.197 
Eggs 0.155 0.551 0.714 1.028 
* Includes (-quota sugar. 
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Table D.6: Scenario Results: CAP-1992, Poland. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 25.884 28.483 31.535 33.520 
of which 
Wheat 8.766 7.265 8.139 8.727 
Coarse grains 17.118 23.340 25.736 27.272 
Oilseeds 0.712 0.528 0.584 0.617 
Sugar* 2.117 2.297 2.415 2.415 
Milk 12.007 14.502 14.739 14.749 
Butter 0.162 0.207 0.205 0.203 
Beef 0.475 0.606 0.562 0.532 
Pork 2.012 2.348 2.496 2.666 
Poultry 0.468 0.533 0.586 0.632 
Eggs 0.427 0.188 0.192 0.209 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 27.085 27.736 29.351 30.752 
of which 
Wheat 9.389 10.294 11.211 12.026 
Coarse grains 17.695 15.698 16.326 16.853 
Oilseeds 0.905 0.910 0.910 0.910 
Sugar 1.653 1.530 1.709 1.861 
Milk 12.007 14.502 14.739 14.749 
Butter 0.158 0.127 0.141 0.155 
Beef 0.431 0.375 0.422 0.465 
Pork 1.866 1.688 2.044 2.400 
Poultry 0.490 0.469 0.591 0.714 
Eggs 0.431 0.539 0.607 0.665 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals -1.201 0.747 2.184 2.768 
of which 
Wheat -0.623 -3.029 -3.072 -3.299 
Coarse grains -0.577 7.642 9.409 10.419 
Oilseeds -0.193 -0.381 -0.326 -0.293 
Sugar 0.463 0.767 0.706 0.554 
Butter 0.004 0.081 0.063 0.048 
Beef 0.044 0.231 0.140 0.067 
Pork 0.146 0.660 0.453 0.266 
Poultry -0.022 0.064 -0.004 -0.082 
Eggs -0.004 -0.352 -0.414 -0.457 
* Includes C-quota sugar. 
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Table D.7: Development of World Market Prices in AGENDA (EUR/ton). 
1997 2010 % Change 
Wheat 110.42 115.02 4.2 
Barley 82.20 88.66 7.9 
Corn 95.83 95.34 -0.5 
0. Grain 65.67 69.13 5.3 
Rice 207.58 218.98 5.5 
Sugar 334.76 353.29 5.5 
Soybean 225.92 216.20 -4.3 
Rapeseed 259.20 268.12 3.4 
Sunseed 270.59 287.48 6.2 
Soymeal 172.48 174.38 1.1 
Rapemeal 141.80 138.15 -2.6 
Sunmeal 115.77 115.59 -0.2 
Manioc 65.67 48.81 -25.7 
CGF 74.43 64.58 -13.2 
0. Energy 87.56 88.93 1.6 
0. Protein 87.56 88.93 1.6 
SMP 1344.25 1424.77 6.0 
Butter 1331.91 1450.45 8.9 
Cheese 1873.41 2075.26 10.8 
Beef 1129.35 1184.76 4.9 
Pork 1218.02 1292.55 6.1 
Poultry 1000.89 885.89 -11.5 
Eggs 808.85 829.42 2.5 
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Table D.8: Scenario Results: AGENDA, European Union. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 180.905 190.768 210.767 217.99 
of which 
Wheat 88.098 93.882 106.856 111.214 
Coarse grains 92.806 96.886 103.911 106.780 
Oilseeds 12.307 13.644 15.138 15.553 
Sugar* 16.238 16.883 16.883 16.883 
Milk 121.288 121.288 123.186 123.186 
Butter 1.776 1.787 1.721 1.729 
Beef 8.046 8.367 8.860 8.985 
Pork 16.338 18.597 20.336 20.575 
Poultry 7.825 7.922 8.256 8.326 
Eggs 5.499 7.494 8.145 8.338 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 165.307 179.167 186.570 188.126 
of which 
Wheat 74.800 82.411 85.055 85.446 
Coarse grains 90.507 96.756 101.515 98.713 
Oilseeds 24.137 24.807 27.066 27.481 
Sugar 12.914 13.178 13.530 13.559 
Milk 121.288 121.288 123.186 123.186 
Butter 1.651 1.667 1.672 1.693 
Beef 7.267 7.915 8.352 8.434 
Pork 15.384 17.819 19.135 19.266 
Poultry 7.259 8.057 8.480 8.556 
Eggs 5.344 6.519 6.685 6.687 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals 15.598 11.601 24.198 29.868 
of which 
Wheat 13.298 11.471 21.801 25.767 
Coarse grains 2.300 0.130 2.396 8.067 
Oilseeds -11.830 -11.162 -11.928 -11.928 
Sugar 3.324 3.705 3.353 3.324 
Butter 0.124 0.120 0.049 0.036 
Beef 0.779 0.452 0.507 0.551 
Pork 0.954 0.779 1.201 1.309 
Poultry 0.566 -0.135 -0.223 -0.230 
Eggs 0.155 0.975 1.460 1.652 
• Includes (-quota sugar. 
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Table D.9: Scenario Results: AGENDA, Poland. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 25.884 27.144 29.784 30.646 
of which 
Wheat 8.766 7.359 8.427 8.771 
Coarse grains 17.118 21.764 23.493 24.061 
Oilseeds 0.712 0.594 0.674 0.698 
Sugar• 2.117 2.350 2.412 2.412 
Milk 12.007 14.513 14.753 14.760 
Butter 0.162 0.207 0.197 0.198 
Beef 0.475 0.614 0.573 0.557 
Pork 2.012 2.454 2.590 2.691 
Poultry 0.468 0.548 0.607 0.631 
Eggs 0.427 0.219 0.236 0.247 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 27.085 30.618 32.846 33.750 
of which 
Wheat 9.389 10.908 11.844 12.282 
Coarse grains 17.695 17.739 18.902 19.321 
Oilseeds 0.905 0.910 0.910 0.910 
Sugar 1.653 1.530 1.709 1.784 
Milk 12.007 14.513 14.753 14.760 
Butter 0.158 0.127 0.145 0.152 
Beef 0.431 0.386 0.438 0.460 
Pork 1.866 1.793 2.220 2.406 
Poultry 0.490 0.474 0.598 0.659 
Eggs 0.431 0.550 0.618 0.648 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals -1.201 -3.474 -3.063 -3.104 
of which 
Wheat -0.623 -3.549 -3.418 -3.510 
Coarse grains -0.577 4.024 4.591 4.740 
Oilseeds -0.193 -0.315 -0.236 -0.213 
Sugar 0.463 0.820 0.703 0.628 
Butter 0.004 0.081 0.052 0.046 
Beef 0.044 0.229 0.135 0.096 
Pork 0.146 0.661 0.370 0.285 
Poultry -0.022 0.075 0.009 -0.028 
Eggs -0.004 -0.331 -0.381 -0.401 
• Includes (-quota sugar. 
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Table D.10: Development of World Market Prices in LIBERAL (EUR/ton). 
1997 2010 % Change 
Wheat 110.94 110.80 -0.1 
Barley 89.55 88.00 -1.7 
Corn 98.80 97.15 -1.7 
0. Grain 66.80 70.29 5.2 
Rice 207.90 219.39 5.5 
Sugar 361.00 370.56 2.6 
Soybean 225.78 215.55 -4.5 
Rapeseed 251.09 253.68 1.0 
Sunseed 271.93 275.18 1.2 
Soymeal 172.22 173.75 0.9 
Rapemeal 135.78 134.70 -0.8 
Sunmeal 112.33 110.96 -1.2 
Manioc 42.22 42.83 1.5 
CGF 56.50 57.42 1.6 
0. Energy 87.57 88.93 1.6 
0. Protein 87.57 88.93 1.6 
SMP 1393.22 1436.06 3.1 
Butter 1812.27 1931.19 6.6 
Cheese 2057.40 2225.31 8.2 
Beef 1546.23 1589.20 2.8 
Pork 1256.96 1283.62 2.1 
Poultry 1202.88 1119.69 -6.9 
Eggs 793.45 767.72 -3.2 
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Table 0.11: Scenario Results: LIBERAL, European Union. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 166.881 199.285 222.276 238.23 
of which 
Wheat 88.258 104.863 118.244 127.659 
Coarse grains 78.623 94.422 104.032 110.569 
Oilseeds 13.026 15.874 17.184 18.046 
Sugar* 12.918 16.883 16.883 16.883 
Milk 96.215 99.555 104.403 107.299 
Butter 1.513 1.509 1.505 1.504 
Beef 5.689 6.010 6.390 6.641 
Pork 20.036 21.713 23.069 23.944 
Poultry 5.484 5.411 5.290 5.143 
Eggs 7.079 9.876 10.437 10.809 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 177.364 187.379 193.332 196.238 
of which 
Wheat 76.988 81.123 84.010 85.186 
Coarse grains 100.376 106.255 109.323 102.813 
Oilseeds 24.139 24.933 26.944 27.805 
Sugar 15.343 15.883 16.203 16.212 
Milk 96.215 99.555 104.403 107.299 
Butter 2.634 2.654 2.663 2.638 
Beef 14.423 14.360 14.587 14.572 
Pork 19.953 20.821 21.454 21.514 
Poultry 10.037 10.954 12.007 12.619 
Eggs 6.059 6.719 6.885 6.883 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals -10.483 11.907 28.944 41.991 
of which 
Wheat 11.271 23.739 34.235 42.474 
Coarse grains -21.753 -11.833 -5.291 7.756 
Oilseeds -11.113 -9.059 -9.759 -9.759 
Sugar -2.425 1.000 0.680 0.670 
Butter -1.120 -1.145 -1.157 -1.134 
Beef -8.734 -8.350 -8.196 -7.930 
Pork 0.082 0.892 1.615 2.431 
Poultry -4.553 -5.543 -6.717 -7.476 
Eggs 1.020 3.158 3.553 3.926 
* Includes C-quota sugar. 
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Table D.12: Scenario Results: LIBERAL, Poland. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 24.308 26.309 29.006 30.949 
of which 
Wheat 8.718 9.507 10.533 11.269 
Coarse grains 15.590 16.801 18.472 19.680 
Oilseeds 0.735 0.791 0.867 0.920 
Sugar* 1.862 1.790 2.051 2.243 
Milk 12.524 13.019 14.504 15.549 
Butter 0.183 0.182 0.181 0.180 
Beef 0.531 0.533 0.598 0.645 
Pork 2.330 2.558 2.781 2.934 
Poultry 0.396 0.424 0.458 0.477 
Eggs 0.272 0.269 0.299 0.323 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 31.423 33.318 36.567 38.897 
of which 
Wheat 10.062 10.620 11.788 12.711 
Coarse grains 21.361 22.698 24.780 26.186 
Oilseeds 0.916 0.917 0.918 0.918 
Sugar 1.844 1.916 2.123 2.302 
Milk 12.524 13.019 14.504 15.549 
Butter 0.148 0.151 0.169 0.185 
Beef 0.438 0.451 0.506 0.556 
Pork 1.810 1.882 2.238 2.581 
Poultry 0.525 0.566 0.731 0.899 
Eggs 0.534 0.569 0.636 0.698 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals -7.114 -7.009 -7.561 -7.948 
of which 
Wheat -1.344 -1.113 -1.254 -1.441 
Coarse grains -5.771 -5.896 -6.307 -6.506 
Oilseeds -0.180 -0.126 -0.051 0.002 
Sugar 0.D17 -0.126 -0.072 -0.060 
Butter 0.036 0.031 0.012 -0.004 
Beef 0.093 0.082 0.093 0.089 
Pork 0.521 0.676 0.543 0.353 
Poultry -0.129 -0.141 -0.273 -0.422 
Eggs -0.263 -0.299 -0.337 -0.375 
* Includes C-quota sugar. 
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Table D.13: Scenario Results: MEMBER. Czech Republic. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 6.603 7.272 8.252 8.951 
of which 
Wheat 3.651 4.012 4.566 4.948 
Coarse grains 2.952 3.260 3.686 4.003 
Oilseeds 0.564 0.678 0.780 0.848 
Sugar* 0.542 0.563 0.612 0.653 
Milk 2.983 2.985 3.063 3.207 
Butter 0.073 0.073 0.070 0.067 
Beef 0.166 0.159 0.166 0.174 
Pork 0.475 0.564 0.663 0.729 
Poultry 0.137 0.136 0.138 0.132 
Eggs 0.148 0.159 0.178 0.191 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 6.699 7.366 8.251 8.949 
of which 
Wheat 3.746 4.106 4.565 4.947 
Coarse grains 2.912 3.260 3.686 4.002 
Oilseeds 0.581 0.695 0.797 0.865 
Sugar 0.484 0.393 0.340 0.313 
Milk 2.983 2.935 3.063 3.207 
Butter 0.049 0.050 0.052 0.055 
Beef 0.164 0.159 0.166 0.174 
Pork 0.488 0.471 0.481 0.506 
Poultry 0.143 0.147 0.163 0.184 
Eggs 0.135 0.134 0.142 0.156 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals -0.095 -0.095 0.001 0.002 
of which 
Wheat -0.095 -0.095 0.001 0.002 
Coarse grains 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Oilseeds -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
Sugar 0.058 0.171 0.272 0.340 
Butter 0.024 0.023 0.018 0.011 
Beef 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pork -0.014 0.093 0.183 0.223 
Poultry -0.006 -0.012 -0.026 -0.052 
Eggs 0.014 0.025 0.036 0.035 
• Includes (-quota sugar. 
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Table D.14: Scenario Results: MEMBER, Hungary. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 11.244 12.456 13.923 15.408 
of which 
Wheat 4.389 4.882 5.486 6.099 
Coarse grains 6.855 7.574 8.438 9.309 
Oilseeds 0.883 1.055 1.423 1.693 
Sugar* 0.492 0.417 0.450 0.486 
Milk 1.998 1.931 2.000 2.105 
Butter 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 
Beef 0.074 0.070 0.072 0.075 
Pork 0.360 0.417 0.565 0.680 
Poultry 0.374 0.376 0.463 0.511 
Eggs 0.388 0.409 0.514 0.589 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 9.592 10.018 11.971 13.434 
of which 
Wheat 3.046 3.233 3.891 4.414 
Coarse grains 6.545 6.785 8.080 9.019 
Oilseeds 0.599 0.117 0.717 0.987 
Sugar 0.399 0.397 0.393 0.398 
Milk 1.998 1.931 2.000 2.105 
Butter 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021 
Beef 0.070 0.070 0.072 0.075 
Pork 0.287 0.285 0.279 0.295 
Poultry 0.250 0.261 0.276 0.304 
Eggs 0.271 0.272 0.262 0.275 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals 1.652 2.439 1.953 1.975 
of which 
Wheat 1.342 1.649 1.595 1.684 
Coarse grains 0.310 0.789 0.358 0.290 
Oilseeds 0.284 0.939 0.706 0.706 
Sugar 0.092 0.020 0.057 0.089 
Butter -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
Beef 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pork 0.073 0.132 0.286 0.385 
Poultry 0.124 0.115 0.187 0.207 
Eggs 0.117 0.137 0.252 0.314 
• Includes (-quota sugar. 
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Table D.15: Scenario Results: MEMBER, Poland. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 25.884 28.320 31.328 33.398 
of which 
Wheat 8.766 9.742 10.921 11.668 
Coarse grains 17.118 18.577 20.407 21.729 
Oilseeds 0.712 0.881 1.125 1.290 
Sugar* 2.117 1.891 2.039 2.233 
Milk 12.007 11.221 11.204 11.665 
Butter 0.162 0.161 0.157 0.157 
Beef 0.475 0.402 0.361 0.349 
Pork 2.012 2.331 2.823 3.233 
Poultry 0.468 0.463 0.588 0.767 
Eggs 0.427 0.475 0.585 0.685 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 27.085 28.759 33.054 36.984 
of which 
Wheat 9.389 10.029 11.706 13.282 
Coarse grains 17.695 18.730 21.348 23.702 
Oilseeds 0.905 0.906 0.906 0.907 
Sugar 1.653 1.694 1.841 1.977 
Milk 12.007 11.221 11.204 11.665 
Butter 0.158 0.161 0.163 0.179 
Beef 0.431 0.402 0.434 0.479 
Pork 1.866 1.773 1.915 2.096 
Poultry 0.490 0.494 0.589 0.700 
Eggs 0.431 0.414 0.429 0.454 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals -1.201 -0.439 -1.727 -3.586 
of which 
Wheat -0.623 -0.287 -0.785 -1.613 
Coarse grains -0.577 -0.153 -0.941 -1.972 
Oilseeds -0.193 -0.025 0.219 0.384 
Sugar 0.463 0.197 0.198 0.256 
Butter 0.004 0.000 -0.006 -0.022 
Beef 0.044 0.000 -0.073 -0.129 
Pork 0.146 0.557 0.908 1.137 
Poultry -0.022 -0.031 -0.002 0.067 
Eggs -0.004 0.061 0.156 0.232 
* Includes C-quota sugar. 
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Table D.16: Scenario Results: AGENDAPPP, Czech Republic. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 6.603 6.364 7.271 7.924 
of which 
Wheat 3.651 3.189 3.732 4.101 
Coarse grains 2.952 3.492 3.893 4.205 
Oilseeds 0.564 0.700 0.802 0.861 
Sugar* 0.542 0.671 0.671 0.672 
Milk 2.983 3.767 3.848 3.848 
Butter 0.073 0.088 0.084 0.084 
Beef 0.166 0.223 0.249 0.251 
Pork 0.475 0.348 0.349 0.370 
Poultry 0.137 0.262 0.303 0.309 
Eggs 0.148 0.129 0.142 0.153 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 6.699 7.559 8.057 8.531 
of which 
Wheat 3.746 4.384 4.518 4.708 
Coarse grains 2.912 2.490 2.680 2.776 
Oilseeds 0.581 0.717 0.819 0.878 
Sugar 0.484 0.475 0.374 0.315 
Milk 2.983 3.767 3.848 3.848 
Butter 0.049 0.048 0.049 0.052 
Beef 0.164 0.168 0.173 0.182 
Pork 0.488 0.638 0.689 0.752 
Poultry 0.143 0.111 0.118 0.130 
Eggs 0.135 0.148 0.156 0.172 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals -0.095 -1.195 -0.787 -0.608 
of which 
Wheat -0.095 -1.195 -0.787 -0.608 
Coarse grains 0.040 1.002 1.213 1.429 
Oilseeds -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
Sugar 0.058 0.196 0.298 0.357 
Butter 0.024 0.040 0.035 0.033 
Beef 0.002 0.055 0.076 0.069 
Pork -0.014 -0.290 -0.339 -0.382 
Poultry -0.006 0.151 0.185 0.179 
Eggs 0.014 -0.019 -0.014 -0.018 
• Includes C-quota sugar. 
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Table D.17: Scenario Results: AGENDAPPP, Hungary. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 11.244 12.253 14.470 16.223 
of which 
Wheat 4.389 5.137 6.207 7.047 
Coarse grains 6.855 7.828 9.090 10.093 
Oilseeds 0.883 0.729 0.888 1.018 
Sugar* 0.492 0.494 0.494 0.494 
Milk 1.998 2.260 2.317 2.317 
Butter 0.015 0.020 0.019 0.019 
Beef 0.074 0.094 0.107 0.109 
Pork 0.360 0.394 0.431 0.487 
Poultry 0.374 0.634 0.868 0.986 
Eggs 0.388 0.343 0.444 0.508 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 9.592 10.386 11.701 12.750 
of which 
Wheat 3.046 2.937 3.154 3.464 
Coarse grains 6.545 6.704 7.692 8.358 
Oilseeds 0.599 0.387 0.654 0.784 
Sugar 0.399 0.276 0.251 0.244 
Milk 1.998 2.260 2.317 2.317 
Butter 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Beef 0.070 0.058 0.058 0.059 
Pork 0.287 0.307 0.311 0.328 
Poultry 0.250 0.223 0.229 0.261 
Eggs 0.271 0.281 0.265 0.279 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals 1.652 1.867 2.769 3.472 
of which 
Wheat 1.342 2.200 3.053 3.583 
Coarse grains 0.310 1.124 1.398 1.735 
Oilseeds 0.284 0.342 0.234 0.234 
Sugar 0.092 0.218 0.243 0.250 
Butter -0.005 0.003 0.002 0.002 
Beef 0.005 0.036 0.049 0.050 
Pork 0.073 0.087 0.120 0.158 
Poultry 0.124 0.411 0.639 0.725 
Eggs 0.117 0.062 0.178 0.229 
• Includes C-quota sugar. 
241 
Wolfgang Münch - 978-3-631-75691-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 02:55:04AM
via free access
Table D.18: Scenario Results: AGENDAPPP, Poland. 
1995-97 2002 2008 2012 
Production, Mill. tons 
Cereals 25.884 28.001 31.753 33.936 
of which 
Wheat 8.766 7.664 9.166 10.066 
Coarse grains 17.118 22.371 24.846 26.256 
Oilseeds 0.712 0.617 0.752 0.838 
Sugar* 2.117 2.295 2.412 2.412 
Milk 12.007 14.508 14.747 14.766 
Butter 0.162 0.207 0.197 0.198 
Beef 0.475 0.651 0.598 0.544 
Pork 2.012 2.362 2.531 2.798 
Poultry 0.468 0.501 0.680 0.919 
Eggs 0.427 0.212 0.238 0.273 
Total Domestic Use, Mill. tons 
Cereals 27.085 29.871 31.950 34.395 
of which 
Wheat 9.389 10.418 11.214 12.344 
Coarse grains 17.695 17.508 18.663 19.846 
Oilseeds 0.905 0.910 0.910 0.911 
Sugar 1.653 1.445 1.479 1.558 
Milk 12.007 14.508 14.747 14.766 
Butter 0.158 0.121 0.132 0.141 
Beef 0.431 0.369 0.396 0.429 
Pork 1.866 1.671 1.878 2.127 
Poultry 0.490 0.434 0.495 0.579 
Eggs 0.431 0.513 0.525 0.559 
Net Exports, Mill. tons 
Cereals -1.201 -1.870 -0.197 -0.460 
of which 
Wheat -0.623 -2.754 -2.048 -2.278 
Coarse grains -0.577 4.863 6.183 6.410 
Oilseeds -0.193 -0.293 -0.158 -0.073 
Sugar 0.463 0.850 0.933 0.854 
Butter 0.004 0.086 0.065 0.057 
Beef 0.044 0.282 0.202 0.115 
Pork 0.146 0.691 0.653 0.670 
Poultry -0.022 0.066 0.185 0.340 
Eggs -0.004 -0.300 -0.287 -0.285 
* Includes C-quota sugar. 
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CeGE•Schrlften 
Oas CeGE - Center for Globalization and Europeanization of the Economy - wurde 1999 van der Wirt-
schaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultat der Georg-August-Universitat Gottingen gegrOndet. Oas Zentrum 
dient als Forum zur intemationalen und interdisziplinaren Zusammenarbeit bei der Analyse okonomi-
scher Fragestellungen van europaischer oder globaler Bedeutung. In den CeGE-Schriften warden For-
schungsergebnisse aus Oissertationen, Habilitationen und anderen Forschungsprojekten des Zen-
trums veroffentlicht. 
Band 1 Axel Gerloff: Wechselkurspolitik in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Eine theoretische Analyse unter 
besonderer BerOcksichtigung der Erfahrungen der zehn Kandidaten fOr eine EU-Osterwei-
terung. 2001. 
Band 2 Inga Konrad: Zur Integration ausgewahlter mittel- und osteuropaischer Under in die wah-
rungspolitische Ordnung Europas. 2002. 
Band 3 Axel Hennighausen: Wegekostenfinanzierung und Lenkung im deregulierten europaischen 
Verkehrsmarkt. 2002. 
Band 4 Wolfgang MOnch: Effects of EU Enlargement to the Central European Countries on Agricul-
tural Markets. 2002. 
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